Why the Government Elected in the 96 Presidential Election Will Disappoint Everyone?

In various presidential elections in Iran, despite election engineering (with supervisory oversight, fraud, misuse of state and public resources, annulment of ballots or votes from a city, the flow of "dirty money" or money laundering, and the presence of military personnel with widespread arrests before the election period), ultimately, a group of citizens welcomed the outcome and saw the possibility of realizing some promises. Candidates always present a plethora of promises, but their audiences know that they cannot fulfill all of them and must settle for one or two. However, such an event will not occur in the 96 elections, and even supporters of the winning candidate will be disappointed. Why? The deadlock of political, cultural, and social demands. Given the experience of several past presidential elections and the performance of presidents (from Rafsanjani to Rouhani), the way is blocked for the realization of any political, social, and cultural promises. Reformists have experienced various types of authoritarian pragmatists, leftist reformists, and security moderates, and have seen that all of them have failed to bring about even the smallest changes in these areas. The military and religious bureaucracy fundamentally blocks any political, social, and cultural change. For this reason, Rouhani's government and its reformist allies came to the scene with promises of change in foreign policy and improvement of economic conditions. Look at the status of canceled cultural programs, censorship, filtering, and interference in the cultural sphere, executions, and public intimidation in social policies, and abuse of power and repression in politics. It can be seen continuously that from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (elections 76 to 96), things have turned on the same axis. The repeated (implicit and explicit) remarks of Khamenei's close associates after the second of Khordad 76 were that "nothing has changed." Iranian society has undergone many changes, but the government remains steadfast in its positions and diligently pursues and implements the policies desired by Khamenei and the clerics of Qom. The political, cultural, and social problems and demands of Iranians are not even reflected in elections (we do not see any trace of them in the discussions of candidates and political groups regarding the 96 elections), but they manifest themselves in social processes. To find these trends, one must look at social harms. The most significant social harms in today's Iran include the disintegration of family ties, the loss of employment infrastructure, the increase in crimes, and the decline of social capital. Of course, before every election, political groups have made promises to gather votes that they knew would not be fulfilled: from women's cycling to the freedom of using satellite television networks, and from the cancellation of supervisory oversight to the release of the leaders of the Green Movement. The last promise of this kind was from Baqai's team, stating, "I hope that in the twelfth government led by Hamid Baqai, the ground will be prepared for the return and activity of artists who have their hearts set on Iran and Iranians." (Abdolreza Davari, advisor to the Minister of Interior in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government, tweeted on March 19, 2017). Neither reformists can change existing policies in cultural, social, and political areas, nor can authoritarianists push the people further into the abyss of fundamentalism and Islamism. The ongoing war between citizens and the government continues, but without a change in policy. Economic problems and demands remain. What remains are economic issues such as recession, inflation, unemployment, poverty, and marginalization. Unemployment has hit university graduates the hardest. Of the approximately 11 million people currently unemployed, about 4 million are university graduates. Unemployment has not only not decreased during Rouhani's government but has increased. Each year, about 1.2 million people are added to the job seekers in the country (First Vice President, Tasnim, April 1, 2017). If we accept Rouhani's ambitious and overly optimistic claim of creating 450,000 jobs per year (Tabnak, June 26, 2016), during his term, 750,000 people have been added to the unemployed each year. The official government figure is 12.4%, which has increased by about 2% since the beginning of the term. Production facilities in Iran have lost their capacity to create jobs: "Currently, 94% of production units in Iran are in the worst possible condition... More than 70% of small and medium-sized production units are either closed or operating at 30% capacity." (Yahya Al-Ishaq, Quds Online, April 1, 2017). The debts of non-governmental banks and institutions to the central bank have risen from 12,470 billion tomans in the last year to 34,130 billion tomans in the current year (Fars, March 11, 2017). The financial constraints of banks, increasing arrears, declining profits from granted loans, inability to sell surplus assets, and interest rates above 20% are factors contributing to this debt growth. Liquidity has increased to 1.2 trillion tomans, which fuels both inflation and further recession. From September 2015 to September 2016, the prices of foodstuffs increased by 17% to 73% (Central Bank report, Mashregh, September 22, 2016). There are about 20 million marginalized people in Iran, whom the Minister of Housing and Urban Development of Rouhani's government calls "very severely poorly housed." Marginalized areas are fertile ground for various social harms. These are topics that still have the potential for public discussion without incurring high costs because in political competition within the ruling caste, these matters are used as handles for evaluating and criticizing the performance of the opposing side and gathering votes. Both supporters and opponents of Rouhani have recognized the priority of economic issues in the upcoming elections. Khamenei insisted that candidates and election discussions focus on economic issues: "I have several recommendations for the respected candidates; first, they should firmly state in their programs and statements that economic issues and the livelihood of the people are their priority and that they will strive to solve economic problems." (Mehr, May 9, 2017). Ziba Kalam, a supporter of Rouhani's government, says: "Rouhani's Achilles' heel is the economy. The economic situation is not as it should be. How much of this situation is due to Rouhani's management is debatable; however, the unfavorable economic situation and its continuation make the likelihood of a populist movement rising from the right against Rouhani serious." (Shargh, March 14, 2016). Zarghami, a rival candidate and then an active member of the rival campaign against Rouhani before registration and disqualifications, said: "Without a doubt, the economic demands of the people are the most determining axis in this election. The hopes created in society for improving the economic situation have not turned into tangible and acceptable results, and the problems of employment, recession, and inflation in essential and public goods are becoming increasingly acute." (Sobhe No, March 7, 2017). Mohsen Rezai wrote in a letter to Rouhani: "Your efforts and plans in negotiations with Obama to lift sanctions have not been able to solve economic problems... You should have presented an economic rescue plan, including rescuing banks, rescuing economic enterprises, and rescuing the state economy... If, during the historic opportunity of the past few years, the government had focused its main efforts on turning economic threats into a historic opportunity by mobilizing internal human and financial resources, and had placed foreign policy in the hands of production, employment, and national currency, our society would have achieved an unprecedented flourishing." (ISNA, March 7, 2017). Ahmadinejad's letters (implicitly supporting Baqai's candidacy) addressed the Rouhani government regarding the empty treasury and warehouses and the debts of the public sector also prioritized economic issues. Why will they be disappointed? The candidates' reactions to economic problems are astonishing promises considering the social and economic conditions of Iran: from creating 5 to 6 million jobs per year (Ghalibaf and Raisi) to tripling the subsidies for the three income deciles (Raisi), from increasing national income by 2.5 times to providing 250,000 tomans monthly to job seekers and unemployed individuals over 18 (Ghalibaf), and from cleaning the country of corruption to preventing brain drain (Mir Saleem). However, in the economic sphere, as in other areas, no transformation will occur (regardless of which group comes to power) because: 1. As long as the Islamic Republic is a tension-causing and tension-absorbing regime, large foreign companies will hesitate to invest in Iran. The most significant result of the Trump administration's warning to the Islamic Republic was a warning to investors to stay away from the Iranian market. It is impossible to fire at American warships in the open waters of the Persian Gulf or to circumvent them while expecting Western companies to invest; without foreign investment, creating one million jobs in Iran is impossible; 2. A significant portion of internal resources is wasted (due to incompetence and the bloated government), corruption, and abuse of power (due to the privileges of the ruling class and the lack of free media), and the ambitions of the Islamic Republic (expanding Shia influence and military presence) in the region, resulting in nearly zero public and governmental development budgets; due to waste and corruption (and not investment in infrastructure), government debt has reached about 750 trillion tomans according to the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, which is more than 55% of the country's gross domestic product; 3. The domestic private sector plays a minimal role in development and increasing employment due to insecurity (the possibility of confiscation and claims from security and military institutions) and brain drain and low entrepreneurial capacity. Social harms will decrease with employment, not by distributing money. The sector that is called the private sector in Iran is primarily a byproduct of the public sector and only creates fake jobs for insiders (like hiring several thousand mourners in Tehran's metro with salaries of 9 to 11 million tomans without doing any work). The "private" sector (state-owned enterprises given to insiders) is also more focused on selling facilities and capital flight than on stimulating the business market. During Ahmadinejad's term alone, more than 600 billion dollars left the country. (Mohammad Reza Khabaz, House of the Nation News Agency, July 18, 2013); and finally, 4. The monopoly of existing resources in the hands of three financial, commercial, and industrial empires of the IRGC, the Office of the Leader, and state companies prevents competition in a free market of capital and business. These three empires compete in imports rather than production. An average of 50 billion dollars worth of goods is imported into the country annually. The average import of goods from China during Ahmadinejad's government was 5 billion dollars, and in the first three years of Rouhani's government, an average of 10 billion dollars worth of goods was imported from China. One of the issues that Hassan Rouhani and his allies have constantly referred to since the election campaigns is the increase in imports from China during the eight years of the ninth and tenth governments. They believed that this trend of Ahmadinejad's government had severely harmed domestic producers and greatly narrowed their space. Due to the existence of these empires, productivity rates in Iran are very low. In such an environment, there is no possibility for efficient management, oversight, and increased productivity and business flow.