Why the Self-Immolation of Street Vendors Does Not Bite Iranian Society?

Within a month, two Iranian citizens first self-immolated in Khorramshahr and then in Tabriz in public view. Both self-immolations occurred after the municipal authorities confiscated the vendors' goods and the futility of pursuing their cases. After the confiscation of his goods by the municipal authorities, Hamid Farrokhi Dizaj, a 43-year-old father of three who had a street vendor permit, repeatedly visited the municipality of Tabriz's district 8 to protest, but received no response. Finally, on April 25, he self-immolated in front of the relevant official's office/building (according to two different accounts in the media). On March 13, 2015, Younes Asakereh, a 34-year-old father of two, self-immolated in protest against the third confiscation of his fruit-selling goods by the Khorramshahr municipality, and he lost his life in the hospital. In late 2013, a young man in Tehran also committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train after his goods were confiscated at Golbarg metro station. These are just recent examples of such incidents. The series of causes for these tragic self-immolations and suicides in Iran is clear: widespread and increasing unemployment and poverty, lack of social safety nets for the unemployed and poor in Iran, violation of the human dignity of a breadwinner by depriving them of the minimum work they can do, lack of institutions to assist individuals in the field of mental health, desperation and a sense of deadlock, and ultimately an attempt to bite the collective conscience. Before setting himself on fire in front of the municipality building, Farrokhi had told the employees of this institution that he would take such action, but they ignored him. If Farrokhi had been referred to a social worker or placed under care, he might still be alive today. The self-immolation of a street vendor in Tunisia sparked a social movement in that country, which ultimately led to the ousting of the president. Why do these self-immolations not bite the collective conscience of Iranian society in various ways (not necessarily political protest)? I will explain this issue by referring to four topics: social solidarity, habituation to death and violence and changing thresholds of conscience, cost-benefit calculations and social numbness, and social empathy. Social solidarity has weakened significantly in Iran today. The connections among community members are fading or not forming at all. A significant increase in crime and offenses is a strong indicator of this issue. According to the Minister of Justice in Rouhani's government, 'the rate of crimes exceeds the population.' He has stated that crime cases in the country are on the rise. Among these, violent crimes have a significant share: 'Homicides with cold weapons have increased by 40 to 45 percent over a decade, and homicides with firearms have increased by about 27 percent... Family murders have also increased... In this regard, we faced 400 cases (28 percent) in 2001 and 677 cases (29 percent) in 2010.' (Ahmadi Moghadam, Commander of the Law Enforcement Force, in a report to the Parliament, Raja News, August 4, 2011) The ideologized Sharia is a factor of solidarity for the small loyalist class of the government and also serves their interests. The classes close to the government, which have maintained connections, are not sensitive to self-immolation or economic corruption and abuse of power, and such news is not reflected in their media to avoid negative portrayals. Their sensitivity is towards the exposure of a few strands of hair, wearing boots, waxing, or women's makeup in the streets (a new demand from the hardliners in Qazvin in a letter to the governor of Qazvin: 'Prohibit waxing in women's beauty salons,' Saham News, April 24, 2015). People in large cities in Iran, when they leave their homes in winter mornings, encounter the frozen bodies of homeless people who died from the cold overnight. In both large and small cities in Iran, executions by hanging are constantly held. The media of the Islamic Republic is very sensitive about not showing kisses and expressions of love but is generous in showing violence, murder, and bloodshed. The literature of Shia religious ceremonies is filled with bloodshed, beheading, and slaughter, and these are constantly repeated. In this way, Iranian citizens quickly become accustomed to death, murder, and violence, and this is part of their socialization process. Therefore, the self-immolation of an individual cannot be very shocking for most of them. The majority of the Iranian people have found themselves such losers in the events of the revolution and war that gradually they began to calculate the costs and benefits of at least some of their actions. This is particularly serious where the government is involved, as the government has shown that it does not recognize any limits in raising the costs of social action (such as applying violence and torture). Therefore, if Iranian citizens give even a slight probability that plainclothes forces and Basijis will get involved (given their actions such as running over people with cars or throwing them off bridges or various types of torture after arrest), they practically hesitate. Despite the daily repression of hundreds of thousands of young people in the streets, there is little sound from them, and this is the result of the psychological impact of daily repression. The experience of the revolution and war has shown Iranian citizens that social and political movements, despite some potential achievements, can have very severe consequences. For this reason, society reacts very slowly to surrounding events. The lesson that society has learned from bloody past events is not to react quickly and to let some time pass after events. Over time, of course, emotions subside, and protests also fade into the background. In the 1990s, Iranian society gradually transitioned from a belief in death to a belief in life. However, just as the belief in death in the 1980s was a kind of collective belief, the belief in life did not transition into a collective belief but remained within the individual and took on the color and smell of self-centeredness and later money-centeredness. The active Iranian, who had tasted the bitter experience of altruism in the 1980s, no longer wanted to sacrifice himself for others. Iranians gradually realized that sacrificing oneself for others is one of the tools of social mobilization of absolute governments. The very low level of social empathy is evidenced by the very small amount of charity compared to other societies. The figure of 180 billion tomans (equivalent to about 70 million dollars) in 2011 (paid to the charity funds of the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, ISNA, April 25, 2012) for a country with about 100 billion dollars in oil exports (before sanctions) and over 500 trillion tomans in gross national income is very insignificant. There is no data on the donations and charities collected and spent in civil institutions, but given the weakness of these institutions in Iran, it should not be significant. The super-rich Iranians have almost no participation in this area compared to other societies. Apart from the story of self-immolations, the overall rate of suicide attempts and suicides leading to death has increased in Iran. The number of suicides reported to the forensic medicine organization increased by 17 percent from 2009 to 2010 (from 3122 to 3649) (Salamat News, August 16, 2012). In the first three months of 2011, the reported suicide statistics to this organization increased by ten percent compared to the first three months of 2010 (Melat, August 16, 2012). Suicide among the very class that has been a symbol of resistance, namely university students, has also been notable. According to some estimates, 60,000 Iranians attempt suicide annually. (Head of the Psychiatry Institute of Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran Emruz, October 12, 2012). In the 1980s, Iran was among the countries with low suicide rates, but now it is in the group of countries with average suicide rates. The rate of suicide attempts increased from about three per hundred thousand people in 1984 to six per hundred thousand in 2004 and then to six and a half per hundred thousand in 2007. Additionally, in some cities, the suicide rate has long surpassed the warning threshold and reached the level of communities with high suicide rates. The highest increase in the number of suicides has been reported in the 25 to 34 age group.