Why the Vienna Nuclear Negotiations Are Likely to Yield Positive Results?

The anticipated agreement to extend the Vienna nuclear negotiations for seven days is another sign of the parties' firm intention to conclude the political efforts of the past 20 months, despite ongoing serious disagreements on several remaining issues; other symbols can be seen in the signing of two temporary agreements over the past 18 months. The main reason for the seven-day deadline for extending negotiations is the April 14 resolution of the U.S. Senate, which stipulates that if the U.S. government submits the main text of the agreements made with Iran and all its appendices to lawmakers before July 10, Congress will evaluate it within a 30-day period for acceptance or rejection of the sanctions relief. However, if the agreement documents are submitted by the President to U.S. lawmakers between July 10 and September 7, the congressional review period will extend to 60 days, during which the President and the U.S. government will not be allowed to lift any of the current sanctions against Iran. During the two months remaining for congressional evaluation, the status of sanctions against Iran will revert to the conditions prior to the November 24 Geneva agreement. Regarding the extension of the Vienna negotiations, which effectively ends two days before the congressional deadline for receiving the agreement text from the President, it has been announced that the 'arrangements' of the November 24 Geneva agreement (the easing of sanctions and payment for oil to Iran) will only continue for seven days. Under the November 24 Geneva agreement and its renewal in Lausanne, Iran has reduced its enriched uranium stockpile and severely limited its nuclear activities. In return, approximately $500 million of Iran's blocked foreign reserves has been made available to the Tehran government monthly. At the end of the seven-day deadline, Iran's commitments to the P5+1 group (the subject of the Geneva temporary agreement and its renewed model in Lausanne) will effectively end, and conversely, the Islamic Republic of Iran's access to blocked currencies will also be cut off. The costs of failure for Iran In the event of a declared failure of the negotiations, the cessation of receiving currency from Iran's blocked resources and the failure to receive the monthly $500 million will not be the only problem for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The immediate proposal to intensify sanctions against Iran in the U.S. Congress and targeting a complete halt of oil exports and stopping the implementation of plans to increase Iran's gas production, as well as intensifying banking restrictions to halt Iran's foreign trade, could put the Islamic Republic in a precarious situation. Over the past year, Hassan Rouhani, as a supporter of the negotiations, has promised the Iranian people that if a nuclear agreement is reached and sanctions are lifted, their living conditions will improve. In contrast, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, while defending the right to continue nuclear activities and presenting it as a 'national right,' has expressed opposition to inspections by the agency in Iran and has drawn multiple red lines for negotiators, effectively positioning himself as an obstacle to the negotiations' success. In the event of a failure of the nuclear negotiations, the latent internal dissatisfaction, which can be seen in the public support for the negotiations, will turn against the leader of the Islamic Republic. If the negotiations are declared a failure, the Islamic Republic's governance will find itself in a transitional and ambiguous situation, and the responsibility for this change in public opinion will fall on Ayatollah Khamenei. The costs of failure for the U.S. government The U.S. government has so far convinced opponents of negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran that the danger of Iran becoming a nuclear military power can be prevented without resorting to military force. In pursuit of this assumption, the Obama administration has engaged in 20 months of discussions at the highest political levels and thousands of hours of technical exchanges with representatives from Tehran and the member states of the so-called P5+1. If the negotiations and diplomatic efforts regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran are declared a failure, the U.S. government will once again be accused of weakness in strategic political judgments. With presidential and House of Representatives elections not far off, a failure in political negotiations with Tehran could seriously threaten the Democratic Party's chances of retaining the White House. Another option for Obama, after declaring the negotiations a failure, would be to turn to a retaliatory military option against Iran, which would further escalate the current regional tensions. The potential benefits of adjusting mutual demands and achieving results in negotiations, following 20 months of efforts, are undoubtedly not less significant than the risks arising from the failure of the talks. In this regard, pragmatic reasoning will support the option that negotiations, at the end of the extended deadline, are inevitably bound to reach tangible and positive results.