Why Trump's Victory Cannot Be Compared to Ahmadinejad's Victory?

Can Trump's victory in the United States presidential election be compared to Ahmadinejad's success in the 2005 and 2009 Iranian presidential elections? Did these events follow a similar theme and process, and can we rely on the well-known concept of 'populism' to draw parallels and analyze the two elections? Iran and the United States: two entirely different elections. Comparing the quality of elections in Iran and the United States is fundamentally flawed. The manner in which elections are held in Iran significantly deviates from the standards and requirements of 'free, fair, and just elections.' Ignoring this reality leads to errors in evaluation and analysis. The political elite's opinion regarding election candidates cannot be disregarded by the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council filters candidates through its 'supervisory oversight' from a political-security and ideological perspective, creating a two-stage election process. Political parties, civil society organizations, and institutions in Iran do not enjoy complete freedom and security to operate within the electoral framework. The press in the Islamic Republic operates under pressure and threat, lacking the ability to function freely and safely. Numerous political and ideological groups (from the opposition to Sunni Muslims) are not allowed to introduce candidates or participate in the electoral competition. There is no independent and fair judiciary to appeal potential electoral violations in Iran. There is no possibility for impartial oversight and review by civil and non-governmental organizations over the electoral process. All of this occurs while the organization and conduct of elections in the United States closely align with the standards and requirements for achieving 'free, fair, and just elections.' Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2005 elections did not occur through a normal process. In addition to all the violations and obstacles mentioned earlier, Ahmadinejad rose to the top of the executive branch with the support and misuse of security-military institutions. In the first round of the 2005 elections, according to official data, Hashemi Rafsanjani received about 6.2 million votes; Ahmadinejad received about 5.7 million votes; and Mehdi Karroubi received about 5.1 million votes. Even if we disregard violations in vote counting, the security forces' intervention in favor of Ahmadinejad and their exploitation of organizational relationships and networks of paramilitary and military forces, as well as the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, became evident. The vote gap between Ahmadinejad and Karroubi— even if we assume accurate and fair vote counting—could not have occurred without illegal security interference and their effective involvement. In a historic and important open letter to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Karroubi referred to the fraud and violations that occurred in the elections, stating: 'I request that you guide a part of the IRGC and Basij, which have entered political matters, to refrain from this action. If some friends in the IRGC and Basij are to gain access to power, the best course of action is to directly assign these responsibilities to them rather than using the IRGC's credibility to bring some individuals to power and committing illegal acts in the process.' Karroubi also protested the intervention of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son, in favor of Ahmadinejad, saying: 'Reports have emerged regarding your esteemed son's support for one of the candidates, which made me concerned that this matter might be related to your views... I later heard that one of the elders told you that 'your son is supporting this person' and you replied, 'He is a gentleman, not a son of a leader,' and it became clear that those supports were personal opinions of Mr. Mojtaba. Meanwhile, there are still reports about his activities in favor of one of the candidates—who suddenly saw his fortune decline three days before the election and the favors shifted to another individual—and even visits to that candidate's campaign headquarters were reported.' Ahmadinejad entered the second round of elections with such unofficial and significant interventions. At this stage, his calls for change, economic promises, and sharp criticisms of Hashemi Rafsanjani led to Ahmadinejad's victory being realized in the context of populism and dissatisfaction with Hashemi Rafsanjani—and even the ruling clerics. Ahmadinejad's victory in the 2009 elections, regardless of the issues listed in the first section regarding the distance of the Islamic Republic's elections from the standards and requirements of 'free, fair, and just elections,' turned into a strange coup. The central power in the Islamic Republic, without any concern, manipulated the actual election results and, with significant and effective intervention in the electoral process, declared Ahmadinejad as the elected president. While the official results claimed Ahmadinejad received over 24 million votes, they estimated Mir-Hossein Mousavi's (the main rival) votes at around 13 million, and claimed Karroubi's votes were even less than invalid votes. The attacks on Mousavi's and Karroubi's campaign headquarters and the widespread arrests of key activists and effective political actors from these headquarters unveiled the electoral coup from the very night of the election. The list of evidence indicating significant fraud and electoral coup in 2009 is extensive, with various documents compiled over the years; one significant and well-known piece of evidence is the official statement of the commander of the IRGC. General Jafari stated in an important speech that the return of the reformists to power was a 'red line' for the regime in the 2009 elections. Jafari also admitted that the 'trend' of the 2009 elections was such that Ahmadinejad's outcome was not the result, and at least, the election should have gone to a second round. Another important witness is the remarks of General Moshfeq, deputy commander of the IRGC's Quds Force. These statements were described by Mir-Hossein Mousavi as 'evidence of fraud and electoral coup.' This senior IRGC commander explicitly mentioned the organized role of the IRGC in Ahmadinejad's victory. These significant statements led to complaints from seven reformist political activists (Mohsen Aminzadeh, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Abdollah Ramazanzadeh, Feyzollah Arab-Sorkhi, Mohsen Safaei Farahani, Mohsen Mir-Damadi, and Behzad Nabavi). Although this complaint resulted in nothing but increased judicial and security pressure on the complainants. The effective and illegal intervention of the core power in the elections led to strange events that not only affected the two protesting candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) but also led Seyyed Mohammad Khatami to call it a 'coup.' Millions of Iranian citizens, who felt that their extensive participation had been violated and betrayed, took to the streets to protest the fraud and significant theft in the elections, expressing their civil discontent for months. This protest was met with bloody repression, batons, bullets, arrests, solitary confinement, and torture. Mousavi, who, like Karroubi and Rahnavard, is under house arrest and has endured over 2,094 days of detention without trial, emphasized before his house arrest in February 2011: 'After the elections, it took two months for me to believe that the so-called debates were not meant to eliminate me or Mr. Karroubi but to settle accounts completely with all rival forces and to unify the country. I was just one of these goals and obstacles. The ruling faction had been planning and attempting for 20 years to unify the country, and it seemed that this election was supposed to be the last act of this effort. The authoritarian forces sought to eliminate all national space from critics and dissenters; a space similar to North Korea with a little gloss of democracy.' Trump's victory in the 2016 U.S. elections, regardless of the reasons behind it and influenced by various factors, was not the result of fraud and significant theft in the election results or the exploitation of the main power institutions. Those who closely followed the U.S. elections attest to how, during the vote counting in some states (including Florida, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan), the percentage of votes for Trump and Clinton was sometimes even within tenths of a percent, with the vote difference limited to a few hundred. This occurred independently of the freedom of the press and media in the United States and the ability to express the sharpest criticisms by rivals, parties, civil institutions, experts, media, and ordinary citizens. Even if we accept that Trump's populist rhetoric and radical statements, along with unsubstantiated promises, deceived millions of Americans and led to the Republican candidate's success based on populism and dissatisfaction with the status quo and the middle class's economic situation, this does not establish a specific relationship with the two Iranian presidential elections of 2005 and 2009 and the declaration of Ahmadinejad as president. Unless Ahmadinejad's campaign promises, vague statements, and unachievable populist slogans are emphasized, and the blatant violations of the standards and requirements for achieving 'free, fair, and just elections' in the Islamic Republic are ignored. In this context, serious concerns about Trump's victory and presidency include: Trump's 'program' for the first 100 days of presidency, Trump's victory and the future of the free trade agreement between the U.S. and the European Union, reactions from leaders, political figures, and people around the world to Trump's victory, a wave of dissatisfaction pushing 'elitism, multiculturalism, and globalization' back, changes in the battlefield of 'proxy wars'; the war against the people in the streets of Iran, the responsibility of opponents and the possibility of radicalizing Iranian society, the death of the last Mossad representative in Tehran amid the Iran crisis, Trump: I hope there is no need for further action regarding Iran; people were killed without hesitation, the shadow of war over Tehran; 'Trump seeks decisive military options against Iran,' the death of the last Mossad representative in Tehran amid the Iran crisis, Trump emphasizes 'stopping executions in Iran': we do not know what will happen in the future, Trump says if the Islamic Republic attempts to assassinate him, 'it will be wiped off the face of the earth.'