Why Was Qassem Soleimani Absent from the Meeting Between Rouhani and Sistani?

David Petraeus, the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, stated on Friday, March 15, in a documentary released by the BBC, that in 2007, Qassem Soleimani had messaged him that he was in control of Iran's policies in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Gaza, and that "you must agree with me and forget about Iranian diplomats and others." This narrative is not new but serves as a reaffirmation that in many regional issues, especially in Iraq, Qassem Soleimani is the leading figure in Iran's diplomacy. The Iranian ambassador to Iraq is chosen with his input, and the current Iranian ambassador in Iraq was a senior advisor to the commander of the Quds Force before starting his role in 2016. Soleimani has repeatedly participated in military operations in Iraq, and the commander of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the largest active militia group in Iraq, considers himself a soldier of Soleimani. He not only played a primary role in coordinating the Iraqi militia forces to counter Iraq but also was a key figure in opposing the Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq. The Iraqi parliament has also been significantly influenced by military and political figures associated with him, and Soleimani was the manager of the project to politicize the Shia militia forces. Despite this, on Wednesday morning, March 13, 2019, in Najaf, during the meeting between Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, and Ayatollah Ali Sistani, a prominent Shia cleric, Qassem Soleimani was absent. Concurrently with Rouhani's trip to Iraq, the Iranian government's information base had released a video a day before the meeting with Sistani, implicitly requesting Iraqi officials that "there is no need to discuss tactical reconciliation with other institutions or military figures, and they can do this with Rouhani as the head of the Iranian government." With the release of this video, it can be speculated that Iranian officials opposed Soleimani's presence at this meeting to prevent his presence from overshadowing the publicity of Rouhani's meeting with Sistani and to emphasize the necessity of government control over regional diplomacy. This issue can be further highlighted in the context of the meeting between Bashar al-Assad and Rouhani, which took place with Soleimani's presence and Zarif's absence, causing significant controversy. Soleimani's absence allowed Zarif, who sat next to Rouhani in the meeting with Sistani, to take a more prominent role. However, if we look at this matter from the perspective of Ayatollah Sistani, what conclusion can we draw? This issue is significant because over the past decade, it has been reported that Sistani is very strict in arranging meetings and allowing visits by domestic and foreign officials. Concurrent with Rouhani's trip, media reported that Sistani had previously rejected a request for a meeting from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his visit to Iraq. These reports are not limited to Iranian or American officials. In 2014, when Haider al-Abadi, the then Prime Minister of Iraq, met with Sistani, Iraqi media reported that this was the first meeting of this cleric with high-ranking Iraqi government officials in four years. The relationship between Ayatollah Sistani and Qassem Soleimani is indirect and multifaceted. The commander of the Quds Force has repeatedly praised Sistani in his speeches. In June 2016, he stated, "We act when the ruling cleric of Iraq has a political and international need" and that "the blessed presence of Ayatollah Sistani has made us need no intervention." In July 2017, quoting Khamenei, he referred to Sistani as a "great treasure, savior, and refuge" for the people of Iraq, describing him as a "noble and distinguished man," a "wise strategist," and a "situational analyst." In December of the same year, he also praised Sistani's role in "mobilizing all resources" to fight against ISIS. Qassem Soleimani can also be considered the most significant beneficiary of the fatwa issued by Ayatollah Sistani in June 2014. At that time, this cleric called on the Shia people of Iraq to volunteer for armed defense against ISIS, and this fatwa played a crucial role in the formation and expansion of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which were largely quickly placed under the supervision of Qassem Soleimani and his affiliated commanders. The leadership circle of these militia forces has known each other for over 25 years, dating back to the formation of the Badr Corps during the Iran-Iraq War, and some of them were eager to point out the importance and impact of Khamenei's fatwa for entering the field and defending Iraq against ISIS, but it was clear that the majority had taken up arms at Sistani's request. Nevertheless, on December 15, 2017, when Sistani's statement regarding the integration of Shia militias into the Iraqi state forces was published, and some Iraqi leaders of these groups spoke of complying with such an order, media affiliated with the IRGC, which dreamed of forming an entity like the "Revolutionary Guards" or "Basij Organization" in Iraq, did not respond favorably to it. The Tasnim website wrote two days after Sistani's fatwa that the "words of the cleric" were directed at groups outside the law, but "the Popular Mobilization Forces" is a "legal entity" and "the conditions in Iraq necessitate the presence of this official military entity." The significance of Sistani's emphasis on integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into the Iraqi army is meaningful in that over the past year, there have been major concerns that integration could be a prelude to dissolution, raised by Iran and Iran-affiliated forces. In other words, it can be said that Sistani's statement, while not fulfilling the demands of those in favor of dissolving the Popular Mobilization Forces, also disrupted Iran's planning. Alongside these disagreements, an important point is that throughout all the years of Soleimani's presence and intervention in Iraq, there has been no news of Sistani's direct support for the commander of the Quds Force or any meetings between the two figures. In November 2014, media close to the IRGC reported, citing a not very credible Iraqi site, that Sistani had "supported" Soleimani's "participation" in the war against ISIS and deemed his presence "legitimate" and "in accordance with jihadist duty," but this news was not confirmed by Sistani's office. In January 2016, a picture of Soleimani's accidental meeting with Jawad al-Shahrastani, Sistani's son-in-law and representative in Iran, was published, but no pictures of a meeting between Soleimani and Sistani have been released. In contrast, in September 2015, the Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper reported that Sistani had rejected a meeting with Qassem Soleimani and asked Khamenei to prevent Soleimani's increasing influence in Iraq. Claims of Sistani's complaints about Soleimani were also published at that time in The Economist. Fars News Agency, on September 8, 2015, responded to these reports by stating that "a new psychological war by the West and Arabs against General Soleimani" had emerged. Initially, Fars News Agency referred to the same November 2014 report to prove the good relationship between Soleimani and Sistani, which stated that Sistani deemed Soleimani's presence legitimate, but shortly after, this part was removed from its report, and it stated that the reports from Western and Arab media were "anti-resistance propaganda." Given this history, it may be more accurate to say that Soleimani's absence from the meeting between Rouhani and Sistani is more a continuation of Sistani's approach to avoid meeting with Qassem Soleimani than a message from the Iranian diplomatic apparatus or a compensation for the Bashar al-Assad incident. It can be said that considering Sistani's increasing desire to play a mediating role in Iraq's developments and the "tension-causing" presence of Soleimani in Iraq's political space, this cleric has refrained from such a meeting or making any comments about Qassem Soleimani to avoid being positioned on one side of the tension. This approach not only takes away a propaganda advantage from Soleimani's supporters but also strengthens speculations regarding Sistani's dissatisfaction with Soleimani's increasing influence in Iraq.