Why Was the 'Espionage Accusation' Denied?

A report published on a website and Telegram channel (Amadnews) regarding the alleged espionage by the daughter of the head of the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran faced widespread reactions from senior judicial and security officials in Iran. The Minister of Intelligence, the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and the head of the Judiciary were the three senior officials who responded to the accusation. Although Sadeq Larijani emphasized that 'rumors are not worth responding to,' he criticized the publishers of the report in strong language. Regardless of the judgment about the accusation against the Larijani family, the noteworthy issue under consideration here is the necessity for senior government officials to 'respond' to public opinion. In the era of communication, the walls of oppression have long been broken down by information and communication technology. The central power's efforts in the Islamic Republic to impose maximum censorship and distort the truth, through new media and digital technology, have become somewhat futile. The speed, scope, and volume of information dissemination based on updated technology have increasingly rendered hardware confrontation and repressive measures ineffective. Until recently, it was possible to influence opposing information waves through jamming against satellite networks outside Iran; however, due to the rapid growth of the digital realm and emerging productions in online social networks, data has been replicated and disseminated faster and more easily. The internet and its related platforms have become an undeniable force supporting and strengthening democracy and human rights and their activists. In this context, a report against the family of the head of the Judiciary is published. Regardless of the judgment about the truth or falsehood of the accusations, the quantity of the accusation's re-publication is such that senior security and judicial officials of the Islamic Republic are compelled to 'explain' and 'respond.' It should not be forgotten that until a few years ago, these officials did not see the need to 'respond' and 'explain' to society, relying on imposed censorship and self-censorship on domestic media through intimidation and threats, as well as resorting to lies and distortion of the truth by state media and affiliated news agencies. In the era of communication and digital technology, the tools for producing messages and disseminating data are no longer exclusive; it is not only governments that spread judgment, messages, and news. Every citizen now has the opportunity to engage and participate in the existing framework. The re-publication of the mentioned report and its increasing replication—especially on Telegram, which has several million Iranian users—created an unavoidable wave; a situation that ultimately led the Islamic Republic's intelligence, security, and judicial experts to the conclusion that the highest relevant officials must respond and explain the accusations made. This necessity for accountability, in an era when the head of the government is not accountable to any institution or media, is not a small matter. It should not be forgotten that the head of the Judiciary is appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the Minister of Intelligence and the head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization are also appointed by the top of the political system. The lack of credibility of the judiciary in the Islamic Republic is rooted in various factors; however, it can be confidently stated that one significant reason is the lack of credibility of the judiciary among the majority of society. When responsible officials in the judiciary report the existence of 15 million legal cases, mention the shortage of judges and threats such as 'money and sexual issues' against judges, acknowledge 'prolonged litigation,' and confess to the undesirable state of the current administrative situation, the judgment of the majority of citizens is clear. It should not be forgotten that in addition to the aforementioned unfortunate situation, the long-term repression of journalists, political activists, and civil society activists by the Revolutionary Court has perpetuated the image of this judiciary as unjust, non-independent, and violence-oriented in society. Independently of these issues, the judiciary's failure to decisively confront bankrupt banks and financial institutions, and the lack of satisfaction for thousands of affected and complaining citizens, has made the situation even harder, more complex, and worse for the officials of this judiciary. In such a social context, public interest in the accusations against the head of the judiciary is assumed and predictable. On another level, and beyond what has been mentioned, the lack of democratic legitimacy of the core power and widespread dissatisfaction with the rulers' record has exacerbated the gap between society and the government. This gap reached its maximum after the 2009 election coup but was somewhat repaired with several recent elections. The ongoing economic crisis and the continuation of unemployment and production stagnation, alongside ongoing restrictions against the lifestyles and demands of millions of young people, and even the lack of seriousness from Rouhani in fulfilling some of his electoral slogans and promises (from lifting the house arrest of Green Movement leaders to employing women, youth, and ethnic and religious minorities in high-level executive management) have created a new wave of dissatisfaction with the established situation. The logical consequence of this situation is the interest in reports and messages produced and disseminated against senior officials of the regime. The troubling and regrettable aspect of this situation is that in the face of such conditions, the central power has resorted to classic biases and ineffective, repetitive, and tested methods. The crackdown on journalists, threats against political activists and civil society actors, increased restrictions against Khatami, the continued house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard, beating the drum of false knowledge and false ideology, and imposing censorship on domestic media while attempting to distort the truth and spread lies using the official government media and aligned propaganda arms are some of these reactions. The core power in the Islamic Republic has yet to recognize the necessity of 'reforms' and the importance of freedom of expression and media, as well as increasing active and critical social participation in ensuring development and national security and marginalizing lies, questions, and ambiguities.