Why Were the Russians Interested in Resolving Iran's Nuclear Issue?

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has had significant effects on economic cooperation and political discourse between Iran and Russia, raising the question of why the Russians were interested in resolving Iran's nuclear issue. Nikolai Kozhanov, in an interview with Radio Farda, shares his analysis on the importance and success of the JCPOA, as well as the Russian perspective on the Vienna nuclear agreement. Nikolai Kozhanov is a researcher at the Carnegie Center in Moscow and the Middle East Institute. He holds a PhD in international economics and served as a political attaché at the Russian embassy in Tehran from 2006 to 2009. A year has passed since Iran and the P5+1 reached an agreement, and several months since this agreement was implemented. How do you assess the importance of this agreement? When discussing the nuclear agreement, its impact on the region, or on Iran's economy, there is always a risk of overestimating or underestimating its value. Primarily, this agreement was a very important step for Iran's political and economic development and paved the way for Iran's return to the international relations system. On the other hand, it is still too early to talk about the complete lifting of sanctions. It is now clear that the U.S. is determined to maintain a significant portion of its sanctions against Iran, especially in the financial sector, which negatively affects Iran's economic relations with the international community. So far, there is no real hope that these sanctions will be lifted with the U.S. elections. During this time, reports have emerged indicating that Iran is facing challenges in utilizing the economic benefits of the JCPOA. Do you see these challenges as a threat to the implementation of the agreement, or are they challenges that will be resolved over time? Certainly, it is a challenge that will be resolved over time. However, I must also point out that expectations from this agreement in Iran were very optimistic. If we look at the developments in Iran's economy so far, while we see signs of improvement, the economy is still going through a tough period, and the improvement will not be as rapid as initially expected. On the other hand, I remember that when I spoke with analysts a year ago after the agreement, there was hope for a change in the approach of politicians and the power circle in Iran. However, so far, the Iranian leader and those close to him have become more critical of the U.S. and the West, and we have not seen any signs of positive behavior from Iran in this regard. You are in Moscow. Do you think this agreement has changed the relationship between Moscow and Tehran, or do these bilateral relations have a strategic basis that such an agreement does not alter? This question is complex. On one hand, the development of relations between Iran and Russia is based on several parameters, of which the nuclear agreement is only one. At the same time, I must say that achieving this agreement has helped improve these relations. Although there was a notion that international sanctions had closed the path for Iran to Russia's competitors, and Russian companies could benefit from this, the truth was that the path was also closed for Russian companies. Now that part of the sanctions has been lifted, Russian players are gradually returning to Iran. For example, part of the first sale of Iranian oil to Europe at the beginning of this year was sold through the Russian company Lukoil. There are many reports and rumors about the significant efforts of Russian companies to play an active role in Iran. The lifting of these sanctions has also facilitated increased cooperation between Iran and Russia in the fields of nuclear energy and transportation, and has strengthened the prospects for cooperation in defense industries, with Russian defense companies being very optimistic about this. This is from an economic perspective. These days, Iran and Russia are often referred to as allies regarding the Syrian crisis. Do you see the relationship between Tehran and Moscow as a strategic alliance beyond economic cooperation? Perhaps I have spoken too much about the economy because this is an area where improvement has been very evident after the agreement. However, this agreement has also impacted the political discourse between the two countries. The Russians have clearly shown their willingness to cooperate with Iran, and Iran's active role during the nuclear negotiations was appreciated by both the West and Iran. Achieving the agreement has also returned Iran to the group of countries that play an active role in other international issues, which was very important for Russia's interests in Syria. I cannot say that a complete alliance for coordinating military and political activities between Tehran and Moscow has formed, but we can say that in pursuit of their goals, these two countries count on each other. Another notable aspect regarding the nuclear agreement and its connection with Russia was Russia's cooperation with Western countries during the negotiations at a time when the two sides had severe disagreements over the Ukraine crisis. Did that cooperation in the nuclear negotiations help reduce tensions between Russia and the West? Certainly, one of the achievements of this agreement was the signals that Russia sent to the West, indicating that despite the difficult circumstances, Moscow would not sever its relations with the West. The Russians demonstrated that they could provide significant assistance in addressing international issues. At the same time, the continuation of nuclear negotiations in that situation did not necessarily mean an effort to improve their relations with the West or Europeans on issues other than Iran, nor was it aimed at exchanging the Iran issue for its tensions with the West. The reason Russia sought to achieve a nuclear agreement was that, firstly, it considered Iran's possession of nuclear weapons unacceptable and sought to create conditions that would prevent Iran's nuclear program from leading to weapon production capabilities. Secondly, given the difficult conditions in the Middle East, Russia sought to prevent Iran from engaging in military conflict due to its nuclear program, which could lead to the country's collapse and have very negative consequences for its political stability. As a result, Russia did not want to witness another crisis point in the region. Finally, it is important to mention Russia's own difficult economic situation, which, following the sanctions imposed on it, made its relationship with Tehran more significant. It was essential to remove the barriers to economic relations between the two countries, which is why the Russians were very interested in resolving the nuclear issue. The final topic I want to discuss with you relates to the increasing tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the months following the agreement. During these months, we have also heard several times from Moscow that it is willing to mediate in this regard, to which Tehran and Riyadh have not responded significantly. What do you think Moscow can do amid this tension and how can it mediate? Well, these tensions between Tehran and Riyadh are a serious challenge for Russia, as Russia's current policy in the Middle East is one of balance, and Moscow is trying to engage in dialogue with all the main players in the Middle East for various reasons. However, this tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia naturally pushes Moscow to take one side against the other. So far, Russia has refrained from doing this and has offered mediation. In theory, Russia could play this role because it has a good relationship with Tehran and has had a reasonably good relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. However, ultimately, two factors are likely to be decisive in this regard. Firstly, the will of the two countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, is important, and so far, we have not seen a willingness to improve relations. Secondly, the continuation of the situation in Syria is crucial. The success of the Syrian regime could have a very negative impact on the Saudis' willingness to engage in dialogue with Tehran through Russia, while the failure of the regime or at least its local failures could have the opposite effect on Iran's willingness to engage with Riyadh.