Will 2016 Be the Last Year of the Implementation of the JCPOA?

The agreement reached on July 14 in Vienna to roll back key aspects of Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for lifting sanctions, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), faces a challenging path for survival in the coming Christian year. Despite significant interest from both main parties to the agreement (the United States and the Islamic Republic) to continue adhering to the commitments outlined in the JCPOA, as well as comprehensive global cooperation to provide the necessary facilities to facilitate its implementation after the acceptance and announcement of the start date, which seems likely to occur in the next three months, developments in domestic politics in Iran and the U.S. could pose the greatest threat to this agreement. The letter dated December 20 from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, which referenced a new congressional resolution regarding changes in the conditions for the entry of dual-national Iranian citizens and visitors to Iran in the past five years, reaffirmed the U.S. government's commitment to respecting and adhering to the Vienna nuclear agreement. On the other hand, the rapid removal of about 11,000 tons of enriched uranium with concentrations of 3.5% and 20% in the form of gas or uranium oxide from Iran and their transfer to Russia via Azerbaijan before the end of the current Christian year demonstrated that Tehran and Washington remain determined and committed to overcoming the obstacles of the JCPOA. The important official statement on December 28 from the U.S. Secretary of State confirmed the exit of enriched uranium from Iran and the close cooperation with Kazakhstan, which is responsible for exchanging Iran's uranium with yellowcake, and Azerbaijan, which facilitated the transfer of radioactive materials from Iran to Russia, and Russia, which accepted the responsibility for receiving them from Iran, indicated that the implementation of the JCPOA enjoys sufficient support from the global community, cooperation from Iran's northern neighboring countries, and particularly the full eagerness of the governments of the Islamic Republic and the U.S. Iran is committed to not increasing its stockpile of enriched uranium beyond 300 kilograms over the next ten years under any circumstances, and the implementation of this clause of the Vienna nuclear agreement may be the most significant step taken to reduce the risk of Iran becoming a nuclear military power. The recent statement from the U.S. Secretary of State claims that with the exit of 25,000 pounds of enriched nuclear materials from Iran, the time for the Islamic Republic to pursue a nuclear bomb has increased threefold compared to the past. This time was estimated to be less than six months before the implementation of the Vienna agreement. Internal obstacles in Iran: The military and hardliners in the Islamic Republic do not see the JCPOA in line with their interests and seize every possible opportunity to criticize it indirectly. The composition of the Islamic Council and the Assembly of Experts in the future and the strengthening or weakening of the positions of government supporters after the elections in Esfand in each of the two councils could somewhat influence the fate of the JCPOA. If opponents of President Rouhani gain a majority in the next parliament and weaken the supporters of the government in the Assembly of Experts, the fate of Rouhani's re-election and the potential successor to Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, will be uncertain. The likely coordinated disclosure of new dimensions of the secret political negotiations between Iran and the U.S. over the past four years by Ali Akbar Salehi, the then Foreign Minister and current head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, indicated that the nuclear agreement was made with the green light and full support of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and will continue as long as he remains in power, despite his media opposition. However, the continued decline in oil prices in global markets, the Rouhani government’s failure to effectively enter the lost oil markets of Iran, and the ongoing economic recession could change the domestic political landscape in Iran, and with these changes, Tehran's commitment to implementing the JCPOA could be reconsidered by Rouhani's potential successor. Geopolitical developments in the region, political changes in Syria, and the severing of Iran's communication with Shiites in southern Lebanon are also among the factors that could make Iran's regional behavior more aggressive and, if retaliatory actions occur, could lead to Tehran's cessation of cooperation in implementing the JCPOA. Military provocations by the IRGC, including the Emad missile test, despite its debatable confrontation with Security Council sanctions, and the recent missile launches in the Persian Gulf near the American Truman ship could provoke retaliatory actions and create a sensitive situation in southern Iran, turning it into a scene of military confrontations and, in turn, halting the implementation of the JCPOA. Political changes in the U.S.: The current Congress is on the lookout for any opportunity to exert more pressure against the Obama administration, particularly its interactive and passive foreign policy. The recent congressional action to pass a law requiring visas for visitors from Iran, which was sharply criticized by Iranian officials and prompted the U.S. Secretary of State to write an official letter to his Iranian counterpart, could take various forms in the coming Christian year, including attempts to pass new sanctions against Iran, putting the Obama administration in a difficult position against Tehran. Washington's nuclear engagement with the Islamic Republic and the agreement with a government that a large segment of American public opinion accuses of enmity towards the United States, supporting international terrorism, and hostility towards its strategic allies (Saudi Arabia and Israel) has been a topic of debate in Congress and also in the presidential candidates' debates over the past year. These critical discussions will heat up in the final year of the congressional and presidential elections in the U.S. Prominent Democratic presidential candidates, while generally expressing support for the nuclear agreement with Iran, have so far refrained from delving into the details of the agreement. Republican candidates, without exception, have severely criticized the terms of the agreement, even while acknowledging its respect by two prominent candidates. Unlike the Obama administration, the next U.S. government, which will take power in Washington in the next 13 months, will not stand against congressional pressures to impose new restrictions on Iran. The potential election of a Republican candidate opposed to the nuclear agreement, such as Senator Ted Cruz, could be seen as the beginning of the end of the cold honeymoon of the nuclear agreement between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic; a development that will receive significant support in Tel Aviv and Riyadh. The year 2016 could be seen as the last year of the JCPOA in its current form, provided that no unforeseen political incidents occur in Iran, or impactful military and security developments arise in the region, avoiding pre-designed or accidental military confrontations between Iran and the U.S. (similar to the downing of a Russian jet by a Turkish military aircraft at the Syrian-Turkish border), and that an opposing candidate to the nuclear agreement does not prevail in the U.S. presidential elections.