Will Obama Succeed in Selling the Nuclear Agreement?

A significant gap between the views of Republican senators and the U.S. government regarding the "dangers and benefits of the nuclear agreement" with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which emerged during the first day of discussions on the agreement in the Foreign Relations Committee, indicates the slim chances for the Obama administration (at this time) to garner support from U.S. lawmakers for the agreement. On Thursday, July 23, coinciding with U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter's visit to the Middle East to promote the nuclear agreement to America's allies, historic discussions on the nuclear agreement with Iran began during a special session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee attended by three senior Obama administration officials. During the first session of the agreement review, Secretary of State John Kerry, Treasury Secretary Jack Lew, and Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz responded to questions and criticisms from senators. U.S. lawmakers will have until September 17 to discuss the agreement and make a decision by the end of the 60-day period. The second session of the nuclear agreement review in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has previously held numerous historic sessions to discuss other significant issues such as the Vietnam War and the U.S. military invasion of Iraq, is scheduled for Tuesday, July 28. Opposing senators, including Bob Corker, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Menendez, and Tom Cotton, argue that the concessions made to the Islamic Republic do not reduce the risk of Iran becoming a nuclear military power in the medium term and that allowing the regime access to $100 to $150 billion of Iran's frozen assets could encourage Tehran to engage in further provocations in the region. Another topic raised during the Thursday discussion was the comparison of the advantages and risks of the agreement with the conditions that would arise if the agreement were not implemented. Opposing senators emphasized that even if sanctions were lifted by the European community, the U.S. would still be able to exert financial pressure and impose unilateral sanctions on the Islamic Republic. Senator Corker reminded the Secretary of State: "Before the agreement, Iran was isolated, and after the agreement, the government intends to isolate Congress." In a clear attempt that perhaps exaggerated the risks of the agreement's failure compared to its realities, John Kerry defended the agreement by stating: "If Congress rejects the agreement, the U.S. will be isolated, and the sanctions regime against Iran will collapse." He warned in a tone that seemed aligned with the hardliners and military in Iran: "If you think that after rejecting the agreement, the Ayatollah will ever return to the negotiating table with an American, you are dreaming." Kerry also claimed, with a warning that could sound like a green light to the Iranian military, that "if you vote against the agreement, you have lit a big green light for Iran to double its enrichment speed, rapidly pursue the construction of the heavy water reactor in Arak, and install new types of advanced centrifuges, all of which will be executed in a timely manner without any effective oversight." Using the mechanisms at its disposal (including paying nearly 50% of the U.N. costs—one-third of the costs of the International Atomic Energy Agency), the U.S. quickly brought the agreement to the Security Council before the issue was raised in Congress and secured the Council's vote in support of the agreement, while in the text of the agreement, raising the issue in the Security Council could have been postponed for three months after Congressional discussions. On the first day of testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Kerry did not mention what would happen to previous statements by U.S. officials about keeping "all options on the table" in the event of Iran's rush toward a bomb, and what Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter's specific statements last month about using B-52 bombers and bunker-buster bombs to stop the Islamic Republic would entail, nor whether Israel would remain a silent observer in such a situation. Obama has made the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic a personal and prestige issue for his administration and will undoubtedly support it with all his might, similar to his "Obama Care" initiative. Domestic and foreign opponents of the agreement (the Republican Party and the Israeli government) have also begun their efforts to undermine the agreement. Obama's advantage over domestic opponents of the agreement, who hold a majority in Congress, is his veto power if the opponents' resolution lacks two-thirds of the lawmakers' votes. Given the current conditions, it is likely that the agreement will not receive a majority vote in the Senate and House of Representatives if put to a vote, while the plan to defeat the agreement will also lack the support of two-thirds of Congress to neutralize the President's veto power. In this case, the President of the United States will have 24 days to decide on the representatives' vote, with the use of the veto being the most natural reaction of the executive power to the representatives' decision against the agreement. Another remaining avenue for the representatives opposing the agreement is to pass punitive or restrictive measures that would effectively prevent the U.S. government from implementing the lifting of sanctions against Iran. In this case, the nuclear agreement with Iran will not completely die, but it will lose its legitimacy during the formation of the next U.S. government. In such a situation, the next President (if elected from the Republican Party) will be able to announce the cancellation of the nuclear agreement's provisions with Iran and revert the approach to the Islamic Republic to pre-negotiation conditions; an action that hardliners and the ruling military will also warmly welcome.