Will Rouhani Clarify His Promises?

Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, in his latest remarks (speech to the people of Golestan province), emphasized his 'loyalty' to the 'promises' made during the 2013 presidential election, stating: 'What I promised you was the rescue of the country's economy, the revival of ethics in society, and constructive interaction with the world. I stand by my promise until the last moment and with all my strength.' In revisiting his promises, Rouhani notably did not make any affirmative or proactive references to political and cultural development. He did, however, mention the challenges faced in selecting a Minister of Science, adding: 'I promise my dear young generation, especially my dear student youth, that I will stand by my promises. If I needed to introduce 50 ministers to the parliament, I would have done so, but I will not retreat from my path and the promise I made to you young people last year.' While Rouhani attempts to maintain the 'trust' of the young and academic supporters from the 2013 election, some statements by Mohammad Farhadi in parliament—on the day of his vote of confidence—met with negative reactions from supporters of the Green Movement. Farhadi stated that the 'sedition' (the term used by hardliners to describe the social protests following the 2009 presidential election) is his 'red line.' Did Rouhani not make political promises? In his new remarks, Rouhani categorizes his promises into three main groups: 'economic,' 'international,' and 'ethical,' while in his presidential campaign, he attracted certain social layers—especially the modern middle class—with exciting promises regarding political and cultural development. The moderate government, as effective and successful as it has shown to be in diplomacy and foreign policy, has not only failed to shine in domestic politics and political development but has also shown limited effectiveness against entrenched hardliners in the government. During his electoral campaign—especially in his speeches at universities—he alluded to and explicitly mentioned the possibility of freeing political prisoners and efforts to lift the house arrest of two opposition candidates from the 2009 election (Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi). For instance, he emphasized: 'The president must have the power to create consensus for lifting the house arrest.' However, as evidenced by the past 16 months, he has not succeeded in creating this consensus for any reason. Not only have Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rahnavard remained under house arrest, but summonses and arrests of political, journalistic, and academic activists, as well as heavy judicial sentences, continue. Recent examples include the arrest of Mahdieh Golroo, a human rights activist protesting acid attacks in Isfahan, and the imprisonment of Nasser Hashemi, an economics professor and national-religious activist, who is serving an 11-year prison sentence. Even his promise to 'facilitate the return of expatriate Iranians' has faced serious obstacles and resistance; several political, journalistic, and student activists who left the country in recent years have encountered passport confiscation, interrogation, threats, and arrests upon their return to Iran (Seyyed Abdol Hossein Mir Damadi, a reformist journalist, is one notable case). Rouhani also mentioned the reopening of the journalists' syndicate and changes in the activities of political parties and civil institutions, which have yet to materialize, and no determination for their realization is observed. Accountability and responsiveness of the Ministry of Intelligence and a change in the behavior of this security institution were among his other promises. This has not occurred; the Ministry of Intelligence continues to act as a tool of pressure against civil and political activists. Rouhani also spoke of efforts to eliminate gender, ethnic, and religious discrimination and to create a politically open atmosphere in universities. The gap between these promises and what has actually occurred is significant. All of this, now in Rouhani's latest speech, is notably met with silence and pushed to the margins, overshadowed by three economic, international, and ethical promises. The end of indifference to political development What has been briefly mentioned does not signify a change in the political-social situation after the rise of the moderate government compared to the previous era. This occurs while the resistances are also presumed to be considerable. It is reasonably predictable that the obstacles to a substantive change in the political and cultural situation are numerous and powerful. The core of power in the Islamic Republic shows a predictable opposition to political and cultural development. However, there is a significant gap between 'the unfulfilled promises of Rouhani in the political and cultural arenas' and 'the indirect denial' of these promises. It seems that in his new speech, Rouhani, based on 16 months of experience in the executive branch, relying on established economic and international realities, and summarizing various active components in the political power structure, has revisited his promises and refined his slogans, while passing over what pertains to political and cultural development. Of course, in this same new speech, Rouhani emphasizes that the era of extremism and security atmosphere has ended; however, it is unclear on what indicators and what programs and actions his assessment is based. Especially since, in addition to the IRGC Intelligence Organization and the judiciary, even some of his own subordinates (including in the Ministry of Intelligence and the Ministry of Interior) act as obstacles to political opening. Rouhani's indifference to political development and limiting the moderate government's programs to two areas—economy and international affairs—especially after the protracted negotiations with the West over nuclear energy and the decreasing oil prices, does not seem justifiable. This will make Rouhani's government weaker against the demands and pressures of hardliners. The purple government needs to maintain the support and continuous presence of its social base to succeed in the two time-consuming areas of economy and foreign policy; this will not be achieved unless Rouhani's government takes serious and practical steps in the realm of political development. The smoke of indifference to political development will also irritate the eyes of the government.