Will the Current Ceasefire Negotiations Continue After Their Announced Failure?

After nearly two years of extensive negotiations between representatives of the Islamic Republic and the United States, besides the 'Joint Action Plan', which is considered a temporary agreement, the only other announced agreement is the declaration that the current round of negotiations is non-renewable. The ongoing negotiations, while having a chance of success, may remain at a deadlock by the end of July. Undoubtedly, both the Islamic Republic and the current U.S. administration will strive to bridge their positions and create conditions for reaching the desired agreement within the remaining time. However, the likelihood of the agreement remaining out of reach at this stage is as high as the chance of it being achieved. If an agreement is potentially reached, its consequences will be included in the text of the agreement. What remains unclear is the results and situation arising from the failure of negotiations by the deadline. The necessity to avoid a third extension of negotiations was initially raised by U.S. Republicans, arguing that the Islamic Republic is not ready to relinquish its questionable nuclear programs and that the Obama administration is stalling with Tehran. After the Republicans gained a majority in the U.S. Congress at the beginning of this Christian year, the Obama administration first felt compelled to accept this condition from the powerful rival party, then the Islamic Republic, facing a united front of Republicans and Democrats in the U.S., declared the ongoing negotiations with the 1+5 group non-renewable to maintain appearances. The overall framework of a potential nuclear agreement, according to U.S. demands, would keep the Islamic Republic within a one-year distance from the capacity to conduct nuclear tests over the next ten years (despite any overt or covert attempts). To achieve this primary goal, the U.S. is prepared to accept the operation of up to 6,000 centrifuges and a stockpile of about 500 kilograms of uranium with a concentration of up to 5 percent in Iran, provided there is unassailable oversight over nuclear facilities. In exchange for relinquishing the capacity to become a military nuclear power, which has cost billions of dollars in direct expenses and hundreds of billions in economic losses to Iran over the past 20 years, the Islamic Republic is seeking the lifting of current sanctions. The Islamic Republic would not have entered into ongoing negotiations with the U.S. if it did not feel compelled to accept the suspension (or shutdown) of some of its nuclear capacities, although some of Tehran's calculations regarding the negotiations have changed compared to the time negotiations began two years ago. At the end of 2012, after being deprived of oil exports to Europe, reducing oil exports to Asia, and enduring severe banking restrictions, the Islamic Republic experienced premature fear of economic collapse. Such fear was also felt in 2003 after the U.S. military invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam's regime, along with the announcement of the Greater Middle East plan (exporting democracy to the region), which led the leaders of the Islamic Republic to agree to the (nuclear) Saadabad agreement with the presence of foreign ministers from three major European countries: Joschka Fischer from Germany, Jack Straw from Britain, and Dominique de Villepin from France. At that time, the Islamic Republic's concerns were milder compared to the West's intentions for regime change, and the referral of Iran's nuclear file to the Security Council was a significant worry. The failure of the Greater Middle East plan, following the complications from the U.S. military attack on Iraq and the global demand for oil exceeding supply, changed the calculations of the Islamic Republic's leaders. The rise of conservatives (Ahmadinejad) to power and the resumption of suspended nuclear programs were a direct result of the changing equations in Tehran, justified by the claim that Europe had not fulfilled its promises. Now, two years after enduring oil and banking sanctions, due to finding ways to evade sanctions and especially a reduction in fears of economic collapse or the onset of internal uprisings, the Islamic Republic has become stricter regarding the conditions for relinquishing its nuclear programs than at the beginning of negotiations. At this stage, in the context of addressing the details of a potential agreement, Tehran is demanding more concessions. If two years ago it accepted having 1,500 centrifuges, gradual lifting of sanctions, and extensive inspections, today it demands 90,000 to 120,000 centrifuges and a complete lifting of sanctions. Although the desire to reach a nuclear agreement with the West within the general framework has not disappeared among the leaders of the Islamic Republic, addressing their requested details could still prevent negotiations from reaching a conclusion. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, who has noticeably moved closer to the ruling right in recent months, threatened before the second extension of negotiations last year that if the nuclear talks fail, Iran would resume enrichment at any concentration (over 20 percent) and continue. The simple meaning of his statements was a threat to move towards military-grade uranium enrichment. Last month, Hossein Mousavian, a former negotiator who is effectively an unofficial spokesperson for the Iranian regime in nuclear negotiations, predicted in an article in Al-Monitor that if the nuclear talks fail, Iran would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Implementing either of the two mentioned threats would equate to declaring war on the international community and facing consequences beyond the Islamic Republic's capacity. On the opposing side, American senators (mostly Republicans) threaten that if the ongoing negotiations do not yield results by the deadline, they will put forth a plan that would bring Iran's oil exports to zero, paralyze its foreign trade, and expand sanctions to political dimensions (banning Iranian officials from traveling to the U.S. and its allied countries). Aside from the veto power held by the U.S. President, it is unexpected that representatives of the rival party would risk public opinion by intervening in the foreign policy of the current administration, placing national interests below party interests. The main goal of the Republican Party is to win the upcoming presidential election. If they achieve a favorable outcome, they will be able to rebuild the damaged Washington-Tel Aviv relations and reconsider any unfavorable agreement with Iran. Therefore, despite the threats from both main negotiating parties to take drastic and retaliatory actions, if the current talks fail, the existing situation resulting from the implementation of the 'Joint Action Plan' will continue with slight changes, at least until the next U.S. president is determined.