Will the Security-Military Forces Abandon Elections?

The Expediency Discernment Council of the Islamic Republic has approved a policy prohibiting the entry of armed forces personnel, including the army, the Revolutionary Guard, police, intelligence and security agencies, and the Basij in political factions and supporting specific candidates during elections. Will the active security-military forces in the Islamic Republic withdraw from elections and refrain from interference? There are multiple pieces of evidence indicating that the problem of military interference in elections and major political processes in the Islamic Republic does not merely await a resolution through legislation; legal stipulations and requirements in this area have not been lacking, and the solution must be sought elsewhere. What does the law say? According to existing laws in the Islamic Republic, military and police forces are prohibited from interfering in elections. Based on Article 24 of the Presidential Election Law and Article 16 of the Parliamentary Election Law, military and police forces have no right to interfere in electoral matters, including executive and supervisory affairs. Furthermore, as stated in Article 40 of the Armed Forces Crimes Punishment Law, the involvement, participation, or activities of armed forces personnel in political classifications, disputes, and electoral propaganda are prohibited and considered a crime, punishable by six months to three years in prison. Additionally, according to the emphasis of Note 4 of the single article of the law on the presence of representatives of presidential candidates, military, police, and intelligence forces cannot represent or supervise on behalf of any candidate. Moreover, members and employees of the army, the Revolutionary Guards, and the police are not allowed to be affiliated with or belong to political groups (Article 29 of the Army Law, Article 16 of the Employment Law of the Revolutionary Guards, and Article 16 of the Employment Law of the Islamic Republic Police). Article 47 of the Revolutionary Guards' charter also states that this institution is independent of all parties and political groups and should never acquire a party identity in society or act as a political party or organization. Despite these emphases, the current reality in the political arena of Iran is different. There is a significant gap between political realities and legal emphases, and even the claims of senior officials of the regime (including some of the leader of the Islamic Republic's emphases). As a notable example, after the announcement of the results of the 2005 presidential election and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory, Mehdi Karroubi, in a critical letter to the leadership of the regime, wrote: "I am certain that the majority of the brave forces of the Revolutionary Guards are also dissatisfied with some existing issues... I request that you guide a part of the Guards and Basij, which have entered political matters, away from this action—whose danger is far greater than economic actions. I believe that if some friends in the Guards and Basij are to gain access to centers of power, the best course of action is to assign these responsibilities directly to them rather than spending the credibility of the Guards to bring some to power and commit illegal acts in this process... I believe that the crisis caused by inappropriate interference in elections is the most dangerous crisis threatening the country today and in the future." The interventions of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij in elections (parliamentary, council, and presidential) not only did not decrease but rather increased. A range of them, in a formal process and by circumventing the law, would retire themselves while effectively entering the electoral process. Dozens of parliamentary seats in recent elections have been seized in this manner—using the financial and human resources of military institutions—independently of direct and indirect interventions by security-military personnel in favor of presidential or parliamentary candidates, disregarding existing laws. One of the peaks of this illegal behavior was the 2009 presidential election. There, not only was there a noticeable rise in the security-military hierarchy's efforts to continue Ahmadinejad's government before the election, but also the forces affiliated with these centers played an effective role in the bloody suppression of civil protests against the official results. Furthermore, commanders and senior officials of the Revolutionary Guards explicitly emphasized the direct involvement of this institution in the elections. There are numerous documents in this regard. The account of General Moshfegh was one of the famous pieces of evidence. A document that, following the release of a tape of this security-military official's speech, served as significant evidence of the engineering of the 2009 elections. Moshfegh admitted in his remarks that his associates disrupted the legal activities of Mousavi's campaign headquarters using government resources on the night of the election. He also explained that all legal, natural activities, and meetings of Mousavi during the election were monitored, and security forces sometimes used their knowledge for psychological operations against him. This military-security official also revealed the control and pursuit of critics, stating that the intelligence and military forces considered all of them subversive. General Moshfegh emphasized that the military-security group's intervention in the elections was coordinated with the leader of the Islamic Republic. His remarks sparked a wave of criticism and protest among reformist forces opposing the electoral coup. In one significant reaction, Mir Hossein Mousavi referred to the "famous tape," emphasizing that the hardliners had been planning and striving for twenty years to consolidate the country, and it seemed that this election was supposed to be the last act of this effort. The debates under this perspective take on a different meaning, as do the purges that began in the fourth parliament and expanded in subsequent elections. The authoritarian forces sought to eliminate all national space from critics and dissenters, creating an atmosphere similar to North Korea with a bit of cosmetic democracy. Another significant and recent piece of evidence regarding the intervention of the ruling security forces in the Revolutionary Guards during elections was General Aziz Jafari's important speech to the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. A document that the film of which—published by Mohammad Nourizad—serves as another important testimony of significant fraud and engineering in the 2009 elections. The commander of the Revolutionary Guards, in his remarks, referred to the "sensitivity" of the 10th presidential election (2009) and spoke of the "concerns and worries" and the "red lines" that were posed for him and other aligned forces; that is, that the "opponents of the revolution and the values of the revolution, who had found an opportunity during the second Khordad and infiltrated the government, should not come to power again." He criticizes the reformists' opposition to the Revolutionary Guards and Basij's interference in elections from this perspective. Jafari referred to the "slope" of the elections, stating that the process was such that "the elections would definitely go to a second round, and in the second round, it was unclear what the outcome would be." He also explicitly spoke of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij's interference in suppressing civil protests and dealing with the activists of Mousavi and Karroubi's campaign headquarters. In another important document and film, Ali Saidi, the representative of the Supreme Leader in the Revolutionary Guards, explicitly reveals the intervention of this institution in the elections. Saidi, referring to Ahmadinejad's positions being close to the Supreme Leader, thanks the Revolutionary Guards for their efforts in the elections, stating: "Our goal is to realize the leader's wishes... Our duty was to wholeheartedly accept and realize the leader's wishes within the Revolutionary Guards. This was a blessing that God granted to our nation, and this duty came with a result; victory accompanied it—a very surprising victory that was pleasing to the Supreme Leader." He emphasizes that "the closest institution in the Islamic Republic to the positions of the Supreme Leader is the Revolutionary Guards. In these recent events, the blind seditions, some institutions that had a long history in guiding public opinion stagnated and could not identify where the path and direction were. However, the Revolutionary Guards did not hesitate for a moment. They had no angle of doubt." He openly criticizes various reformist factions and speaks from their angle about the core of power in the Islamic Republic, affirming the Revolutionary Guards' intervention in the electoral process. The leader's view; from words to action A quarter of a century has passed since Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership. For a long time, he has pursued his desired political-ideological visions in close relationship with the aligned security-military current. Over these years, he has rarely criticized the political approaches of the Revolutionary Guards. In one of the few comments, a few months ago, he made a mild remark saying: "It is not necessary for the Revolutionary Guards to engage in political activities"; and, of course, added: "Guarding the revolution requires a precise understanding of realities, so a body that is the guardian of the revolution cannot be blind and ignorant about various deviant, non-deviant, or other political currents." Ayatollah Khamenei has a relationship of trust with the Revolutionary Guards' intelligence organization, and a significant part of his security wishes is pursued through this channel. This institution plays a crucial role in suppressing and threatening political and civil activists and journalists, as well as in restricting the political space. The Supreme Leader openly prefers the positions and evaluations of this institution over those of the Ministry of Intelligence. For instance, in the case of the mass arrest of national-religious forces in 2001, Ayatollah Khamenei rejected the evaluation of the reformist government’s Ministry of Intelligence and aligned with the Revolutionary Guards (the executors of the arrests and interrogations). Thus, it can be confidently claimed that even if the new resolution of the Expediency Council is signed and approved by the Supreme Leader, the current reality in the political arena of Iran will be different. The top figure of the regime, from an authoritarian and autocratic perspective established in the government, will pursue his desires in alignment with the security-military forces. Elections will not be unaffected by the wishes of the leader and the surrounding security-military current. If Ayatollah Khamenei spoke of "the people's right" in the 2013 elections and invited opponents to participate in the polls, he remembered the majority of society's boycott of the 2010 parliamentary elections and had learned pragmatically from the gap between the nation and the government after the 2009 elections. Furthermore, if the core of power ultimately accepted Rouhani's victory, part of the reason was their fear of the outcome of the second round of elections and the explosive and protesting reaction of millions of citizens (regardless of other causes and reasons). The social force is the executive guarantee of the law. This (the interference of the ruling security forces in the elections and the authoritarian usurpation of the electoral process and results) has shown that only with the presence of social forces or civil society protests and public opinion will it be sidelined. Otherwise, the authoritarian forces and military personnel will pursue their political-security projects using the governmental resources at their disposal, even if in an illegal manner. The situation becomes even more regrettable when we do not forget that in the Islamic Republic, there is no independent and fair judiciary in operation; thus, the legal pursuit of authoritarian and delinquent military personnel is practically ruled out. Although the freedom and integrity of elections in Iran suffer from a lack of clear and decisive laws and, in some cases (such as supervisory oversight), require reform, the current problem of elections in Iran is not the law. The problem lies with the authoritarian military and totalitarian forces that, using the governmental levers at their disposal, seek to impose their will through quasi-democratic processes on the majority of society. The ruling security forces in the Revolutionary Guards and Basij are following the same path as the Guardian Council, relying on supervisory oversight and its broad interpretation, while the judiciary continues to issue heavy judicial sentences against political activists and maintains the house arrest of Green Movement leaders and the media ban on Khatami.