Will the Seizure and Destruction of Embassies in Iran Come to an End?

After the seizure of the United States embassy (1979) and the British embassy (2011), it was the turn of the Saudi embassy in Tehran to be occupied and looted by Islamists close to the government (in the case of the United States), Basij forces (in the case of Britain), and militia forces close to military and security institutions (in the case of Saudi Arabia). Why are the Islamic Republic and its loyalists so interested in attacking embassies? Is there no other way to protest against another country except by attacking its embassy? Is it conceivable that there could be a stopping point for this irrational act that goes against international norms in Iran? Groundwork and Execution Based on the behavior that officials and propaganda agencies have shown before the attack and seizure of foreign embassies, a specific behavioral pattern can be observed today in the groundwork and execution of this behavior. The groundwork is primarily seen in the words of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Before the attack on the U.S. embassy, Khomeini repeatedly referred to the United States as the devil. Khamenei also called Britain wicked several times during the Green Movement. In recent months, the attack on the Saudi government has been repeatedly mentioned in the Supreme Leader's speeches, and official and semi-official media have attacked Saudi Arabia almost daily on various occasions (such as the deaths of pilgrims, ISIS, Yemen). The execution of Nimr was merely the spark that ignited this attack. During Khomeini's era, the organization of such acts was carried out in Islamic associations and later coordinated with the leadership office. The Imam Line students carried out this work through Mousavi Khoeiniha. In Khamenei's era, the organization of these actions (any attack on gatherings and centers) has been carried out by the IRGC and forces close to the leadership office, and the execution has been entrusted to individuals involved in religious committees and the Basij. Why embassies? For three reasons, Islamists have considered embassies to be good targets for attack. First, attacking an embassy creates excitement for the loyalists of the government who see themselves as revolutionary and against the West and its allies. An official protest from the Foreign Ministry or summoning a chargé d'affaires cannot satisfy the fervor within the militia forces. They want fire, breaking doors and windows, hostage-taking, and chaos, just like during the 1979 revolution, to heal, and the government opens this path to healing. Second, attacking an embassy, which is considered part of the respective country, is a form of disrespect to that country, and Islamists desire this transfer of feeling of disrespect. Third, attacking an embassy and disrupting the documents within it responds to the thirst to prove the conspiracy theory, which is the dominant theory of Islamists in their view of the 'other.' This thirst was pursued in the documents of the U.S. embassy, and many files were created, but nothing was gained from the attacks on the British and Saudi embassies for the conspiracy theorists, and they will not gain anything. Other ways of protest Today, every country has various and different ways to protest against another country without violating international regulations, even if summoning an ambassador, expelling some embassy members, or even severing diplomatic relations does not seem sufficient. Today, all countries have propaganda tools against each other and can use existing trade relations to strike at another country. Sanctions against a country have very broad dimensions: from economic sanctions to tourism sanctions, from political sanctions to specific sanctions against individuals and institutions. The Islamic Republic can stop sending pilgrims for Hajj as a means of protesting against Saudi Arabia in any case (the Umrah has already been suspended); however, from the perspective of Islamic Republic officials, sanctions are a violation of international regulations (and they have repeatedly said this about U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic), but attacking another country's embassy does not have this characteristic. Organized Spontaneity State and semi-state media usually introduce attackers of embassies and other gatherings and centers opposed to the government as 'spontaneous people' or 'self-directed forces,' but in all three cases, these attacks and seizures were not spontaneous and self-directed. The students who were later introduced as Imam Line students were organized before the attack. The Basijis who attacked the British embassy were organized within the Basij framework. In the attack on the Saudi embassy, the coordination in the attack on the Saudi consulate in Mashhad and the embassy in Tehran, the delay in the arrival of sufficient forces to prevent the attack despite being predictable, the attackers being equipped with Molotov cocktails and sticks and stones, the presence of posters that had been printed beforehand, and the slogans of the attackers (Haydar Haydar) indicate that this attack was organized within specific groups. Essentially, the term 'self-directed' that is heard from security officials (and has been heard in this case as well) refers in the political lexicon of the Islamic Republic to the Basij and militia forces close to and supported by security forces and the IRGC. For the police in Tehran and other security forces, who have tens of thousands of personnel in Tehran, protecting the Saudi or British embassy from about a thousand attackers is not a difficult task. However, when higher officials send a positive signal to the security and police forces that they should open the way for their own militia forces to attack so that both the 'enemy' is humiliated by an attack on part of its territory and the loyalists can heal, there is no room left for prevention. Humiliation and Tension Creation as a Behavioral Pattern After the attack on the British embassy, it was thought that the seizure of embassies during Khamenei's era would be a thing of the past. During Khomeini's time, his supporters attacked the U.S. embassy to showcase anti-Americanism in competition with Marxists and thus seize power in the country and humiliate a powerful country. Khamenei also needed such a movement—at least symbolically—and his supporters did this for him in 2011. For this reason, it was thought that Khamenei had reached his long-held desire to follow in Khomeini's footsteps, and the seizure of embassies would come to an end during his era. However, two issues have prevented this halt: the Islamic Republic's habit of violating international commitments and the government's constant need to create tension. Attacking the embassies of other countries, which is clearly organized or supported in Iran by militia forces and the leadership office (party apparatus), is a clear violation of the Islamic Republic's international commitments, but these violations are not limited to attacks on embassies and have continued in all areas for 37 years. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is a crisis-ridden and crisis-generating system and needs to constantly mobilize its militia forces to keep the repression machine running and provide content for its propaganda apparatus. For this reason, the trend of attacking foreign embassies in Iran will not stop. These attacks have become part of the governance style of the Islamic Republic. The arrest of a few attackers, who are usually released a few days later without any punishment, and the condemnation of such acts by some mid-level officials of the Foreign Ministry and even the head of the government only reflect the government's attempt to manage these behaviors at the international level and send dual signals. Next Draws Potential future candidates for attacks and seizures of embassies, based on attacks on other countries in government publications and websites and in the language of Shia clerics, include Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain. Azerbaijan and Bahrain are two countries with a Shia majority and governments that have serious problems with the Islamic Republic and its interventions, and any small action from them against Shia Islamists will face a severe reaction from the Islamic Republic. Shia clerics have repeatedly spoken out against the governments of Bahrain and Azerbaijan. Recently, a gathering was also held in front of the Azerbaijani consulate in Tabriz in protest against the Azerbaijani government's treatment of Shia Muslims in the Nardaran region, carried out by militia forces, Basij, and religious committees. Turkey is also portrayed in official and semi-official media of the Islamic Republic as an ally of Saudi Arabia and ISIS, with leaders dreaming of constructing an Ottoman Empire. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has, of course, not expressed harsh words against the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan, and if he indirectly or directly makes statements against them, the likelihood of attacks on their embassies will increase.