Will the Vienna Meeting's Plan Cure the Syrian Crisis?

The second meeting of major and minor stakeholders in Syria to find a comprehensive solution to the crisis in the country was held on November 14 in Vienna. These stakeholders, who chose the name "International Support Group for Syria," included the Arab League, the European Union, the United Nations, the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. According to a statement issued at the end of the meeting, the members of this group agreed to continue their efforts to establish a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria and, in parallel, to take necessary steps for the transfer of power in Syria based on the Geneva statement of 2012 and under the supervision of the United Nations. Furthermore, the meeting and its final statement emphasized the necessity of ending the suffering of the Syrian people, preventing further physical destruction of the country, and drying up the roots of instability in the region as a result of the increase in terrorist groups in the Syrian war. The holding of this meeting and the presence of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United States, and Russia, which often pursue completely contradictory goals in Syria, is in itself a positive step. However, there are fundamental problems in ending the Syrian crisis, and there are serious obstacles to implementing the provisions of the Vienna meeting's statement that could undermine even the minor progress made. Ceasefire and Free Elections Based on the scheduled timeline of the "International Support Group for Syria," the members of this group agreed to hold a meeting on December 14 to assess the progress made and pave the way for formal negotiations between representatives of the Syrian government and its opposition groups under the supervision of the United Nations, negotiations that must take place before January 1, 2016. According to this timeline, a ceasefire in Syria is to be established within the next six months, by May 14, 2016, so that a national unity government in Syria can draft a new constitution, and finally, 18 months later, by May 14, 2017, free elections under UN supervision will be held to form a new government in Syria, with all Syrians, including those living abroad, participating in these elections. To achieve these goals, the "International Support Group for Syria" is to provide fundamental solutions to end the civil war in Syria. Meanwhile, to establish and maintain a ceasefire in Syria, according to some Western media reports, all members of the mentioned group have agreed to refrain from providing assistance to the parties involved, including the Syrian government and opposition groups, so that the efforts of the national unity government and subsequent free elections can bear fruit. Despite the reasonable and solution-oriented steps proposed by this group, achieving the set goals, given its scheduled timeline, is optimistic, and it is not expected that this plan can effectively and sustainably resolve the Syrian crisis in practice. None of the opposition groups to the Assad regime were present at the Vienna meeting. This absence, aside from indicating the deep and contradictory divisions among these fragmented and non-functional groups, could pose a serious problem for the program and plan of the "International Support Group for Syria." However, the United States and other countries in this group have stated that the decision not to invite opposition groups was intentional, aiming to avoid exacerbating tensions and disagreements among the attendees, while also wanting to send a unified message to these groups and the Damascus government. However, the reality is that despite this so-called unified message, which is summarized in the agreement on the timeline, achieving consensus among the countries of the "International Support Group for Syria" is challenging due to their deep-rooted disagreements, and reaching a consensus among armed groups in Syria is even more difficult, if not impossible. The multitude of armed groups The "Institute for the Study of War" in Washington, in a comprehensive review conducted in October this year regarding these groups, their operations rooms, areas of activity, and their supporters, identified 16 operations rooms. Each operations room, which is essentially a coordinating center for operations, operates in a specific geographical area, and opposition groups to the Assad regime, and in some cases, those opposing both the regime and ISIS, join this room to coordinate their operations without merging with each other. In other words, each group maintains its unique identity while coordinating with other groups. The names of these operations rooms in Syrian provinces include: Fath Aleppo, Ansar al-Sharia, Euphrates Volcano (Aleppo province); Jish al-Fath Idlib, Victory Battle (Idlib province); Jish al-Fath Idlib and Jish al-Nasr (Hama province); Victory of the Oppressed (Homs province); United Command of Eastern Ghouta, Alliance under One Flag, Jish al-Fath Qalamoun, Western Qalamoun Gathering, Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room (Damascus province); and Jish al-Haramoun, Jish al-Fath South, and Southern Front (Daraa and Quneitra provinces). The number of active armed groups in Syrian provinces is as follows: 54 groups in Aleppo province; 23 groups in Idlib province; 14 groups in Latakia province; 14 groups in Hama province; 7 groups in Homs province; 45 groups in Damascus province; and 44 groups in Daraa and Quneitra provinces. Many of these groups operate in various provinces while maintaining their names and identities, coordinating with the relevant operations rooms. Consensus among groups and regional and extra-regional actors Given the multitude of armed groups, one of the major problems facing the Geneva agreement and the implementation of the scheduled program of the "International Support Group for Syria," even at this initial stage, is reaching an agreement on which group or groups can represent all groups and participate as the opposition in the upcoming dialogues. The question of which group or individuals can represent the opposition has always been a fundamental question among Western and Arab countries. Expecting cooperation and coordination among small and large armed groups, whose numbers exceed a hundred and who only agree on the removal of Assad from power, is overly optimistic. Additionally, the countries supporting the opposition groups have different views on resolving the Syrian crisis. For example, the United States has consistently insisted that the Free Syrian Army should be part of the opposition in the upcoming dialogues, but recently Washington, under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, has accepted that the "Ahrar al-Sham" group should also be part of the opposition. In this context, another fundamental issue is the Syrian Kurds, which the participating countries have not addressed. Turkey does not want Syrian Kurds to have a prominent role in the upcoming negotiations regarding the resolution of the Syrian crisis. Undoubtedly, Syrian Kurds will insist on autonomy or self-governance, which contradicts the demands of other armed groups and pro-Assad forces. Terrorist and non-terrorist groups Which groups are considered terrorists is another question raised for resolving the Syrian crisis. The civil war in Syria will not completely stop even with an agreement between armed groups and the Assad government because two major groups, such as the Islamic State (ISIS) and the Al-Nusra Front, are, as emphasized in the final statement of the Vienna meeting, terrorist groups. There is no question about labeling the Islamic State as a terrorist group, especially since nearly all other armed groups and operations rooms in Syria consider ISIS an enemy. The recent attacks in Paris by this group have given extraordinary priority to resolving the Syrian crisis, but excluding the Al-Nusra Front and some other groups that are on the terrorist list will complicate the resolution of the Syrian crisis and could even undermine future agreements. Some armed groups, including Ahrar al-Sham and the Free Syrian Army, have closely collaborated with the Al-Nusra Front, and convincing these groups to sever their ties with this group, whether ideologically or for pragmatic reasons, will be challenging. More importantly, persuading these groups to cease their fight against government forces and instead direct their weapons towards the Al-Nusra Front will be very challenging. Russian aircraft have bombed the positions of the Free Syrian Army, which collaborates with the Al-Nusra Front, several times during their operations in Syria, and from Russia's perspective, both groups are of the same ilk, although recently Russian officials have stated that they might accept part of the Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, the Al-Nusra Front is not the only extremist group in Syria. Jihadist groups like Ansar al-Din Front and Al-Aqsa Front have similar and even more extreme ideological positions. It is highly likely that these groups will oppose the Vienna meeting's plan for establishing a ceasefire and continue their fight. Supporters of the groups Convincing or forcing armed groups to accept a ceasefire by halting the military and non-military support from their supporting countries will be a difficult and complex task, as some countries in the "International Support Group for Syria" are practically involved in the civil war in the country. Russia has a significant presence in Syria with nearly 4,000 military personnel. Iran, according to Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, supports the Syrian army at four strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels. Apart from sending IRGC personnel to Syria, Iran participates in the civil war through sending Afghan members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade and Iraqi Shiites and through Hezbollah in Lebanon, although IRGC commanders consider this assistance as "advisory roles." In this context, the United States supports the "Syrian Democratic Forces," and Turkey and Saudi Arabia can also claim that their assistance to their proxy groups is for fighting ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front, not for confronting Syrian government forces and Assad's supporters. In any case, each of the mentioned countries will try to ensure that their proxy groups have a better position in the upcoming negotiations, making the cessation of support from the interested countries very difficult. The Future of Assad One of the key problems of the Syrian crisis, which is Assad's future, was not included in the agenda of the Vienna meeting. The "International Support Group for Syria" described the omission of Assad's future as deliberate and intentional. The members of this group believe that discussing Assad's future at this time would block any progress in resolving the Syrian crisis. In this regard, John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, stated that Moscow and Washington have differing views on this matter, but these differences should not be a barrier to continuing the diplomatic process. Iran and Russia argue that Assad should not step down from power and that the Syrian people should decide their political future. The Gulf countries believe that Assad cannot be part of the political process in Syria and must step down from power. Turkey also wants Assad to resign but agrees to his symbolic retention for a six-month period. Meanwhile, the U.S. insists on Assad's resignation, stating that this does not need to happen before a transitional period. Given these disparate demands, the exclusion of Assad's future from the agenda of the "International Support Group for Syria" may continue for some time, but sooner or later, this very important issue must be seriously addressed. Compromise among the conflicting parties? Given the existing disagreements among the members of the "International Support Group for Syria," the implementation of this group's scheduled program for resolving the Syrian crisis appears optimistic and, in some cases, impossible. At the same time, the necessity of defeating ISIS, emphasized in paragraph 6 of the Vienna meeting's statement, requires a coherent strategy among the coalition countries led by the United States, Russia, and Iran, which seems impossible at this time. The United States, as the most significant member of the "International Support Group for Syria," aims to use diplomatic tools and pressure, taking advantage of appropriate opportunities, to convince Iran and Russia that continuing the war in Syria is not in their interest and that they should agree to the necessary compromises and exchanges to establish peace in Syria. Pursuing this strategy offers the U.S. advantages in that it will neither increase the level of violence and conflict in Syria nor endanger the lives of American soldiers, whose numbers are limited to advisors and special operations groups, and will not result in significant human losses for the U.S. In contrast, Russia and especially Iran, which are directly present in the battlefield, have shown that they are willing to bear the necessary human and non-human costs to maintain Assad, and for this reason, it is unlikely that these two countries will easily yield to U.S. demands and abandon Assad and his regime. IRGC commanders insist on Assad remaining in power, and recently, Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, linked Iran's national security to Syria, stating: "Syria's security has a direct effect on Iran's security." Assad's continued rule, as desired by the IRGC, is synonymous with the continuation of the Alawite minority's rule in Syria, which armed groups vehemently oppose, and the removal of Assad is at the top of their demands. These two incompatible and mutually exclusive demands will prolong the war. The Vienna meeting, despite the shortcomings and obstacles to implementing its timeline, seeks to choose a middle path, and its final statement calls on all interested parties to adhere to the unity, independence, territorial integrity, and non-sectarian nature of the Syrian state so that state institutions remain intact and the rights of all Syrian people are preserved.