Will There Be a Coup in Iran as Well?

The sudden military action by a part of the army in Turkey has once again echoed the term 'coup.' Regardless of who the main planners and initiators of the coup in Turkey were, another question that arises in the current political context is whether Iran will witness a coup today as well. If the answer is yes, who will be behind a potential coup in Iran? The safety of Iran's non-political army. The army is considered the main and central origin of a coup. However, in Iran, after the change of the political system and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the army has increasingly come under surveillance and political-security purging. The army, which was the main support of the monarchy, was suspected of attempting a coup after the Islamic Revolution. Ibrahim Yazdi, the deputy prime minister of the provisional government and one of the main architects of the establishment of the Revolutionary Guards, states that 'after the victory of the revolution, the leadership, the Revolutionary Council, and the provisional government did not trust the army commanders for a long time. There were documents and evidence that the U.S. government still had a coup plan in Iran on its agenda.' Apart from the execution of some army leaders after the revolution, the purging within the army also progressed increasingly alongside the establishment and stabilization of the Islamic Republic. Senior army officials were appointed with the approval of the Supreme Leader, and new figures aligned with the new regime and the Supreme Leader replaced the older ones. This situation, independent of the consequences of the birth of the Revolutionary Guards and the expansion of the military-security and even political and economic activities of this institution arising from the new regime (Islamic Republic), has led the army to a point where its leaders are trusted by the first person of the regime and its senior commanders are connected and coordinated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the central power hub. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic also emphasizes the 'ideological' nature of the army, stating that it must not only 'guard the independence and territorial integrity and the regime of the Islamic Republic' but also 'sacrifice' in the pursuit of the goals of the Islamic Revolution. All this means the formation of an army that is meaningfully distinct from its counterparts in countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan, which have always been the initiators of coups or have been assessed as being on the verge of doing so in recent decades. Thus, the army of the Islamic Republic has become increasingly safe for political power in Iran. The Revolutionary Guards and generals ready for a coup. Major General Mohammad Baqeri, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic, has stated about the role and position of the Revolutionary Guards: 'The army and the Guards complement each other in the Islamic Republic of Iran; defense against the enemy is the responsibility of the army according to the Constitution; if the attacker's capability is such that the army alone does not have the power to confront, according to the Constitution, the Guards will enter the arena. In addition, the Guards are responsible for maintaining internal security beyond the capabilities of law enforcement; deepening the Islamic Revolution in the regions of West Asia and Islamic countries is also the responsibility of the Guards.' However, the role of the Guards is not limited to this list of military duties. The Guards' intervention in political-security and even economic areas has increasingly become prominent and intensified during the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei. As the latest example, Hossein Taeb, the head of the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization, has announced that 'we are monitoring the recent violations behind the scenes.' He added: 'The file of the country's major economic corruption is on the agenda of the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization.' The intertwining and connection of the top of the regime with the security forces governing the Guards is also evident and well-known enough for political observers. The direct intervention of the Guards in the process of holding and the outcome of the 2009 presidential elections and the widespread arrests coinciding with the announcement of the official results, as well as the bloody suppression of questioning citizens, is an important witness to this cooperation with the view and approach of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Senior commanders of the Guards (such as General Jafari, General Hamadani, and General Naqdi) have not hesitated to express the extensive interference of this military institution in the aforementioned elections and the unfortunate events that followed. Thus, the Revolutionary Guards can be described as the only military force ready for a coup in Iran. An institution that has long played the role of a shadow government in the political-security developments of Iran. In the approval and disqualification of candidates, it is considered one of the main references of the Guardian Council; it has a free hand in summoning, threatening, and arresting journalists, political activists, and civil society actors; it plays a significant role in issuing judicial rulings by the Revolutionary Court; it engages in obstruction and opposition against misaligned governments (such as the Khatami and Rouhani administrations, and even the second half of Ahmadinejad's second term) using its propaganda and media arms; and... The security forces governing the Guards will not hesitate to confront any option they assess as a threat to their desired status and their political-ideological projects and visions. Only the Supreme Leader, due to the close connection and intertwining of his position and authority with the potential of the Guards, has the ability to restrain, control, or regulate their actions. In addition to what has been mentioned, the organizational structure and hierarchy of the Guards have given it a unique potential in today's Iran. This organizational structure, based on military, security, and economic capabilities, can take extensive, rapid, and unified action when evaluated against the top of the Guards; the very thing that is described as a coup. When is a coup by the Guards likely to occur? Answering the question of when the Guards will carry out a coup is not easy; however, one of the potential critical moments could be the period following the death of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. It is not far-fetched that if the security forces governing the Guards do not evaluate the output of the Assembly of Experts in line with their desired visions, they may resort to military action against the established government and take control directly and independently. In recent years, the security forces governing the Guards have tried to pursue their desired goals and projects through quasi-democratic corridors and by exploiting electoral processes. The day the Guards find this tool irrelevant or ineffective and rely on their military-security capabilities, the consequences for Iran will not be trivial; just as this occurred—with the cooperation of the Supreme Leader—in the 2009 elections. Even if the direct and visible military action of the Guards to fully seize political power does not occur, this force can indirectly pursue and realize its desired situation through serious pressure and threats. This approach has not been rare in the past two decades, from the suppression of journalists and political activists to threatening misaligned representatives in the parliament, interfering in elections, and even irrational political behaviors (such as attacks on embassies). This assessment does not imply the overwhelming power and unfettered hand of the Guards in political maneuvering and governance of the country. Regardless of the presence of pragmatic, action-oriented, expedient, and moderate factions within the Guards—who may have a different or critical stance against a coup or similar actions—the organizing elements of Iranian civil society, in the age of communication and information technology, are a resilient and very effective and important component. This is irrespective of the governance challenges in the volatile Middle Eastern region and the unavoidable pressures of governance in international relations. To counter the military-security hard power of the coup plotters, there is no escape from relying on the capabilities of civil society and the social forces supporting democracy; the same forces that also came to Erdogan's aid in Turkey.