With Donald Trump's Victory, Will the JCPOA Come Under Threat?

One of the reasons for Donald Trump's surprising and historic victory in the U.S. presidential election is his adherence to the views he expressed 18 months ago, from the beginning of the primaries, and maintained until the final competition against his experienced rival, Hillary Clinton. The President-elect of the United States, Donald Trump, described the nuclear agreement of July 2015 between the 5+1 group and the Islamic Republic, known as the JCPOA, which was achieved under the leadership and architecture of the Obama administration, as 'the worst deal in history' and 'shameful.' Trump promised that if he reached the White House, he would not tear up the agreement but would make serious revisions to it. Following the recent elections, the political scene in the U.S. will change with the unification of executive power and the legislature, and the expectation of a conservative majority in the Supreme Court with the appointment of a new member by President Trump. This change, after Trump's election and the retention of a Republican majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, at least from one angle, poses serious difficulties for last year's nuclear agreement with Tehran, the Islamic Republic. Immediate and short-term changes are due to the difficulties in implementing the JCPOA on both main sides of the agreement, from the certainty of the exit of nearly 10,000 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran, which was considered the most important goal of the U.S. and confirmed the disarmament of Iran's nuclear capacity, to the exit of heavy water, even through forced purchase by the U.S. government, filling the site of the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak with cement, and also finding a framework to cover an acceptable situation leading to the closure of Iran's file regarding activities deemed 'suspected of having military dimensions' (read efforts to build a bomb). John Kerry, the current U.S. Secretary of State, was in daily contact with his Iranian counterpart, Zarif. Since mid-January, when the implementation of the JCPOA became official, Javad Zarif, the Iranian Foreign Minister, has been in regular contact with his U.S. counterpart to soften U.S. positions and take advantage of the JCPOA. The Rouhani government expected the U.S. to encourage major banks to engage more seriously in financial transactions with Iran, facilitate the renewal of insurance conditions for Iran's oil exports, and especially to issue permits for Iran's foreign transactions based on the U.S. dollar, a subject that has yet to be realized. In addition to meeting mutual expectations, both the Iranian and U.S. governments were inevitably forced to confront opponents of the agreement that had been labeled 'historic.' After the elections on Tuesday in the U.S. and the certainty of Trump's victory, Obama and his administration have practically become 'lame ducks' in Washington. From Wednesday, the 9th of this month, heads of U.S. security and intelligence organizations will provide the President-elect with reports similar to the daily reports they send to Obama. According to records, unless in a crisis situation, the current president will seek the opinion of the President-elect in making any significant decision or taking any important action domestically or internationally until he officially leaves power on January 20 of next year. From November 9, it is not expected that Obama will use his veto power to nullify hypothetical congressional resolutions against Iran, and John Kerry, aligned with the outgoing president, will continue communications with Javad Zarif under the best conditions, without accepting any commitments, rarely and only in special circumstances, ceremonially and not friendly. Regarding the nuclear agreement, Trump does not need to take any immediate or specific action. Ignoring the issue of the agreement and Washington's 'voluntary commitments' and setting them aside is the most effective action that the Trump administration and its Secretary of State can take against the Islamic Republic. As a result, European parties to oil transactions, major banks, and foreign investors will suspend any agreement with Iran until the situation is clarified and the subsequent U.S. policies are announced and implemented. The Trump administration will likely attempt to coordinate issues related to the nuclear agreement with Russia as a member of the 5+1 group, which does not necessarily mean softening Trump's positions regarding the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic. Perhaps Putin will be among the first foreign guests of Trump to visit Washington, but in Trump's discussions with Putin, the nuclear agreement will not be a special priority. The Trump administration will align with a Congress that has taken numerous actions over the past year to impose new sanctions against the Islamic Republic but has been stalled behind Obama's veto wall. However, Trump will encourage the imposition of new pressures rather than obstruct Congress. Looking at Trump's potential associates, including Newt Gingrich or Rudy Giuliani, both of whom were guests at a recent gathering of the Mujahedin-e Khalq in Paris, Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama, a staunch opponent of the nuclear agreement, Walid Phares, a Lebanese-American counter-terrorism expert, George Papadopoulos, and military figures like General Joe Schmitz, the outlook for the Islamic Republic's relations with the next U.S. administration does not appear warm or bright at all. It can be expected that under pressure from conservatives, Iran will either as a preventive measure or retaliatory action seek to turn its back on the JCPOA and at least 'suspend' it, a decision that, due to the lack of an effective lever (loss of nuclear capacity and reserves), will not lead anywhere.