Zarif at the Congress of the 'Voice of Iranians' Party; A Leap for the 2021 Elections?

As far as we know, it has never been seen that Mohammad Javad Zarif, in his capacity as Foreign Minister, has participated in a gathering of a political party. However, in a first of its kind, he recently attended the fourth congress of the 'Voice of Iranians' Party and, more importantly, delivered a speech there. Zarif is a familiar face for the media and gatherings, both domestically and internationally. He utilizes his ability, innovation, skill, and eloquence to influence audiences, both inside and outside the country. These characteristics cannot be found in any of Iran's foreign ministers since the revolution. Given this, if he is a master of public diplomacy and establishing 'direct communication' with audiences, why should we contemplate his presence at a party congress? Why should this presence be scrutinized? The answer to this question is embedded in the question itself, as all of Zarif's active participation in domestic and international meetings, organizations, and media pertains to his specialized field of foreign policy and international relations. His presence and speech at a 'party' is certainly an exception. Furthermore, all employees of the Foreign Ministry, big and small, are prohibited from party membership or even political activity according to the ministry's charter. In other words, just as military personnel are prohibited from engaging in politics, diplomats are also barred from entering parties. Interestingly, from the content of Zarif's speech at the congress of the Voice of Iranians Party, it can be inferred that he himself is concerned about the possibility that his presence at this gathering may conflict with legal prohibitions. Therefore, at the beginning of his speech, he attempted to address this concern by stating, 'I have never had the opportunity to be a party member, as I have been responsible in the Foreign Ministry from the beginning. The ministry's charter prohibits employees from participating in parties.' Zarif's internal concern is evident when he refers to the 'enthusiasm' and a 'deep movement' at the party congress, saying, 'If it weren't for these, the Foreign Minister would not participate in a party meeting.' He did not specify what deep movement he sees in this gathering and where this 'movement' is heading, but he diverted his speech by stating, 'I am not very familiar with this party movement that has formed here.' Is this really the case? Throughout his speech, he tried to avoid discussing the agenda of the Voice Party except for one exception; praising the Secretary-General of the Voice of Iranians Party, Sadegh Kharazi, whom Zarif stated, 'I have not yet been able to repay his kindness.' Sadegh Kharazi, before joining the ranks of domestic political activists with the establishment of the Voice of Iranians Party in 2014, was a diplomat with a history in foreign policy. He previously served as Iran's ambassador and deputy permanent representative to the United Nations (1989 to 1995), deputy foreign minister (1998 to 2002), and Iran's ambassador to France (2002 to 2006). During Kharazi's years in New York, Zarif began his work at the Iranian representation at the UN as a local employee and was later called back to Tehran, gradually climbing the ranks to become Foreign Minister. Javad Zarif and Sadegh Kharazi have a long-standing acquaintance, as described briefly. He is also aware of the position of the Kharazi family in the power structure of the Islamic Republic. Sadegh Kharazi, aside from his positions, is the son of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohsen Kharazi, a former member of the Assembly of Experts. Sadegh Kharazi's sister is the daughter-in-law of Khamenei (the wife of Masoud Khamenei). His uncle, Seyyed Kamal Kharazi, was Foreign Minister in two governments of Mohammad Khatami. With the establishment of the Voice of Iranians Party, which does not have a significant presence in the domestic political sphere, he is certainly seeking participation in the power hierarchy—something beyond being a senior diplomat. So far, he claims that about 30 members of his party have entered the city council, and 1 to 4 members were elected to the parliament in the 2016 elections. He considers the Voice Party as 'the embodiment of the unity of all reformists.' Given this description of the success he has recorded for himself, it is evident that he is looking for a bigger leap for the 2021 presidential elections; whether he himself runs for president—which is unlikely due to his illness—or he nominates a well-known candidate for presidency, especially since that well-known individual is his long-time ally and the current Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif. There is no doubt that the Voice Party is seeking to secure the next presidency or participate in the victory of the selected individual in 2021, but what can we infer from Zarif's presence at the congress of the Voice of Iranians Party? What does Zarif mean by 'repaying the kindness' of Sadegh Kharazi? Is it not the case that Sadegh Kharazi is seeking to introduce someone from his party for the presidential nomination? In this assumption, who could be a better option than Javad Zarif, whose merits and demerits are well-known both inside and outside the country? Outside, Kissinger referred to him as a 'respected adversary,' and inside, some have placed him in the position of Mohammad Mossadegh. Conversely, his opponents, such as Nader Ghazipour, have described him as '100% American' and have even moved to propose his impeachment. Zarif is someone who has been involved in every critical negotiation of the Islamic Republic—from the release of American hostages to Resolution 598 and the exhausting nuclear negotiations—a record that can confidently be said no other diplomat has in their portfolio, especially if we recall his one-on-one negotiations with John Kerry and his handshake with Obama, and do not forget that at his suggestion, Rouhani agreed to a phone conversation with Obama. At this point, it cannot be stated with certainty whether Zarif's unusual participation in a party gathering was to support the party's future candidate or for the Voice Party to support him as a potential candidate. However, if we consider the second assumption— which is a strongly plausible assumption—Zarif indeed has strong motivations to test his luck for the presidency. He is well aware of the power dynamics in the structure of the Islamic Republic. His friends have placed him in the position of Mohammad Mossadegh, and his enemies are thirsty for his blood. Despite all the dissatisfaction of the leader with the outcome of the JCPOA—whom he called a total loss—he has never uttered a word of reproach against the nuclear negotiating team led by Zarif. More importantly, Zarif and many like him consider the return of another 'Ahmadinejad' as a nightmare for their future and the system, which will not hesitate to resort to any 'fraud' and 'suppression' in the pursuit of the presidency, even if it incurs the costs of 2009. If, following Ahmadinejad's presidency in 2005, Zarif was banned from all government jobs, even teaching at the university, and became a recluse, in the aftermath of 2021 and a repeat of the 2005 scenario, only God knows what will happen to Zarif and his team, especially if we consider the hypothetical death of the current leader. Based on the calculations of Sadegh Kharazi and others like him, in confronting the violations of the opposing faction for the presidency—which will ultimately be overlooked by the leader and supervisory bodies—Zarif could be a 'heavyweight' candidate; a candidacy that is popular among certain segments of the population due to the JCPOA and has personal connections with individuals, personalities, and media in the West, even in America, who view his rise to power as a 'sign of rationality' in the authoritarian system of Iran. The praise that the Secretary-General of this party gave to Zarif at the congress is an indication that Zarif is likely the candidate of the Voice Party for the 2021 elections. Sadegh Kharazi stated that Zarif is an 'outstanding personality and an international figure' who 'cares more than we do.' These and more are reasons that likely led Zarif to speak at a party, contrary to his usual practice, with half an eye on candidacy for the 2021 elections, even though it is an unusual act. Nevertheless, it is still unclear whether he is seeking to support another candidate from the Voice Party or if he will run himself. What is now clear from this unusual act of this seasoned diplomat is that the 2021 election campaign has been 'kicked off' by his action.