Zarif: Foreign Minister or Spokesman for the Revolutionary Court?

Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister of Rouhani's moderate government, stated in an interview with PBS in the U.S.: "We do not imprison anyone in Iran for their beliefs... Those who commit crimes, those who violate the laws of the country, cannot hide behind titles like journalist or political activist." Zarif can confidently be considered one of the elite, experienced, and sharp diplomats of the Islamic Republic. Many Iranian and non-Iranian journalists speak of his command over language and precise word choice. With such characteristics, the foreign minister of Rouhani's government makes a strange and ambiguous claim. Although he expresses a seemingly correct statement that cannot be denied from a certain perspective (i.e., a 'criminal' cannot and should not be condemned due to their profession or social identity), he knows very well that he is simultaneously distorting the truth and covering up very important realities (including the repression of independent and critical journalists). The statements of the Islamic Republic's foreign minister not only do not correspond to the political-judicial realities in Iran but also have noticeably negative consequences for a significant part of the social base supporting the government. This is independent of the damage to his image in global forums; where Zarif must strive to gain the trust of the opposing side regarding the political system's claims in the nuclear energy sector. While Zarif denies or justifies the issue of 'imprisoned journalists' in Iran, independent human rights organizations (such as Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders) have reported that the Islamic Republic has become one of the largest prisons in the world for journalists and media activists in recent years. Zarif's statements are a repetition of claims made by senior judicial officials in recent years. For instance, Mohseni Ejei, spokesman and deputy of the judiciary, believes: "An individual is not pursued simply because they are a journalist. An individual may have committed a crime that has nothing to do with their work and profession. Perhaps this individual has committed a crime due to their job." Or Mohammad Javad Larijani, secretary of the Human Rights Headquarters of the judiciary, emphasized in an interview with foreign media that "no journalist has been imprisoned for journalism." Almost all detained journalists have been questioned and deemed 'criminal' regarding their primary action, which is journalistic activity, during interrogations and the security-judicial pressure imposed on them. Senior judicial officials of the Islamic Republic try to evade the heavy burden of justifying the detention of dozens of journalists by separating the reason for the journalists' convictions from their expertise and profession, believing they can deny and explain human rights criticisms. Meanwhile, almost all detained journalists have been questioned and deemed 'criminal' regarding their primary action, which is journalistic activity, during interrogations and the security-judicial pressure imposed on them. Zarif's recent remarks significantly recall a similar important comment from Rouhani. The purple government president has also, in several interviews with foreign media, instead of attributing the responsibility for the actions of the judiciary to this power and responding with the discussion of 'separation of powers' in the Islamic Republic, has come to deny or justify the detention of journalists. For example, a year ago, Rouhani, in an interview with the American NBC television network, in response to a question about the situation of an Iranian-American journalist and his imprisoned wife, said: "Individuals may be summoned and detained for security or non-security reasons within the framework of the regulations of the judiciary and may be interrogated, and a judicial process may take place." Rouhani also made a thought-provoking statement: "I am sure that the Iranian judiciary will pursue cases within the framework of law and regulations and justice." In another interview with CNN, in response to a similar question, he expressed: "I do not think anyone has been arrested for journalism or media activity in Iran. An individual may be a journalist and be arrested for other charges that they must respond to." Both Zarif and Rouhani must understand that denying the repression and threats facing journalists and political activists, and justifying unfair judicial rulings issued in a process contrary to the Islamic Republic's constitution, is a 'double-edged sword' for their political status and character. Neither Western parties (including journalists, academics, and diplomats) believe these claims and justifications, nor do aware citizens and the social base supporting the moderate government inside the country. The moderate government, instead of striving to expand the political space and remove threats and violence against civil society—through dialogue with decision-makers in the judiciary and the central power hub—and thus strengthen its social backing, is undermining its civil supporters by evading its electoral promises and slogans and attempting to justify the established unfavorable situation. Externally, there is increasing sensitivity to this distortion of truth and denial of reality, leading to distrust and sensitivity towards the negotiating side—regarding the nuclear issue; and internally, those disappointed with the established situation will view the 'Government of Prudence and Hope' as separate from society and will abandon serious cooperation and support for it. The reality of the repression of independent and critical journalism in Iran, as well as the violence against political activists protesting the current situation and human rights defenders, is too well-known and documented to be denied or portrayed as lawful and fair by Zarif and Rouhani's denials or their attempts to justify it. According to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the three branches of government operate 'under the supervision of the absolute guardianship of the jurist and the leadership of the nation' and are 'independent of one another.' Both Rouhani, a lawyer, and Zarif, a diplomat, know this. Therefore, another justification for the dire existing situation can be presented: the responsibility of the judiciary and the independence of the executive from the other branches. The security-judicial confrontations following the controversial and ambiguous elections of 2009 do not connect to Rouhani's government (from the president himself to his foreign minister). Thus, the motivation for Rouhani and Zarif's insistence on sitting in the position of 'lawyer for the judiciary' or 'spokesman for the Revolutionary Court' is unclear. Whatever the reason for this approach, it will have negative consequences for Rouhani's government. The moderate government, instead of striving to expand the political space and remove threats and violence against civil society—through dialogue with decision-makers in the judiciary and the central power hub—and thus strengthen its social backing, is undermining its civil supporters by evading its electoral promises and slogans and attempting to justify the established unfavorable situation. If Zarif—and Rouhani—cannot direct the top of the political system's attention to the importance of political development and respect for human rights, at the very least, public expectations from them are that they do not position themselves as justifiers of the illegal actions of the judiciary and do not find themselves in the role of spokesperson for the Revolutionary Court. Unless garnering positive attention and encouragement from the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic for Rouhani, Zarif, and the moderate government is more strategic than paying attention to civil society and relying on public opinion.