Zarif: The Additional Protocol Does Not Allow Excessive Access

Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated on Tuesday, May 18, that "the Additional Protocol does not allow for excessive and unjustified access to the structures of countries; rather, it creates a regulated framework that is currently being implemented in 124 countries." According to ISNA news agency, Zarif described the statements of Western officials regarding inspections of Iran's military sites as "emotional" remarks made to "calm certain pressure groups." He added, "Existing regulations prevent the misuse of such accesses, which are not inspections but access, and their frameworks are completely specified and managed." Under the Additional Protocol of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which Iran accepted to implement voluntarily in the Lausanne nuclear agreement, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be allowed to conduct surprise inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities whenever they deem necessary. Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the IAEA, emphasized in an interview with the Associated Press the right to inspect Iran's military sites "based on the Additional Protocol," stating that if a final nuclear agreement is signed between Iran and the 1+5 group, the path for IAEA inspectors to visit some of Iran's military facilities will be paved. However, Ali Akbar Velayati, the international affairs advisor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, emphasized on Sunday, May 27, that "military officials are not authorized to allow anyone to inspect the defensive system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and these matters are part of the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran." Meanwhile, Hamid Baidi-Nejad, a member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, wrote on his Instagram page that the Iranian negotiating team has opposed "granting special authority to the Agency" for inspecting Iran's military facilities from the very beginning of the negotiations. He added, "The only assumption that can be made for access to military facilities is the claim that these non-nuclear facilities are dealing with nuclear materials or are involved in the fuel production cycle." According to Baidi-Nejad, any access to military facilities must be conducted through a "managed access mechanism," under which the country can cover all necessary equipment and unrelated areas and activities from the eyes of agency members when granting access. Abbas Araghchi, a senior member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, stated on Tuesday evening, May 15, during a television program that he did not rule out the possibility of inspections of Iran's military sites, stating that "possible" inspections based on the Additional Protocol of the NPT would be "managed." On Sunday, May 20, Araghchi referred to "managed access" to Iran's military sites as "environmental sampling." Similarly, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, stated on Tuesday, May 7, that "inspectors can take samples from areas around non-nuclear sites based on the Additional Protocol." The statements of these Iranian officials come while previously, Iranian military officials had referred to inspections of military sites as a red line and emphasized that they would not allow inspections of these sites. For instance, Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, warned on Saturday, April 29, that the Islamic Republic would respond to visits of its military sites "with hot lead." In this context, Araghchi announced Iran's readiness "for any scenario" in the negotiations. Najafi: We do not give a blank check to the IAEA for inspections of sites. Kamalvandi: There is no obligation for access to military sites in the Additional Protocol.