Escalated Protests and Outdated Solutions

Seven days have passed since the beginning of nationwide protests in Iran! A news statement that did not seem so close to reality just a few days ago. Just when the entire ruling establishment was introducing the Islamic Republic of Iran as an island of stability and calm in the tumultuous Middle East and boasting about the defeat of ISIS, last Thursday's gathering of people in Mashhad (which some believe was orchestrated by Ahmad Alam al-Huda, the hardline representative of the Supreme Leader in Khorasan Razavi) marked the beginning of protests by a populace tired of factional games and disillusioned with political and economic reforms. The slogans quickly shifted from economic demands and anti-government chants to subversive slogans targeting the apex of political power in Iran, and in the blink of an eye, the protests spread across the entire geographical expanse of Iran like sudden flames igniting in the presence of flammable materials. The simultaneous and unified nature of these movements in terms of behavior and types of slogans in various cities, despite lacking a cohesive leadership and unified strategy, is not far-fetched, aided by social networks and modern technologies. However, the geographical spread of the protests is only comparable to the movements leading to the 1979 Revolution, a strange and surprising issue that seems to have created a specific confusion within the ruling establishment regarding how to confront it. In recent days, various reports, analyses, and opinions have been published in cyberspace and especially in media outside of Iran regarding the causes of the protests, the backgrounds of the protesters, their social bases, and their goals, which have sometimes been contradictory. To confirm or refute them, field research and calmer conditions are needed. However, there is also descriptive information that does not require analysis and can be judged with near certainty simply by observing internet videos. This reality indicates the emergence of a new type of political protester, which in the dramatically transformed world of recent years signifies a kind of leap or mutation that could disrupt the calculations and predictions of rulers and even political analysts. The most important feature is the emergence of violent and highly emotional behaviors among young people who are not very old, seen attacking public property and even setting personal belongings like cars on fire during protests, reminiscent at first glance of certain video games and movies. In previous protests, initially, the protesters did not engage in destructive actions, and usually, it was in response to security forces and after being suppressed that the resulting anger manifested in attacks on government centers and similar targets. However, in recent movements, mosques, religious centers, and seminaries, which are traditionally symbols of the country's official religion and usually respected, have not been spared from the angry attacks of protesters, and it can even be imagined that they were pre-determined targets. It is also clear that a kind of association of these centers with the ruling establishment and their easy accessibility has influenced the choice of these targets. Another important feature is a kind of challenge and direct confrontation with law enforcement forces, and the apparent disappearance of fear, exemplified by a brave woman chanting 'Death to Khamenei' face-to-face with security forces or a teenage girl publicly waving her headscarf, both signs of openly crossing the values and red lines of the existing regime. Another significant point is the attack on police stations, which can be seen as a desire to obtain weapons and military ammunition. In videos released in recent nights, scenes of armed confrontation and gunfire exchanges in front of the main police headquarters in the city of Qahderijan in Isfahan province were published, and if their authenticity is confirmed, it can be said that these protests are rapidly turning into an urban war, a phenomenon that has not been seen since the events of 1980 or in Kurdish regions. This occurrence, if it happens, considering the pent-up anger of various groups of people over the years and the wide and deep social, economic, and ethnic divides, as well as the regional conflicts created and the new strategy of the U.S. under Trump's leadership in supporting regime change, will present an ambiguous future for the territorial solidarity of Iran. Other multiple factors can be added to the list of surprising and different aspects of recent movements, such as agility in mobility, gathering in small groups instead of large crowds, which would make controlling and suppressing them extremely difficult, or ignoring the reasoning and calls for calm from social reference groups. However, in the author's opinion, these factors alone suffice to demonstrate a leap in the methods and styles of protest and the emergence of a new generation of protesters whose anger and fatigue from the structure and hatred of the imposed values of the Islamic Republic are the most prominent manifestations. Although there is no space to address the causes and examine the backgrounds of the emergence of this angry and hate-filled generation, it seems that under the incompetence of officials and the inefficiency of the regime, these individuals are as deprived of wealth, status, and welfare as they have unfortunately inherited the violence of the past forty years of the Islamic Republic. In such an atmosphere, where all signs inside and outside the country indicate the emergence of a completely new and different phenomenon, unfortunately, the officials of the Islamic Republic have, as in the past, adopted a strategy centered on enemies, conspiracy theories about foreign plots, and refusal to acknowledge their gross mistakes in managing the country as their main approach to dealing with protesters. While Mr. Rouhani has spoken about recognizing the right to protest in the Islamic Republic, the principle of freedom to hold gatherings and marches does not even include critics within the regime itself, and in practice, there is no possibility of issuing permits for gatherings of political opponents. It is conceivable that if this one right had been implemented since the beginning of the revolution and the formation of the Islamic regime, the country would not have gone astray! On the other hand, while protests are rapidly expanding and changing phases, he threatens protesters with the derogatory term 'gathering' to confront the millions of government supporters and speaks of 'people against people,' which could itself exacerbate protests and increase the likelihood of urban warfare, showing that he has not learned from the bitter experience of Syria. All of this occurs while with a bit of political acumen and, of course, a difficult and costly choice to prioritize national interests over political futures or personal interests, Rouhani could have used the recent protests as a bargaining chip with the hardline power core to achieve minimal promises of his electoral campaign, the failure to fulfill which and his meaningful shift to the right have led to public disappointment and the erosion of his regretting supporters. Additionally, in recent days following the protests, we have witnessed the ridiculous competition among the heads of branches in presenting statistics and figures and stating their performance and the miracles of the Islamic Republic in progress and prosperity, from roads and telephones to electricity and hospitals, and even more humiliatingly, the repeated broadcasts of news about the decreasing prices of eggs and some other goods from state media, which itself shows the peak of ignorance and unawareness of the main causes of the protests and the slogans raised during the recent demonstrations. The initial economic sparks are currently sharply directed at the widespread dissatisfaction and street protests regarding the inefficiency of the clerical regime, opposition to religious despotism, the existence of a blockage in the circulation of power, and the pervasive structural corruption. Given this, it must be acknowledged that in the shadow of escalated protests and the emergence of a new type of protesters, and the use of outdated and regressive solutions by officials, there is no bright and hopeful outlook for a peaceful transition to democracy and an efficient regime, while it could have been avoided by acknowledging mistakes by the top of the political hierarchy and demonstrating a commitment to genuinely reforming the legal and real power structure (for example, by announcing a commitment to holding free and competitive elections), thus preventing heavier and more costly burdens than those imposed on Iran and Iranians in recent years.