Formation of Street Protests and Political Economy

The protest gatherings that formed in Razavi Khorasan province, centered in the city of Mashhad on December 28, unexpectedly spread to eight other cities including Qom, Ahvaz, and Isfahan on Friday, December 29, creating a wave of spontaneous protests. Protests continued on Saturday, December 30, in other cities such as Tehran, Khorramabad, Kerman, Urmia, Qahderijan, Shiraz, Zanjan, Gorgan, Dorud, Kashan, Arak, Hamadan, Ardabil, Malayer, Bushehr, Izeh, Behshahr, Karaj, Tonekabon, Semnan, Shahrud, Amol, Tabriz, Bandar Abbas, Saveh, Bahnavard, and Delijan. In Tehran, students from the University of Tehran joined the protests. Based on available evidence, it seems that these protest movements are spontaneous and grassroots, with no political group leading them. The main background for the emergence of the protests is economic and livelihood issues, which, during interactions with law enforcement and political authorities, have become politicized, and it can be said that they have flowed within the realm of economy-politics. The weakness and inability of the political system, along with both reformist and principlist factions in managing the country's issues and controlling major challenges, combined with the use of force in dealing with cultural and political issues, and the dominance of the institution of the Supreme Leader over most of the country's resources, as well as preventing the circulation of elites in power and the organized violation of citizens' rights, have placed the country in an explosive and unstable situation. The worsening problems of financial victims of financial and banking institutions, who have lost hope of recovering their deposits, alongside the government's moderate program to significantly increase public goods and fossil energy, appeared as a catalyst in Mashhad and quickly spread to other parts of Iran. The extensive volume of corruption, embezzlement, unemployment, and deepening economic recession, along with increasing class disparities and worsening environmental issues and air pollution, had long created the expectation that protests centered around economic motivations would emerge. Now, after a delayed phase, this event has materialized. A comprehensive and realistic analysis of the events that have swept through most of the major cities in the country cannot yet be made. This requires the passage of time and more information. However, based on existing evidence, it can almost certainly be said that the common features of the protests include a subversive approach, dissatisfaction with the entirety of the Islamic Republic system, the decline of the institution of the Supreme Leader, the removal of Khamenei from power, the simultaneous rejection of both principlists and reformists, and the neglect of the internal divisions within the system, opposition to the Islamic Republic's regional policy, especially in Syria, opposition to the clergy, emphasis on the separation of religion and state, and the denial of religious governance, demands for justice, protests against discrimination and class disparities, and the fight against corruption. Alongside this convergence, various slogans and demands have also been raised. Formally, these protests still lack the necessary characteristics of a social movement. There is currently no clear targeting, high coherence is absent, and they suffer from a lack of organization and leadership. However, the motivational potential and activism within them are high, and they have the capacity to expand. Yet, at the same time, their sustainability and continuity are unclear and depend on multiple factors and variables, including public motivations, the reaction of the hard core of power, the response of law enforcement, the degree of coherence in the protests, geographical dispersion, and global reflections. The lifespan of these protest movements may be short-term and could lead to blind riots. However, if they can establish coordination within themselves, organize, and choose their leaders, then they have the potential to evolve into an effective social movement. In a general and preliminary analysis, the emergence of these protests can be interpreted as a sign of increasing despair with the Islamic Republic and both of its factions against the backdrop of the accumulation of problems in Iran over the past four decades since the revolution. In fact, the structural background, considering the multiple crises of legitimacy, effectiveness, and social solidarity, has been conducive to the formation of a social movement in recent years. The weakness and inability of the political system, along with both reformist and principlist factions in managing the country's issues and controlling major challenges, combined with the use of force in dealing with cultural and political issues, and the dominance of the institution of the Supreme Leader over most of the country's resources, as well as preventing the circulation of elites in power and the organized violation of citizens' rights, have placed the country in an explosive and unstable situation. In fact, the intensification of contradictions and the increase in tensions, according to Smelser's theory, has created structural pressure in society and has made society experience conflicting interests and divergence against the ruling body. The rampant expansion of economic corruption, alongside injustice and poverty development, in conditions where existing mechanisms and institutions practically lack the ability to control them, and the judicial system itself promotes injustice and oppression and lacks the capacity to control corruption, has left the people with no choice but to take to the streets and create public power to establish effective institutions. The indefensible performance of Rouhani alongside the reformists' orientation towards power and indifference to political and social reforms is another factor that has facilitated and accelerated this trend. It is not incorrect to say that the emergence of these protests, regardless of what fate they encounter, is a product of the blockage and deadlock created within the existing governing structure for positive change and transformation in both minor and major societal issues. The political system has completely lost its constructive capacities, and the aggregate of its internal forces is almost close to zero. The country is on a regressive path, and the moderates have managed to slow down its speed at most. This situation encourages public opinion to move towards structural changes and surgery in the political arena. Analysis of videos shows that the nature of these protests is distinct from those of 2009 and the major political protest movements of the 1990s and 2000s. While there are some commonalities, the differentiating features are more pronounced. The slogans are more similar to those before the victory of the Islamic Revolution; this movement has not directly emerged from political issues but has reached the political realm through economic issues, and currently, the political aspect of the slogans outweighs the economic one. This movement does not have a specific steward, and there are no shared discursive and political beliefs governing it. Most importantly, for the first time in contemporary Iranian history, its spark has ignited outside of Tehran and is not center-oriented. Its geographical dispersion is relatively greater than all previous protests, including the 2009 electoral protests. So far, no religious slogans have been raised in the rallies, and secular language dominates. Anti-religious sentiment is not prevalent, and it is somewhat non-religious while simultaneously protesting the government's expression of religion. The intensity of dissatisfaction and anger towards the clergy is unprecedentedly high, and interestingly, in Qom, the most slogans against the clergy and their privileges have been raised. The composition of individuals and social classes involved is unclear, but it seems that the marginalized and lower classes are relatively more represented. However, it cannot be definitively said that this is a rebellion of the hungry or those aspiring for prosperity. The quantity of youth appears to be significantly higher, and they seem to possess a specific enthusiasm. This protest movement has also been subjected to the clashes and rivalries of the power bloc. Initially, the reformists and Rouhani's government declared it a conspiracy of rivals. Although their dominant faction still seeks to discredit this movement by denying it, gradually more individuals from the reformists are calling for understanding the people's demands and non-security responses. The principlists, on the other hand, differentiate the protests into 'economic demanders' and 'rioters and those linked to the counter-revolution,' while opposing street protests, they also wish for the dissatisfied to set aside political demands and only raise livelihood demands and opposition to inflation, thus weakening Rouhani's government in the public sphere. However, the expansion of protests drives both factions towards unity. The coming days will show whether these protest movements will evolve into a broad social movement or fade away. Currently, no accurate speculation can be made about their fate. However, whatever happens will have lasting repercussions. First, it will strengthen subversive tendencies among reformists and exacerbate the legitimacy and effectiveness crisis of the regime. The concentration of social dissatisfaction towards Khamenei and the institution of the Supreme Leader, alongside the decline of Rouhani and government-centered reformism, is another consequence. The paradigm of justice-seeking and attention to public welfare in the public sphere and the realm of reformism will be strengthened. Additionally, the alarm bell for the clergy has seriously sounded, which will encourage the growth of the gap between seminaries and the regime.