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Ghalibaf's Economic Statement Under Scrutiny

Jan 28, 2026 January 28, 2026 8 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, a candidate for the Iranian presidency, promises an 'economic revolution' focusing on job creation and income increase, but lacks a detailed plan. His claims raise skepticism about their feasibility given Iran's economic history and current conditions.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: Ghalibaf's ambitious economic promises raise questions about their feasibility, reflecting broader concerns about Iran's economic future.

👥 Key Players

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf MENTIONED
Mayor of Tehran and presidential candidate
"A prominent figure in Iranian politics with military and administrative experience, Ghalibaf's policies and promises can significantly influence public sentiment and electoral outcomes."
Hassan Rouhani MENTIONED
Former President of Iran
"His administration's economic policies are being criticized by Ghalibaf, which reflects ongoing political tensions and public dissatisfaction with the previous government."

📰 What Happened

Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf announced his candidacy for the presidency, promising an 'economic revolution' focused on job creation and income increase, but his lack of a detailed plan raises skepticism about the feasibility of his proposals.

  • Ghalibaf claims that 96% of Iranians are dissatisfied with the current economic situation.
  • He promises to create five million jobs and increase national income by 2.5 times within four years.

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: Ghalibaf's promises reflect the urgent need for economic reform in Iran, highlighting public dissatisfaction and the challenges facing future leadership.
🌍 Regional: The outcome of the presidential election could impact regional stability and Iran's relations with neighboring countries.
🌐 International: International observers will be watching to see if Ghalibaf's proposals can lead to meaningful changes in Iran's economic policies, which could affect sanctions and diplomatic relations.

📚 Background

Iran has been facing significant economic challenges, including high unemployment and inflation, leading to widespread public dissatisfaction with the government.

Iran's economic policies Public dissatisfaction and protests in Iran
📡 Source: STATE MEDIA
📊 Confidence: 70%
The article appears to be critical of Ghalibaf's claims, suggesting a need for skepticism regarding the promises made by political figures in state-affiliated media.

Following a military career that led him to the rank of "General" and with twelve years of experience at the helm of Tehran's municipality, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf is running for the presidency of the Islamic Republic for the third time. In an interview with the "Tasnim" news agency, Mr. Ghalibaf declares that solving the people's livelihood problems is his main priority and calls for an "economic revolution" aimed at achieving social equality. The pathways to achieving this grand goal require the publication of a comprehensive program of at least one hundred pages filled with analysis and statistics so that Iranian voters understand what the "economic revolution" means and how it intends to bring society to equality. There is no news of such a program, and the curious have no choice but to refer to a one-page election statement released by the mayor of Tehran on April 15. The statement begins with a very harsh criticism of Hassan Rouhani, who, in Mr. Ghalibaf's view, has gone from four years of "inaction" to "dishonesty" and denies his previous promises. Then, in the continuation of the statement, Ghalibaf conducts an assessment of the current situation in Iranian society that astonishes any observer. His statement is as follows: "Mr. Rouhani talks about improving the economic situation, but if he steps out of his room and goes among the people, he will get a more accurate picture of the tangible realities in society and will realize that only 4 percent of the community is satisfied with the current situation." This assessment cannot be easily dismissed, as it comes from someone who is not only one of the most prominent military figures of the Islamic Republic but has also held the position of executive head of Iran's capital for twelve years, and if I'm not mistaken, holds the record for the longest tenure as mayor in this metropolis. A man with such a record states in an election statement that ninety-six percent of the Iranian people are dissatisfied with the current situation. Iranian media should ask Ghalibaf during interviews about his candidacy in the elections: What statistics and analysis is your assessment of the percentage of satisfied and dissatisfied people based on, and if the relationship between the people and the country's political system is truly such, does not your entire professional life and the ideals you have so decisively defended come into question? Beyond this assessment, Mr. Ghalibaf defines his "economic revolution" in two or three lines: I promise you to "increase the country's income by two and a half times, create five million jobs, change the tax system in favor of 96 percent of the people, and, most importantly, implement a detailed plan to solve the immediate problems of low-income groups." The mayor of Tehran is fully aware that he must provide substantial analysis and statistics regarding how he will fulfill these heavy commitments. He knows that the people (with that level of dissatisfaction) will be baffled by these promises. Therefore, in his statement, he raises the question from their perspective: "Ghalibaf! The previous ones said the same things. On what basis should we trust your words?" And he himself responds to the people's doubts: "These words are said by Ghalibaf, and you know him well, with all his strengths and weaknesses." In other words, the mayor of Tehran says you should accept Ghalibaf's words because he is Ghalibaf. By what miracle? Such a statement, with arguments of this kind, cannot be taken seriously in any election worthy of the name. Here, we only address two main objectives of Mr. Ghalibaf's "economic revolution": 1) Increasing the country's income by two and a half times - "Gross national income" is a concept somewhat similar to "Gross domestic product," which, in very simple terms, is the value of all goods and services produced in a country over a year. Economists have calculated that if a country has an average annual growth rate of five percent, its national income will double in fourteen years, and with a ten percent annual growth rate, the same goal will be achieved in seven years. If Mr. Ghalibaf wants to double Iran's national income in four years, the GDP growth rate must reach about 25 percent per year, in a country where the average annual growth rate over the thirty-eight years since the Islamic Revolution has been only about 2.5 percent. Currently, Iran's GDP, according to the International Monetary Fund, is 377 billion dollars per year. Mr. Ghalibaf promises to increase this variable to 942 billion dollars following his four years in office. If Mr. Ghalibaf wants to double Iran's national income in four years, the GDP growth rate must reach about 25 percent per year, in a country where the average annual growth rate over the thirty-eight years since the Islamic Revolution has been only about 2.5 percent. In other words, the mayor of Tehran wants to immediately, after taking office, increase Iran's annual growth rate to ten times the average of this indicator since the Islamic Revolution. By what miracle? Is the price of oil in the global market supposed to multiply several times? Will the volume of domestic and foreign investments in Iran suddenly reach astronomical figures? Will productivity rates suddenly skyrocket after years of stagnation? Will the Iranian economy free itself from its worn-out state and semi-state structures and oil dependency in just four years and reach the level of economies like South Korea? 2) Creating five million jobs - This goal is also closely related to what was mentioned regarding the GDP growth rate. Based on official statistics from the Islamic Republic, it was only during Mohammad Khatami's eight-year presidency that the Iranian economy was able to create an average of about 670,000 jobs per year. During Hassan Rouhani's presidency (if we exclude the year 2016), the average number of jobs created reached 370,000 per year. Mr. Ghalibaf has committed to raising this average to one million two hundred and fifty thousand jobs per year. According to expert evaluations, only with a growth rate of at least eight percent, and that too over several consecutive years, can the Iranian economy create jobs at the level claimed by Mr. Ghalibaf each year. Of course, the mayor of Tehran goes far beyond the eight percent rate and, with the goal of doubling the national income, intends to effectively raise this variable to over twenty percent. We have previously pointed out the impossibility of achieving an annual growth rate above twenty percent in Iran. The economic conditions in the country are not even conducive to achieving a sustainable eight percent growth rate. Mr. Ghalibaf has not stated what he intends to do to create five million jobs per year, and simply being "Ghalibaf" is not enough to convince his audience. Additionally, beyond these two objectives, which have generated a lot of noise, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf has committed to establishing a "national job allowance system" and paying two hundred and fifty thousand tomans as an "allowance" to all job seekers aged eighteen and above who register in this system. A significant ambiguity weighs on this commitment as well: How many people will register in this system? This ambiguity arises from the significant difference between the official number and the actual number of unemployed. According to official statistics, an unemployed person is someone who has not worked even one hour in the week prior to the survey. In other words, anyone who works just one hour in the week before the survey is no longer considered unemployed. With this accounting, all part-time workers are excluded from unemployment statistics. Additionally, all those who, due to despair, have removed themselves from the job market and are no longer considered job seekers, have no place in the official unemployment statistics. Considering all these factors, the official number of unemployed in Iran is three million two hundred thousand. However, if we include those who, out of necessity, take on a few hours of work per week or month, or those who have withdrawn from the job market due to despair, the actual number of unemployed in the country will be at least six to seven million. The difference between official statistics and actual unemployment makes calculating the cost of paying the "allowance" very difficult. For example, currently, many people have become homebound due to despair over the job market and have no place in the unemployment statistics. But if every job seeker over eighteen is to be paid two hundred and fifty thousand tomans per month as an "allowance," naturally, all those who have turned their backs on the job market due to despair will register in the "national job allowance system." What is the financial burden of Mr. Ghalibaf's commitment, and how will this cost be covered? Here, we are not outright denying such supportive programs. Within the framework of a coherent and scientific economic policy, support for underprivileged groups has its place. The issue is that the "allowance" plan of the mayor of Tehran resembles more a lever designed to buy the votes of Iranian voters than a part of a comprehensive economic program aimed at rebuilding the Iranian economy.

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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