Both official sources of the Islamic Republic and international economic organizations report high growth in Iran's gross domestic product in the year 1395 (2016-2017). According to calculations by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, Iran's growth rate reached 7.4 percent in the first six months of the current solar year. In a ceremony on the 22nd of Bahman, President Hassan Rouhani considered reaching this high rate one of the most important achievements of his government and a sign of the country's economy emerging from recession. The Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly also predicts an economic growth rate of 7.2 percent for this year in one of its latest reports. International economic organizations share this optimistic assessment regarding Iran's growth rate, with the International Monetary Fund estimating a growth rate of 6.6 percent for the current solar year. However, based on the World Bank's assessment and forecast, this figure was 4.6 percent for Iran last year and is expected to reach 5.2 percent in 2017. We see that assessments regarding this year's growth rate in Iran are not uniform, but all indicate a high level of this key economic indicator in the country, especially when compared to previous years. In fact, according to the statistics from the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, Iran's economic growth rate between 1391 and 1394 was minus 6.8 percent, minus 1.9 percent, 3 percent, and 0.3 percent, respectively. How is it that the leap in the country's growth rate from such low levels to what has been announced for the current solar year remains hidden from the perspective of economic activists and the public? In fact, the quality of the country's economic growth remains at a very low level, and its quantity is not sustainable, especially if new tensions arise in Iran's foreign relations, particularly regarding the JCPOA. In a country with normal economic structures, such a leap in growth rate cannot go unnoticed and should reflect in the business environment and daily economic life. Typically, if the growth rate rises to such a high level, both economic activists and the public quickly realize that the situation is 'shifting.' Production enterprises gradually utilize their idle capacities, new businesses emerge, hiring increases, consumption revives, real estate transactions pick up, and construction becomes more prevalent... There are no signs of economic prosperity in today's Iran. The job market shows no signs of improvement, consumption has not revived, and production units as well as the housing sector are struggling in recession. Why have the manifestations of Iran's economic growth remained hidden? Are the Islamic Republic's sources providing false statistics, or are international organizations mistaken in assessing the real state of the country's economy? Neither of these is true. The answer to this contradiction must be sought in the quality of Iran's economic growth this year. In both the short and long term, the growth rate and its level cannot, in themselves and abstractly, signify a real improvement in the economic situation or sustainable development. Alongside the quantity of growth (increase in gross domestic product), the quality of growth must be considered, and it can even be said that the quality of growth is more important than its quantity. The quality of growth depends on the factors that generate growth and its consequences. Good growth is primarily endogenous, originating from improvements in the business environment in a country, resulting from increased investment and improved productivity, and is long-term. The quality of growth increases when it does not harm environmental balances and its benefits are distributed somewhat equally among citizens. In contrast, some countries achieve only quantitative growth that is obtained for temporary reasons and is not expected to be sustainable. A banana-exporting country, if the price of this fruit suddenly peaks in the global market within a year, can achieve a high growth rate in that year. But the following year, the banana market may collapse, and a country whose economy is solely tied to the export of this product may crash. For decades, many oil-exporting countries have lived with this purely quantitative growth, constantly fluctuating with the ups and downs of the 'black gold' market. All evidence indicates that the potential 6 to 7 percent economic growth for the year 1395 promised by senior officials of the Islamic Republic is merely a quantitative growth arising from increased oil production and exports, thanks to the JCPOA. In fact, over the past few years, including after Hassan Rouhani's government came to power, no fundamental changes have occurred in the production structures and institutions of the country. Iran's economy remains under the control of the government and 'quasi-government,' the bloated and corrupt bureaucracy remains intact, and the train of reforms in various areas (privatization, tax system, banking system, real pricing, seeking fundamental solutions for cash subsidies...) has stagnated and completely halted. The Research Center of the Assembly, in the report mentioned earlier, points to the main factor of the expected economic growth in Iran for the year 1395. As mentioned, this center, which is considered the research arm of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, predicts Iran's economic growth rate to be 7.2 percent for the current solar year. However (and this is the main point here), 52 percent of this growth comes from the increase in crude oil production and exports, which was a result of the JCPOA. The same report adds that of the expected 7.2 percent growth rate for this year, 5.2 percent is derived from oil, and without oil, Iran's economic growth in 1395 would not exceed 2 percent. A very important point is that the report from the Research Center of the Assembly predicts a minus 15 percent growth rate for the construction sector this year, indicating a worsening recession in this vital sector of Iran's economy. We know that this sector plays a leading role in the economy due to its various links with many sectors, and its decline at this level is a very negative factor, especially for the job market. Given the 52 percent growth in the oil sector and the 15 percent decline in the construction sector in 1395, the invisibility of Iran's economic growth this solar year is entirely natural. In fact, the quality of the country's economic growth remains at a very low level, and its quantity is not sustainable, especially if new tensions arise in Iran's foreign relations and particularly if the JCPOA is called into question.
Iran: Why Do People Not See Economic Growth?
Iran's economy is reported to have high growth rates, yet citizens do not perceive this growth in their daily lives. The disparity between reported growth and public experience raises questions about the quality and sustainability of this growth, particularly in light of potential geopolitical tensions affecting the economy.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
Despite reported high economic growth rates in Iran, citizens do not perceive improvements in their daily lives, raising questions about the sustainability and quality of this growth.
- Iran's GDP growth rate is reported to be around 7.4% for the year 1395 (2016-2017).
- 52% of this growth is attributed to increased oil production and exports, primarily due to the JCPOA.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran's economy has faced significant challenges due to sanctions, mismanagement, and reliance on oil exports, leading to fluctuations in growth rates.
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