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🔴 Breaking ❓ Unknown

Lack of Alternative Strategy in Iran's Foreign Policy

Jan 26, 2026 January 26, 2026 7 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

The article discusses the lack of an alternative strategy in Iran's foreign policy, particularly in relation to the JCPOA following the U.S. withdrawal. It questions whether Iran has had a feasible alternative strategy since the agreement's signing and highlights the implications of this absence for Iran's national interests and security.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: Iran's foreign policy is at a critical juncture without a backup plan.

👥 Key Players

Mohammad Javad Zarif (محمدجواد ظریف) QUOTED
Foreign Minister of Iran
"Zarif was accused of treason by the far-right."
John Kerry QUOTED
Former U.S. Secretary of State
"John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif decided to discuss matters."
Supreme Leader (رهبر معظم انقلاب) ACTOR
Supreme Leader of Iran
"The negotiating teams, appointed by the Supreme Leader."
Iran negotiating team ACTOR
Nuclear negotiation team
"The negotiating teams conveyed specific messages to the negotiation venues."
U.S. ACTOR
United States Government
"The deadlock created by the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement."
5+1 countries TARGET
Group of countries involved in JCPOA
"The JCPOA is a 159-page document signed by Iran and the so-called 5+1 countries."

⚡ Actions

Iran negotiating team NEGOTIATE 5+1 countries
"The entire text of the agreement is completely silent on the determination of cancellation conditions."
Confidence: 90%
United States WITHDRAW JCPOA
"The deadlock created by the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran."
Confidence: 90%
John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif DISCUSS Iran nuclear agreement
"At least in one instance, John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif decided to discuss matters while walking in the streets of Geneva."
Confidence: 70%

📰 What Happened

Iran lacks an alternative strategy in foreign policy post-JCPOA collapse.

  • Iran negotiating team negotiate 5+1 countries
  • United States withdraw JCPOA
  • John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif discuss Iran nuclear agreement

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: Because the lack of an alternative strategy may jeopardize national interests.
🌍 Regional: Because it could lead to increased tensions in the Middle East.
🌐 International: Because it undermines the credibility of international agreements.

📚 Background

Iran's foreign policy is at a critical juncture without a backup plan.

📝 Key Evidence

"The deadlock created by the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran."
→ Indicates the impact of U.S. actions on Iran's foreign policy.
"The entire text of the agreement is completely silent on the determination of cancellation conditions."
→ Shows the lack of foresight in Iran's negotiation strategy.
📡 Source: NEUTRAL
📊 Confidence: 80%
Radio Farda is known for its independent reporting.

Every country uses strategies and tactics to pursue security and national interests. However, alongside the main strategies, an alternative strategy is also necessary. When the main strategy encounters execution problems and comes to a halt, having an alternative strategy can sustain national interests and security. The deadlock created by the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran, the JCPOA, raises a serious question: Has Iran had or does it have an alternative strategy since the signing of the agreement or since the murmurs of its collapse began, and if so, how feasible is it? This question can also be raised at a macro level: Is there fundamentally an alternative strategy in Iran's foreign policy regarding vital issues? This note focuses on the topic of alternative strategy in relation to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA), but we will pursue other dimensions of this question in subsequent notes. What was Iran's alternative strategy at the time of signing the agreement? The JCPOA is a 159-page document with five annexes signed by Iran and the so-called 5+1 countries (Germany, the U.S., the UK, China, France, and Russia) and was subsequently confirmed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 on July 20, 2015. The series of maneuvers that led to the signing of the agreement indicates that the negotiations took nearly two years for very simple reasons. The negotiating teams, appointed by the Supreme Leader, the President, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conveyed specific messages to the negotiation venues and received the proposals presented within the narrow confines set for them, which they then relayed back to Tehran. In no case could the negotiating team accept, add, or reject conditions at their discretion and initiative unless those conditions had been previously communicated to Tehran and a decision had been made about them. The team was also not allowed to make any specific cooperation promises to the negotiating parties. Any binding statements or proposals had to be made with prior coordination. The team was extremely concerned and pessimistic about the negotiation atmosphere and considered the possibility of eavesdropping at every level; particularly, there was a belief that Israeli agents might eavesdrop on conversations between the negotiating teams. For this reason, at least in one instance, John Kerry, the then U.S. Secretary of State, and his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif decided to discuss matters while walking in the streets of Geneva. However, this short walk later became controversial for Zarif, who was accused of treason by the far-right. A look at the text of the agreement shows that there was no alternative plan for it, and the only goal of the negotiating team was to finalize the agreement. The entire text of the agreement is completely silent on the determination of cancellation conditions, and only in one instance refers to the possibility of filing a complaint in case of its questionable implementation, which can only be discussed through the JCPOA Joint Commission. This means that, contrary to the most trivial contracts, no higher authority for resolving disputes or canceling the contract is provided. Although this does not justify the U.S. action regarding its withdrawal from an international commitment, it indicates that at that time Iran had no specific strategy against the 5+1 to guarantee the continuity of its interests, and its only goal was to reach an agreement and lift the yoke of sanctions. What has been Iran's alternative strategy after signing the nuclear agreement? During negotiations with the Obama administration, the Iranian negotiating team tried to maximize the limited relationship that had developed between Mohammad Javad Zarif and John Kerry to reach a comprehensive agreement that would secure Iran's interests to the maximum extent. In such negotiations, all parties typically try to give the least concessions and gain the most, but there was a significant difference between Iran and the other parties to the agreement. They played with open hands, and all cards were visible. There was nothing that a specific country wanted to lose, which Iran could consider a strategic achievement. The sanctions were often either approved by the UN or imposed unilaterally by the U.S. The limited European sanctions were easily negotiable against the possibility of establishing trade relations, and thus were simply traded off. China and Russia, benefiting from the lifting of sanctions, did not think long-term. Only the U.S. did not fully trust Iran and did not expect Congressional approval either. Therefore, instead of lifting sanctions through Congressional approval, it merely suspended them by presidential decree. This method was exploited by Donald Trump and led to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. If Iran had an alternative strategy, it could have used it as leverage and instead of suspension, demanded their permanent removal. In other words, Iran's strategy during the years of dialogue and negotiation was very simple and focused on starting to exploit short-term economic benefits without having an alternative strategy for its continuity. Gaining these benefits was contingent upon the announcement of periodic reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Iran was determined not to pursue its nuclear program, considering it a foregone conclusion, without taking into account the variability of international and regional conditions or using the existing atmosphere to create subsidiary relations and strengthen regional ties. The atmosphere in the final weeks before the Security Council's approval clearly indicated that the U.S. and Europe were fully aware of Israel and Saudi Arabia's opposition to this agreement, and U.S. diplomatic officials were constantly in contact with them, aiming to silence Saudi Arabia and Israel. The existence of an alternative approach could have reduced Iran's vulnerability in the event of disruptions in international equations. Was the start of uranium enrichment not an alternative approach? After Iran realized that Donald Trump was serious about his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and that it would be paralyzed by the U.S. exit, Iran adopted two parallel approaches: first, threatening to start enrichment operations and, in parallel, using European leverage against the U.S. It is clear that both approaches were temporary and were not pre-planned. It is likely that until the final weeks, Iran believed that the U.S. threat was hollow and would not be realized. In any case, Iran's reaction to the start of enrichment operations was also spontaneous. Even the Supreme Leader's order to start this operation was accompanied by the stipulation "within the framework of the JCPOA," indicating that it was merely tactical. If Iran had viewed this choice as an alternative and strategic approach during negotiations, it would not have agreed to the condition of pouring concrete into the core of the Arak heavy-water reactor and would have only consented to sealing it, which was also acceptable to the West. Conclusion - The lack of an alternative strategy is evident in other issues related to the governance of the country. Momentary and spot decisions are seen in the government's latest decision regarding the announcement of currency parity, where actions were taken without regard to existing demands outside the official market, and practically the price of the U.S. dollar has reached 7500 tomans. Regarding the JCPOA, Iran still does not have a specific alternative strategy, and even the impacts of the threat to resume enrichment have not been well examined, nor have the positive or negative results and the necessary arrangements for attracting technical-industrial cooperation to realize it been anticipated. It is unclear what the goal of this choice is. Is it merely to provoke the U.S. and Israel, or does Iran ultimately want to exit the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and proceed to produce a bomb?

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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