Also available in Persian — نسخه فارسی ✈️ Telegram EN فا
🔴 Breaking ❓ Unknown

Note: IRGC Commanders and the 'Purgatorial' Days of the JCPOA Minus America

Jan 26, 2026 January 26, 2026 7 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA has left Iran's political future uncertain, with the IRGC facing significant pressure amid rising domestic dissatisfaction. The European Union's ability to meet Iran's expectations is crucial, but many European companies are exiting the Iranian market, complicating the situation further.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: The IRGC's resistance to negotiations poses significant challenges for Iran's diplomatic efforts.

👥 Key Players

Ali Khamenei (علی خامنه‌ای) QUOTED
Supreme Leader
"The IRGC has resisted any limitations and flexibility in these areas in line with Mr. Khamenei."
Hassan Rouhani (حسن روحانی) TARGET
Former President
"Their vulnerability to the collapse of the JCPOA is not much less than that of Hassan Rouhani."
Javad Zarif (محمدجواد ظریف) QUOTED
Foreign Minister
"Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's statements... regarding the necessity of mutual changes in Iran-Saudi Arabia policies."
IRGC (سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی) ACTOR
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
"The main burden of pressure falls on the IRGC commanders."
European Union TARGET
Political and economic union
"The main factor that has obscured the future is the final decision and the ability of the European Union to meet the regime's expectations."

⚡ Actions

Iran NEGOTIATE European Union
"The regime will accept the ailing nuclear agreement if its demands... are met."
Confidence: 80%
IRGC RESIST European limitations on missile activities
"The IRGC has resisted any limitations and flexibility in these areas in line with Mr. Khamenei."
Confidence: 90%
Rouhani government REJECT negotiation on defense and military policies
"The Rouhani government has also, so far, aligned with the dominant power structure, rejecting any negotiation."
Confidence: 80%

📰 What Happened

Iran's IRGC faces pressure as JCPOA negotiations with Europe falter amid regional ambitions.

  • Iran negotiate European Union
  • IRGC resist European limitations on missile activities
  • Rouhani government reject negotiation on defense and military policies

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: Because the IRGC's position is vulnerable amidst domestic dissatisfaction and external pressures.
🌍 Regional: Because Iran's regional ambitions could escalate tensions with neighboring countries.
🌐 International: Because the failure to maintain the JCPOA could lead to increased sanctions and isolation.

📚 Background

The IRGC's resistance to negotiations poses significant challenges for Iran's diplomatic efforts.

📝 Key Evidence

"The main burden of pressure falls on the IRGC commanders."
→ The IRGC is under significant pressure due to the JCPOA's uncertain future.
📡 Source: INDEPENDENT
📊 Confidence: 80%
Radio Farda is known for critical reporting on the Iranian regime.

The unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA has created new conditions within the Iranian political system. The regime's decision is not yet fully clear. Although it is evident that there is a desire to maintain the JCPOA with the 1+4 group, the regime will accept the ailing nuclear agreement if its demands, which are not particularly maximalist, are met. However, the main factor that has obscured the future is the final decision and the ability of the European Union to meet the regime's expectations. At best, Europe cannot deposit all the benefits of the JCPOA with the presence of the US into Iran's basket, but its ability to maintain Iran's share in oil sales, establish banking and financial transaction routes, and conduct marine and air transportation activities close to the JCPOA era could align with the minimum demands of the Islamic Republic. However, the decision of many large European commercial, economic, and industrial companies to exit the Iranian market paints a bleak outlook in this regard. Another important variable is the connection between Europe's sensitivities regarding the Islamic Republic's missile activities and regional policies with the maintenance of the ailing JCPOA. The fragile position of the Islamic Republic domestically and the rising dissatisfaction among various classes have also deprived it of the ability to adventure and bear the risk of escalating external tensions. In this situation, the main burden of pressure falls on the IRGC commanders. Contrary to their apparent positions, which are more promotional and performative, their vulnerability to the collapse of the JCPOA is not much less than that of Hassan Rouhani and the moderate government. The second factor is precisely where the IRGC is involved. The IRGC is the main executor and actor of the Islamic Republic's regional policies within the framework of expanding Shiite Islamic fundamentalism, managing and directing Iran's missile program and defense strategy. The IRGC has resisted any limitations and flexibility in these areas in line with Mr. Khamenei. The Rouhani government has also, so far, aligned with the dominant power structure, rejecting any negotiation and agreement on defense and military policies. There has also been no noticeable difference between the moderate government's view on regional policy and that of hardliners and political forces known as 'Velayat Madar'. Although Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's statements at the Council on Foreign Relations think tank meeting in New York regarding the necessity of mutual changes in Iran-Saudi Arabia policies have the potential to open a door for meaningful disagreements. But is the IRGC's resistance unchangeable? The answer to this question is not simple. Under normal conditions, the regime is not willing to soften and accept limitations in its defense policies. It will also not abandon its regional ambitions, which it considers essential for survival, political discourse development, neutralizing Western threats, and expanding strategic depth. Therefore, Iranian negotiators, led by Zarif, repeatedly assert that they do not discuss missile and regional issues in negotiations with Europe. However, the ongoing discussions regarding Yemen raise doubts about the validity of this claim. European officials have repeatedly emphasized that they share concerns with the US regarding these issues and that drafting a supplement to the JCPOA, which includes nuclear restrictions after 2025, is also on their agenda. Therefore, the likelihood of maintaining the JCPOA minus the US by Europe without changes in Iran's missile and regional policies is either impossible or will not have effective capacity and meet the regime's expectations. In this situation, the main burden of pressure falls on the IRGC commanders. Contrary to their apparent positions, which are more promotional and performative, their vulnerability to the collapse of the JCPOA is not much less than that of Hassan Rouhani and the moderate government, especially since the JCPOA was approved in a way that had no direct and clear connection to regional and military policies. The dual policy of leadership in accepting the JCPOA, which was packaged in the policy of 'heroic flexibility', is key to understanding the IRGC's situation, where concerns about the intensification of the crushing sanctions imposed by the US, which have garnered European support, and the passive stance of China and Russia led them to inevitably and out of necessity accept a temporary compromise. However, their red line was maintaining regional positions and military capabilities. But with the aggressive policy of the new US government, the IRGC finds itself in a dilemma. Ignoring new pressures and continuing existing policies requires finding an effective way to circumvent sanctions and create deterrence against the worsening of multiple internal crises of the Islamic Republic. Otherwise, the extension of 'heroic flexibility' to the missile and regional domains may become inevitable. The logic of survival in the behavioral pattern of the Islamic Republic shows that there has never been a stable principle and program to which the regime ties its existence. The ideological and revolutionary approach in foreign policy and anti-Western sentiment in foreign relations has been present but has fluctuated in scope and intensity. The current missile program and regional policies, if compared to the policy of 'war until the removal of sedition from the world', which was set aside in Resolution 598, then a temporary retreat would not be unexpected. No information has been released about the Yemen negotiations, and only Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy Foreign Minister, has vaguely referred to it. If the negotiations aim to find a way to end the internal war in Yemen and the inevitable concessions of the Houthis, then it can be said that, similar to the period of secret JCPOA negotiations, assessments regarding the level of reduction of regional interventions and the limits of compromise with rivals in the Middle East have begun. Of course, the IRGC will not easily accept any potential flexibility. They will first seek a way to preserve existing policies and aggressive programs within the framework of Mr. Khamenei's views and discourse. Especially since maintaining the country's missile program in a non-aggressive framework in line with Iran's national interests and security is meaningful and justified. However, if the US government's claim regarding the establishment of the most severe sanctions in history, which will take time, is realized in practice, then the IRGC will be vulnerable. Since pressures, threats, and Western opposition do not have a binding relationship with the growth of regional positions, and ultimately, they are the product of the realities on the ground in the target countries, from this perspective, if there is no significant change in the balance of power within Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, then the West will face difficulties, and this protective shield will be a powerful leverage for the Islamic Republic. However, if maintaining the current balance of power becomes impossible, then tactical actions to reduce US pressures by slowing the pace of military capability development and temporarily adjusting regional presence may be put on the agenda to change the situation. The Islamic Republic's attention to a non-hasty and patient approach in advancing its programs also paves the way for deferral. This is unlikely to happen suddenly and in the short term; rather, it will follow a period of testing and practical assessment of the capabilities of both sides. Therefore, it is not wrong to say that the days of the JCPOA minus the US are in a purgatorial state for the IRGC commanders, placing them in a difficult position.

🌐

Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

📰 Related Coverage

⚖️ Independent Platform — Artesh.com is not affiliated with any government, military, or political organization. Editorial Policy →