In a meeting of the heads of the branches of government, we concluded that we must accept Resolution 598... Imam said: We have repeatedly said that if the war lasts twenty years, we will stand firm... These words of ours are in the ears of the people. We do not want the people to lose trust in us... I said: If this is the issue, I currently have the authority on your behalf... I announce acceptance... When the work progresses and is implemented, you can put me on trial and execute me so that the responsibility falls on me." This memory is one of the memories that Hashemi Rafsanjani mentioned regarding the acceptance of Resolution 598. The focal point of this memory from Rafsanjani about Ayatollah Khomeini is that for him, maintaining the trust of the people was important. He said, "We do not want the people to lose trust in us." He preferred to personally take responsibility. He drank the "cup of poison" and accepted the end of the war with Saddam due to the power of global powers, but did not want to lose the trust of the people. He knew that the people would not believe the "staging" that Rafsanjani had even suggested at the cost of his execution. With this introduction, is his successor responsible regarding the "fruitless JCPOA"? "Who was it, who was it, I was not there." Undoubtedly, the nuclear issue is the largest, most important, and most challenging issue in the history of the Islamic Republic. It is a case far more difficult and complex than the eight-year war. During the eight-year war, no sanctions were imposed, but in the nuclear case, the toughest sanctions in the history of diplomacy have been imposed on Iran, and with the rise of Trump and the violation of the JCPOA, the sanctions have returned. Over all these years, governments came and went, but Ayatollah Khamenei was at the helm of decision-making. From the initiation of Iran's nuclear project to Iran's refusal to negotiate on this issue, from considering sanctions a blessing to claiming to circumvent them, from agreeing to negotiate with the U.S. (heroic flexibility) to describing the JCPOA as "pure loss" by the leader, from the leader's oversight over every moment of negotiations to the day of its signing, from the approval of the JCPOA in parliament in 20 minutes at the leader's signal to describing the U.S. as a violator of the JCPOA... not a moment passed without the system's leadership being unaware of the agreement. Ayatollah Khamenei played a "central role" in three stages: before the negotiations, during the negotiations, and in the approval of the negotiations. Whether the JCPOA is good or bad, it is the result of the guidance and oversight of Ayatollah Khamenei. Whatever the JCPOA is, it is the product of Ayatollah Khamenei's oversight. For example, Salehi said that when he met with Hassan Rouhani after his presidential election victory and informed him about the secret negotiations between Iran and the U.S. in Oman, the level of progress in the negotiations was "not credible" for Mr. Rouhani. In response to Obama's request, it was Ayatollah Khamenei who issued the permit for secret negotiations with the U.S. at the end of Ahmadinejad's presidency but in a "secret" manner. Did Ayatollah Khamenei consider the U.S. untrustworthy when making this decision or not? If yes, then why all this condemnation of U.S. untrustworthiness now? Is such condemnation not a self-condemnation? After Hassan Rouhani's election, it was Ayatollah Khamenei who openly revealed his change of approach to negotiating with the U.S. on the nuclear issue. He called this new approach "heroic flexibility" and likened it to the flexibility of a wrestler to "bring the opponent to the ground at the right time." Therefore, there is no evidence to claim that he was deceived by the negotiating team. Not only is there no such evidence, but Abbas Araghchi, the second-highest nuclear negotiator, has publicly stated that some red lines were shifted with Ayatollah Khamenei's approval. For example, Araghchi said: One of the red lines was the lifting of all sanctions against Iran, but U.S. officials stated that the government could not lift the sanctions approved by Congress, and if the Iranian negotiating team insisted, "it would mean no agreement." He clarified that the order [from Ayatollah Khamenei] was that it was acceptable for EU sanctions, executive orders of the President, and UN Security Council resolutions to be lifted, but Congressional sanctions should be halted and the U.S. President should "commit" to continuing this halt. Now that a new president (Trump) has come to power in the U.S. and does not consider himself "committed" to halting Congressional sanctions and has also imposed new sanctions, should the responsibility for this "untrustworthiness of the Great Satan" be placed on the negotiating team or on the leader who has taught lessons on enemy recognition and American understanding for three decades but ultimately agreed to negotiate "pure Muhammadan Islam" with the "Great Satan" and has now been "outsmarted"? For example, the ridiculous haste in the approval of the JCPOA, in just 20 minutes due to the presence of Asghar Hajazi from the leader's office in parliament, was not a sign of the leader's satisfaction with the process leading to the JCPOA? Did anyone forget that the Guardian Council passed the JCPOA for approval in just "one day"? With these considerations and the need that Ayatollah Khamenei saw in accelerating the approval of the JCPOA, is all this opposition against the JCPOA and the U.S. untrustworthiness more a condemnation of himself than a condemnation of the U.S.? "I made a mistake" With the return of sanctions by Trump on one hand and the necessity of the Islamic Republic to adhere to the JCPOA without any improvement in Iran's economy, now everyone, especially the leader himself, knows that the Islamic Republic has been outsmarted. He recently confessed that "in the matter of negotiations, I made a mistake and at the insistence of the gentlemen, I allowed the experience, which of course crossed the established red lines." However, since Khamenei is not Khomeini, who would accept responsibility for a pure loss [Khamenei's description of the JCPOA], such a confession must inevitably be erased from history. As a result, the leader's office issued a statement changing the leader's words to say: "In the JCPOA matter, I made a mistake by allowing our foreign minister to talk to them; we suffered losses." In summary, this is an attempt to shift the responsibility from the leader (unlike Khomeini's accountability during the war) in the face of the Islamic Republic being outsmarted by the U.S. In this disgrace, where the system submitted to negotiations with the devil and the sanctions remained, what is important is the leader's reputation, not the trust of the people. This means "Who was it, who was it, I was not there." The opinions expressed in this note do not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda.
Revisiting the Nuclear Positions of the Leader of the Islamic Republic
The article discusses the historical context of Iran's nuclear negotiations, particularly focusing on Ayatollah Khamenei's role and responsibility in the JCPOA. It questions whether Khamenei, unlike Khomeini, will accept accountability for the perceived failures of the agreement. The significance of this discussion lies in the implications for public trust and leadership accountability in Iran.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Ayatollah Khamenei's oversight shaped Iran's nuclear negotiations and the JCPOA's outcomes.
- Ayatollah Khamenei negotiate United States
- Ayatollah Khamenei approve JCPOA
- Ayatollah Khamenei describe JCPOA
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Khamenei's oversight has been pivotal in shaping Iran's nuclear strategy and its consequences.
📝 Key Evidence
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%