Strategic Messages of the December 2017 Uprising: Continuation of Protests and the Illusion of Becoming 'Syrian'

During the peak of the protests in December 2017, various interpretations were offered by political officials, critical political activists, supporters, and political groups and parties: that the message of these protests is a warning to the government regarding livelihood issues, corruption, and the inefficiency of the executive branch (mostly from opponents of Rouhani's government); that the protesters are dissatisfied with the management of the country and the prioritization of resource allocation (civil institutions like the Teachers' Association); that the protesters face not only livelihood difficulties but also social and political restrictions (the message of 16 reformists, three of whom had previously spoken in contradiction to the same message); and that the protesters are disillusioned with reforming the situation (some political and legal activists who have been victims of the repressive regime). Government rallies are actually a sign of the divide between the government and the people, not among the people themselves. Since these government rallies rely on public resources, students and government employees are dispatched to them, and all propaganda apparatuses are present with all their forces, they do not represent any trend or belief among the people and do not represent any social class. If one day the government moved away from the industry of rallies and groups were free to protest and express their opinions, then one could speak about the types of divides among the people. However, other messages were also conveyed in these protests, thematically and subtextually, which are rarely mentioned and are, in fact, strategic in nature. I will refer to four strategic messages: National convergence of protests in messages. Those who want to deter protesters from targeting the repressive regime and humiliation and discrimination scare them with the prospect of becoming 'Syrian' (message from Mustafa Tajzadeh, YouTube site, January 8, 2018). However, these protests manifested in over a hundred cities in the northwest and southeast and central regions of Iran (31 provinces) without anyone chanting ethnic or separatist slogans or focusing on a particular segment of society. Local demands, although always raised by people from smaller towns in meetings with officials, were absent in these protests. While the slogans referred to various demands, they were uniform at the national level. Protesters in a hundred cities, without prior coordination and with different religious, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds, uniformly rejected the Islamic Republic, religious governance, and individual rule. In all cities, there were complaints about the clerical government, individual despotism, and the allocation of resources to other countries and groups. This issue reflects both relative solidarity across the country in terms of demands and complaints and the futility of the threat of the country becoming 'Syrian.' Protesters targeted the religious government and not national symbols and the country. Burning the flag of the Islamic Republic was a rejection of the Islamic Republic, not a rejection of Iran and its national symbols. The path that the December 2017 uprising indicates and calls for is mass gatherings to compel the clergy to relinquish governance. This path is 180 degrees away from civil war. The few places that were attacked or set on fire in some cities were symbols of corruption and discrimination (some banks), the religious nature of the government (mosques, shrines, and offices of Friday prayer leaders), and the plundering of resources by the clergy (seminaries), not manifestations of Iran's national and civilizational heritage. Naturally, when religion in Iran has become a completely governmental and state phenomenon, any protest against the government extends to religious institutions. When mosques and shrines are used as temporary detention centers in various repressions (including in December 2017 in the city of Arak), these places will not remain neutral for the protesters. Ethnic and religious divides were not activated during this period of protests, not because Sunnis or ethnic nationalists or Pan-Arabists and Pan-Turkists did not participate in the protests (Tajzadeh's claim; how do we know if they came or not?), but because the rejection of the Islamic regime is the priority of protesters in various regions, not the disintegration of the country and civil war. Between the all-encompassing centralism on one hand and disintegration and civil war on the other, there are other paths such as completely free elections, federalism, and self-governance, and it is unlikely that Iranian citizens are unaware of these solutions. It is the government that obstructs all alternative solutions, not the protesters. The message of the protests being leaderless and unorganized is that these movements will be repeated under different circumstances because there is no leadership or organization that can be considered to have ended the protests by isolating and dissolving them. The repressive organization has existed in Iran for four decades, but protests have continued. Therefore, the mere existence of this organization cannot be considered a conclusion of the protests. The government's claim is that protests end with government rallies; this is not the case. Protests subside with the killing and detention of tens of thousands of people. All government strategies indicate the irreformability of this regime, and for this reason, the dormant volcanoes in Iran will remain. Government rallies are indeed a sign of the divide between the government and the people, not among the people. Government rallies, because they rely on public resources, send students and government employees to them, and all propaganda apparatuses are present with all their forces, do not represent any trend or belief among the people and do not represent any social class. If one day the government moved away from the industry of rallies and groups were free to protest and express their opinions, then one could speak about the types of divides among the people. The protests implicitly announced that after about forty years, the people have read the government's hand. Forty years is a very long time for the deception or trustworthiness of rulers to become apparent. People in small towns, due to the significant distance from the rents and privileges that government leaders have in large cities, and some of which also overflow to the middle class, were able to see the fundamental problems of society more easily. People who are distanced from concentrated resources in large cities are less likely to be deceived by the illusion of Rouhani's change and Khamenei's bright future because they know that they will gain nothing from this government and will not. The government and its internal factions see them as weak and voiceless, and for this reason, they will not change their policies in light of the protests. Even if some parts of the government want to pay attention, they do not have the capacity to do so. Prominent groups quickly take their share of resources, leaving no room for negotiation. There is no sign of less encroachment by the ruling class on public resources. Instead of changing policies, officials constantly attribute these protests to the US, Israel, and 'the rich' (Khamenei, January 8, 2018). Immediately after the protests, military officials announced a brainwashing plan for students by the Basij: a plan to cover one million students by the Basij (Basij commander, January 11, 2018) apparently indicates that the authorities see brainwashing as a method of preventing protests. The influence of Persian-language media abroad. In the public space of the country, there is no opportunity to present alternative views for managing the country, such as the separation of religion and state, referring to referendums, and ending regional military interventions. What was observed in the slogans of the December 2017 protesters closely aligns with the messages of Persian-language media abroad on these issues. A documentary film that the Manoto network produced about Reza Shah was widely viewed in Iran and allowed Iranian citizens to compare the Islamic Republic regime with the Pahlavi government. Numerous programs from Persian-language networks abroad regarding corruption, abuse of power, and the inefficiency of the regime, articulated by experts in explaining the current situation, have been very effective for audiences. These media are the only platforms that have presented secular governance as an alternative to religious governance. The media (and not propaganda loudspeakers) do not encourage people to oppose the government (do not recommend it), but they clarify the situation for their audiences and illuminate alternative viewpoints. The fact that tens to hundreds of thousands of people, despite four decades of religious and political propaganda by the government, take to the streets in a hundred cities against the foundations of the Islamist regime indicates that critical media have had successes in this regard. Another subtext of the December 2017 protests is that free media can challenge the inevitability of totalitarianism and authoritarianism and introduce alternatives for it. Repetition of protests in the future. The message of the protests being leaderless and unorganized is that these movements will be repeated under different circumstances because there is no leadership or organization that can be considered to have ended the protests by isolating and dissolving them. The repressive organization has existed in Iran for four decades, but protests have continued. Therefore, the mere existence of this organization cannot be considered a conclusion of the protests. The government's claim is that protests end with government rallies; this is not the case. Protests subside with the killing and detention of tens of thousands of people. All government strategies indicate the irreformability of this regime, and for this reason, the dormant volcanoes in Iran will remain. During the same days that protesters are complaining about discrimination in the country, the parliament exempted the exit tax for the Arbaeen pilgrimage from increases, and the Friday prayer leader of Tehran, a week after the street protests subsided, called for an increase in the budget for seminaries (Sadeghi, January 12, 2018). Another Friday prayer leader also called for allocating one-fifth of the mines to seminaries. A religious regime fundamentally becomes a religious regime with discrimination. The result of such discrimination is the increased poverty of the people. With these trends, in the first half of the 2010s, the number of renters in the country increased by 30 percent, from 5.6 million households to 7.25 million households (A, January 7, 2018). The government continues on its previous path; resources are limited, and citizens' shares of resources are constantly being reduced. As a result, the ground for protests is being prepared.