Tehran Residents' Reluctance Towards Childbearing: Men 1.5 Times More Reluctant Than Women

Results from a survey indicate that 63.2% of Tehran residents have no 'desire' for childbearing, with this 'lack of desire' being 1.5 times more prevalent among men than women. Previously, similar studies in other parts of the country, including Mahabad, reported that the number of women intending to 'stop' childbearing was significantly higher than that of men. Among the 63.2%, 33.4% of participants expressed a desire to have children in the future, while 49.5% stated they would not have such a desire even in the future. This data was published in the journal 'Payesh' belonging to the Health Sciences Research Institute of Jihad University and is part of a study titled 'Childbearing and Related Factors from the Perspective of Tehran Residents.' The survey included 1,200 qualified married citizens of Tehran (600 women and 600 men) from the city's 22 districts, all of whom were Iranian nationals. The average age of participants was 33.6 years (32.76 for women and 34.48 for men), with an average marriage age of 23.9 years and an average of 12.96 years of education. In terms of employment, 63.8% were employed, 0.7% retired, 2.5% students, 30.9% homemakers, 2.1% unemployed, and religiously, 89.4% were Shia, 4.4% Sunni, and 0.3% from religious minorities. 31.9% of participants were childless, 31.3% had one child, 25.5% had two children, and 11.3% had more than two children. This research aims to provide insight into the reasons for the declining desire for childbearing in Iran and to assist policymakers in the Islamic Republic in short, medium, and long-term planning. Women are seen as the 'main culprits' for the decline in fertility. Significant changes in the structure and characteristics of families over the past half-century, the transition from extended to nuclear families, challenges to traditional role separations within families, changes in gender roles, profound shifts in the sexual identity of male and female roles, and a decrease in fertility rates in Iran over the past three decades have been evident. Statistics show that from 1986 to 1996, fertility rates in Iran decreased unprecedentedly, and from 2003 to 2006, Iran joined the ranks of countries with fertility rates at or below replacement level. Population decline in Iran reached a point where Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, after receiving reports on this issue, deemed his previous stance on population control as erroneous and described the policies that began during Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency as a 'mistake.' Population control policies in Iran were promoted with slogans like 'Two children are enough' and 'Better life, fewer children' since 1989 and were even encouraged by clerics. However, Khamenei, in a sudden shift, labeled the preference for fewer children as a 'malady' and questioned in a message to the conference on 'Demographic Changes and Their Role in Various Social Transformations' why women and men avoid having children in different ways. Following this message, Khamenei stated that the country needs to reach a population of at least 150 million, and the Ministry of Health announced that 'in line with the general policies of the system and the directives of the Supreme Leader,' the population control policy would change, and the allocated budgets for it would be eliminated. Consequently, the Islamic Republic's demographic approaches shifted to a point where childbearing was encouraged from all state platforms, and women who showed reluctance to have children due to work or education were criticized. Reza Taghavi, head of the Policy Council of Friday Prayer Leaders, stated in a speech before the Friday prayers in Tehran in 2013 that when a woman sees her identity in being an employee with economic independence, pursuing higher education, and believing that work in society is more beneficial and effective than work at home, it is natural that this perspective affects childbirth; she no longer has time to attend to children and the family unit, and if this view prevails in part of our society, it will certainly impact reproduction. The situation escalated to the point where the 'Baharniaz' website reported that the provincial broadcasting organization of Qom aired a special Ramadan program featuring two co-wives from Qom, examining their lifestyle together and evaluating it as 'successful.' The site noted that the presence of these two women in such a program was intended to 'promote' population growth. However, some media outlets and conservative figures, in addition to blaming women, also highlighted the relationship between families' economic conditions and the decline in the desire for childbearing, noting a lack of 'incentive' among people to have 'additional mouths to feed.' The conservative website 'Alif' deemed the methods of encouraging childbearing in Iran as laughable, stating, 'A man whose longest work contract is six months and whose insurance booklet is renewed every two or four months has the right to think only of one or two children.' This website urged the country's officials to 'instead of quarreling over penalties for vasectomy and tubectomy, think about people's livelihoods, about workers and employees who are easily dismissed, about those who go months without receiving wages, about those with two-month and four-month work contracts, and about those whose faces are not red from joy but from slaps.' There is a significant relationship between economic capability and the desire for childbearing. Research shows that the inclination towards childbearing and consequently fertility is influenced by several factors or related to some of them. 'Women's employment and their social economic independence, economic factors, lack of welfare facilities provided by governments, some incorrect attitudes, high educational attainment, and the economic, social, demographic, and cultural characteristics of women in these areas, age of women at marriage, number of children, age of spouse, age at first pregnancy, self-support (physical, social, psychological), new data and communication technologies, awareness of contraceptive methods, and the use of mobile phones and their derivatives' are among these factors. Although there is still no clear picture in Iran regarding people's desire for childbearing and its connection with demographic factors, the lack of desire for having children is significantly related to variables such as years of marriage, male gender, having more children, and low income. According to the Health Sciences Research Institute of Jihad University, the relationship between the lack of desire for childbearing and variables such as age, age at marriage, religion, number of stillbirths, abortions of women and their male partners studied was not significant. However, this relationship was significant with variables such as economic status, number of children, and individuals' perceptions of family status and sufficient number of children. The likelihood of lacking a desire for childbearing among individuals who rated their income as 'bad/very bad and average' was 3.1% and 1.5% higher than those who rated their income as 'very good/good.' Moreover, the likelihood of lacking a desire for childbearing among men who rated their income as 'bad/very bad' was about three times higher than men who rated their income as 'very good/good.' The likelihood of lacking a desire for childbearing among men was reported to be 1.5 times higher than among women. Statistics published by the Statistical Center of Iran indicate that economic factors have significantly more influence on families' negative attitudes towards childbearing than belief, cultural, identity, and physical factors. Although according to the results of the Statistical Center of Iran, there is an inverse relationship between the childbearing behavior of young people on the verge of marriage and married women aged 15 to 49 and their education, researchers of the recent study believe that other factors are also involved in the relationship between education and childbearing. In other words, education alone cannot have a significant impact on the 'need' to become a parent, and economic problems and employment, in addition to the expected direct impact, play a 'mediating' role in the relationship between education and childbearing. The relationship between the lack of desire for childbearing and the audience's views on the desired number of children was also significant. Specifically, individuals who considered one or two children sufficient had a 25 and 6.4 times higher likelihood of lacking a desire for childbearing compared to those who considered four or more children sufficient. Additionally, men who considered one or two children sufficient had about 21 and four times higher likelihood, while women who considered one or two children sufficient had about 25 and six times higher likelihood of lacking a desire for childbearing compared to those who considered four or more children sufficient. Furthermore, according to this research, for each additional child, the likelihood of lacking a desire for childbearing increases by 2.9 times, indicating a gradual but continuous and decisive transformation of families in Iran, an increasing preference for smaller families, and a change in lifestyle among the country's population. Analyzing the results of this research and other studies shows that individuals before marriage have a greater desire to become parents, but after facing 'life challenges,' this desire somewhat 'fades and takes on a different approach.' Researchers at the Health Sciences Research Institute of Jihad University believe that the desire to have children is not necessarily indicative of a 'heartfelt desire' to have children, but rather is based on 'fulfilling or reducing' a number of 'perceived needs.'