The 1979 Revolution and the Divided Society Under the Islamic Republic

The 1979 Revolution divided Iranian society into two groups: the 'insiders' and the 'outsiders,' and this duality continues to persist. For more than three decades, Iranian society has been in a state of 'neither war nor peace' between two orientations: Islamist and secular (personal, non-political Islam plus irreligion). This situation is much deeper than the conflict between Islamists and communists, and later among Islamists themselves in the first decade of the Islamic Republic, which led to the massacre of tens of thousands. The Islamist/secular divide has even extended to the level of families. The constant rhetoric from officials about sedition, hypocrisy, and enemies in the political sphere, the ongoing discussion about lifestyle and its components such as hijab and the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, and the moral policing in ideological propaganda and social repression, as well as the constant confrontation between the anti-Western and détente-oriented factions in foreign policy, are manifestations of this situation. However, this ideological war and behavioral divide is deeper than mere rhetoric, and at least the Islamist side not only makes no effort to alleviate hostility but beats the war drum every day. Secularists in today's Iran desire peaceful coexistence with Islamists if mutual respect is observed, but Islamists seek to destroy and eliminate the opposing side. On one side of this divide is a population of about 3 to 5 million Islamists and the affluent surrounding them, who, through the nationalization of large industries and the confiscation of the wealth of major capitalists, hold a significant portion of the country's wealth and resources, political power, media, and security and military institutions. On the other side is over 90% of the population, who resist this totalitarianism without power and wealth and have sometimes acted as foot soldiers for this minority during elections. More than 50% of the country's population are government employees living on minimal wages: 8.5 million government employees (Mehr, January 27, 2015) and millions of others working for municipalities (public sector) and economic institutions under the leader's supervision (foundations, endowments, and headquarters), whose statistics have never been disclosed. Considering household size of about 4 people, roughly half of the population lives on government salaries. Those who are not government employees, if they do not benefit from government rents (about 45% more), cannot lead the luxurious lives of government officials and their close associates. In election periods, competition is among members of that same 3 to 5 million group, who have held high-ranking positions in various governments over the past 36 years: about 300,000 people at the level of judges, ambassadors, commanders, and government officials over the past 36 years, forming a population of 1.5 million when including their family members. (The population of government managers during Ahmadinejad's presidency reached about 150,000: Tasnim, February 3, 2015) Additionally, there is a small population of wealthy individuals who collaborate with government and state officials and benefit from rents derived from state facilities and public resources. However, a part of the powerless population has always felt that they might gain something in this competition, which has not happened. Today, where can we observe the depth of this divide? Gatherings and participation in events: loyalists to the government gather in mourning ceremonies and other religious and political events, including gatherings to insist on violating the rights of others and repression. In contrast, secularists, both religious and non-religious, have their own ceremonies. Night parties are one of these gatherings that are always attacked by the police and the IRGC and Basij. After each attack, the repressive forces announce that they have discovered a number of bottles of alcohol and a deck of cards, as if they have uncovered biological weapons or mortars and bombers. The government considers these parties a threat to its survival. Mourning ceremonies and other religious events on one hand, and night parties and other recreational events on the other, are two different worlds that could coexist peacefully in a tolerant society, as they do in all societies and as they did in Iran before the 1979 Revolution. However, in the Islamic Republic, power has backed mourning ceremonies and religious events and thus represses night parties or secular recreational activities. But this repression has not eliminated night parties or other types of gatherings; instead, it has deepened the divides among those who attend one or the other. This divide is also clearly visible in weddings: formal weddings are segregated, while mixed secular weddings occur in homes or gardens outside the city. Food and clothing: the religious and those in the managerial class of the Islamic Republic are strongly opposed to chewing gum in public, which is one of their lifestyle indicators (in Shia religious schools and in gatherings of state managers, teachers, and high-ranking officials, this issue is dealt with severely), yet Iran, with 82% of its citizens chewing gum, ranks first in the world for gum chewing. (IRNA, January 14, 2015) In terms of cosmetic consumption, which the religious oppose in public, Iran holds the first or second position in the Middle East for per capita cosmetic consumption. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia is at a similar level or close to Iran in both issues. In the area of alcoholic beverages, Iranians have become mass producers in their homes, and the government is powerless against them. The government struggles with issues like women and girls wearing leggings in summer and boots in winter. Tourism: Islamists control all government budgets in tourism and focus their efforts on pilgrimage to Mecca and holy shrines, while the secular faction travels to Dubai, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and other European countries. In 2014, all government, military, and public institutions (municipalities) mobilized to provide free services to pilgrims to Karbala to take more people there. However, the secularists have not remained idle and travel in droves to Istanbul, Antalya, Baku, and Yerevan to breathe away from the eyes of the police and Basij. A trip to Karbala and Istanbul clearly illustrates these two fronts and their deep differences in orientations and behaviors. Statistics from the tourism organization indicate that 7 million Iranian tourists traveled abroad in 2013 (2014), with 2.2 million going to holy shrines and 600,000 to Saudi Arabia for Hajj and Umrah, while the rest traveled to Turkey and Azerbaijan. (Jam-e Jam, January 14, 2015) Officials of the Islamic Republic agreed to suspend the condemnation of polytheists during Hajj to maintain the program for sending pilgrims to Saudi Arabia. Khamenei's New Year trips to Mashhad aim to direct the tourism of loyalists to the regime towards pilgrimage during the New Year holidays. Media: State radio and television and other media affiliated with the government and state, if they only broadcast propaganda programs of Islamists such as mourning ceremonies or speeches by clerics, cannot find a significant audience even among that 3 to 5 million loyalists to the government. However, non-religious programs like football or movies still have audiences (about 25% of society). But according to repeated statements from media and military officials, about 60 to 70% of people use satellite networks. The percentage of those who use both state television programs and satellite networks is a small fraction from both sides. The circulation of newspapers (mostly state and government) that serve as propaganda tools for the government or factions within the government has decreased to less than one million, and that one million is mostly purchased by government offices and the public sector. The situation for books is similar, with most works produced by the state itself. Apparently, the secular part of society has separated itself from state media and no longer returns to it. Transactions between both sides: of course, these two fronts pay each other enough bribes for coexistence: a significant portion of secularists inside try to minimally comply with Islamic government orders, and those who are affluent recognize the rents and privileges of the clergy and even seek to get closer to the rulers to benefit from the rents, allowing their children to spend such money in Istanbul, Paris, and London. On the other hand, Islamists provide a spillover of resources to influential secularists to buy their loyalty, lest one day a dissenting voice be heard from them to the world. Religious reformists align with that minority in all the above areas and only separate their accounts from the other part of the government in words. Thus, Iranians appear to live in one country or society in the public space, but they have two different worlds or different worlds. One world is the paradise of privileges and benefits of the government for a small minority, and the other world is that of people who want to live like people in other parts of the world. Some members of this second world also attend religious mourning and fasting ceremonies but drink their wine at home and do not observe hijab. Members of this second world are ideologically vetted for jobs or education, but the specter of their vetting does not force them to live in the first world. This very divide of two worlds and the repression of the second by the first has kept the potential for tensions and social and political movements high in Iranian society, and the government has been forced to constantly oil and keep its repression machine running.