The Bound Hands of Civil Society in Iran

Collective movements last year raised numerous questions about the state of Iranian society, public opinion, and the civil sphere. The focus is on the meaning of civil actions and political participation over the past year, including the parliamentary elections and various scattered collective movements. A review of several writings by academics and civil activists in the media prior to the elections in Esfand indicates a kind of pathological analysis of the general state of civil society and its activism, as well as widespread public frustration, especially among youth and students. Two main data points in these writings relate to the significant expansion of virtual social networks and their increasing role in the public sphere on one hand, and the emergence of 'non-political' or less political collective actions (protests against animal abuse, environmental defense, or children's rights, etc.) on the other. Many believe that the pressures and high costs of civil participation push some citizens towards actions that have a weaker ideological or political aspect and create less sensitivity in official institutions. Others emphasize that the extremist part of the government shows more flexibility towards 'non-political' actions in society because they do not question the ideological foundations of the regime, and at the same time, controlling them is easier. However, some writings also focus on the psychological dimensions of the public sphere, such as distrust, cynicism, voyeurism, and withdrawal as signs of the current crisis in Iranian society. Civil society does not exist in a social vacuum. The general state of society, the economy, and the political and cultural atmosphere, as well as the extent of existing social harms, are part of the determining realities of the civil sphere. Civil society also has a history, experience, and a historical memory that weighs heavily on its current consciousness and awareness. In examining the civil sphere and the meaning and reasons for actions, one must refer to these macro data and not summarize everything within the framework of a specific event or action. The misfortunes of civil society in Iran have been widely discussed in academic research and other writings since Khordad 2, 1376. The emergence of a new civil society after the difficult and gray decade of the revolution and the long and bloody war with Iraq, and its widespread emergence during the elections of Khordad 1376, was unexpected and surprising for many, indicating a new chapter in the internal dynamics of Iranian society. In these years, civil organizations in various fields flourished, with the dynamic part of Iranian society, namely women and the middle-class youth, taking on the role of the engine of civil society. The One Million Signatures Campaign and the Green Movement were two significant and meaningful manifestations of civil society in Iran over the past decade. The political failure of the Green Movement and other major civil movements of the 1380s is considered a failure of the Iranian middle class in achieving its main civil demands. The middle class, which is successful in the cultural and social realm and resists the imposition of official religious values from above, has lost the political battle to its powerful opponent. Frustration, passivity, silence, negative and cynical views towards collective movements, and avoidance of participation in the public sphere, which have been frequently discussed in recent years, must be examined in light of experiences, repeated failures, and the significant setbacks of two decades of activism that have turned hope into despair regarding changes. Because of these failures and frustrations, Iranian civil society remains fragile, scattered, and weak despite important experiences. The government and control of civil society: Iranian society is unconventional and unique in many aspects compared to other countries, and comparing its status with other experiences is not always easy. These characteristics, including the religious nature of the government and the type of relationship between official institutions and civil society, are significant. The main approach of non-elected governmental institutions and the extremist faction in Iran is to control public opinion, impose security oversight on society, and incapacitate civil society. Engineering and doctrinal oversight of civil society is particularly evident in three main areas: The first area relates to independent civil intermediary organizations. Experience over the past three decades shows that civil organization in its various forms is viewed as a fundamental threat to the Islamic order by the extremist and security-oriented factions of the government. Fear of the dormant, rebellious, and unpredictable power of civil society has led to its incapacitation and immobilization since the 1370s, becoming a priority for security forces. They view public participation and civil organization negatively and approach it with a security mindset. This approach has prevented political parties and civil, professional, and trade organizations from functioning and growing harmoniously in the public sphere. In a security atmosphere, either political groups and independent civil organizations are not allowed to operate, or these organizations quickly find themselves trapped in a political and security deadlock. The ideal model for the extremist faction within the government and military-security forces is a society without organization, where actions are limited to mass participation in state and religious ceremonies and marches. The bitter experience of some human rights organizations, independent civil organizations, or parties close to the ruling reformist faction, such as the Participation Front, the Builders of Iran, the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization, or the so-called national-religious forces, clearly reflects the regime's view of civil society. This narrative also applies to large professional and trade organizations, as such organizations are given little opportunity to grow due to their social and political significance. Direct intervention in the elections of influential large organizations (doctors, lawyers, filmmakers, teachers, journalists, etc.) and oversight of labor unions are clear signs of the policy of containment and authoritarian oversight of civil society. Security agencies even view small local civil organizations that address social, environmental, and children's issues with distrust and skepticism, and their existence is tolerated only as long as their effectiveness remains limited and they cannot mobilize large groups around social issues. The One Million Signatures Campaign of women's organizations in the 1380s was the most significant peaceful civil movement in society, and its relative success led security agencies to become even more suspicious of civil movements and collective actions, seeking to counter them. The Green Movement's ability in 1388 was also due to the participation of independent political and civil organizations and the rapid formation of virtual networks with effective participation from civil activists. The experience of the Green Movement also demonstrated that there is a significant potential in society for protest and the formation of a civil movement and large waves of dissent. The second area relates to the world of communications. Dominating and comprehensively controlling society without controlling the media and public opinion is very difficult. The problem of the Islamic Republic as a religious government is that media control is not limited to the political sphere, and a significant portion of cultural and social domains also fall victim to government censorship. Major nationwide media are in the hands of the most extremist factions of the government, which is why a large segment of the population no longer trusts them or has completely turned their backs on them. In the absence of influential and publicly accepted national media, people turn to various other media that are closer to their mental world, tastes, and needs. The consequence of this situation is the widespread presence of alternative media inside and outside the country, which have a large audience among the people and somewhat compensate for government censorship. In fact, in Iran, we are dealing with a media war in various forms, and what has disrupted the rules of the game in the past decade is the expansion of the use of new information and communication technologies and the formation of virtual networks that connect people to each other and eliminate the possibility of comprehensive oversight of society. The third area of incapacitating civil society relates to efforts to prevent the emergence of influential civil activists and reference figures. For security agencies, the existence of influential and symbolic figures in civil society and the role they can play in shaping public opinion in moral, cultural, or political fields is also seen as a threat to the regime. The lack of acceptance of a large segment of government elites and those imposed on society as 'moral teachers' and 'cultural figures' from above has created a pathological void in this area. It is no wonder that security agencies closely monitor elites and independent political, civil, and cultural figures and activists, trying to isolate and confine 'outsiders' or even push them abroad to prevent them from having extensive connections with public opinion. The pathological harassment of some civil and human rights activists, such as Narges Mohammadi, Bahareh Hedayat, Nasrin Sotoudeh, Eisa Saharkhiz, and Saeed Razavi Faqih, reflects the fear that exists regarding activists and civil activism. The fragmented civil society: In Iran, a significant part of the government, especially its extremist faction, does not view civil society as a living force of society and part of the social system, ignoring its mediating role in promoting collective consensus and public cohesion. For the extremist faction of the government, the civil sphere and participation are not seen as an opportunity for the dynamism, creativity, and progress of society, but rather as a permanent threat and danger. Instead of analytically assessing their significant failure in attracting public opinion and the reasons for the profound gaps in society, they seek to contain and control civil society through security measures. The consequences of policies countering civil society are very negative and destructive. The approach of incapacitating civil society in Iran has practically led to fragility and even the disintegration of civil and cultural structures and a moral decline in Iranian society. The insistence on and effort to comprehensively control the public sphere has also created significant gaps in various aspects of social life, from political demands to cultural domains and value systems and lifestyles. Elites, activists, and the living forces of society do not have access to the tools and conditions that a conventional modern society provides its citizens to shape its internal dynamism. Civil organizations are weak and limited in scope, have limited choices, and the sword of Damocles of punishment, pursuit, repression, and prohibition hangs over them. The endless failures, setbacks, and frustrations of civil society over the past two decades have significantly diminished its spiritual capacity and dynamism. Major social harms and economic problems in a non-participatory society without a dynamic civil sphere exacerbate the current situation's complexity. The continuation of the civil and cultural crisis and the existence of significant gaps in the public sphere, along with the absence of dialogue and public consensus, have caused Iranian society to become fragmented and turned into separate islands. Elections and the experience of civility: The noisy and controversial experience of participation (or non-participation) in the elections of Esfand 1394 can also be considered one of the manifestations of the pathological state of civil society in Iran. A sociological approach to the type of participation or non-participation of people in an event like elections focuses more on the social and individual meaning of electoral behavior. The meaning of a social action expresses the relationship between individuals' goals and motivations. Here, the discussion is not about this or that political project or discourse from a macro perspective, but rather about the citizens' perception and experience of a social action. A review of numerous writings and statements during the election period shows that during this event, civil society, or at least large parts of it, was at a crossroads of participation or turning away from the ballot boxes. The legitimate doubts of society were related to the special conditions of the elections, the injustices of the Guardian Council, and the limited choices presented to individuals, as well as the general public atmosphere and the region. Different groups of people did not go to the ballot box with uniform motivations. For some, political alignment with this or that faction motivated participation in the elections, while for others, participation sometimes occurred to prevent the situation from worsening or as a form of defiance against the extremist faction. The writings and statements during the election period also show little sign of hope for democratic changes in the near future, and it can be said that there was a lot of illusion in society regarding this matter. Thus, civil society made little use of the small 'democratic' window that had emerged to express its opinion. The type of spontaneous electoral communication and information among people in an atmosphere where there was no news of the open political competition common in other countries largely reflects the meaning of people's participation. For many, this special electoral behavior was a collective reaction to assert existence in a society where there is no horizon for fundamental changes. Thus, participation in elections did not mean opposition to meaningful political changes or ignorance and illusion regarding the political deadlock in the country, nor did it imply acquiescence to limitations, just as non-participation did not signify support for democracy and an open society since individual or collective boycotts of the elections were not accompanied by a program and political alternative. To create fundamental changes, civil society must be present on the scene and feel capable of changing something. The existence of this awareness and collective conscience lays the groundwork for a social movement for change. The experience of the Green Movement also showed that limited political dynamism, even based on illusion, can open the way for the expansion of a broad democratic social movement. Non-political collective movements: Another question raised last year was about collective movements with humanitarian goals or the defense of this or that non-political phenomenon. This question had previously been raised in relation to sympathy demonstrations.