In a directive issued on the last day of August by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic, banks and credit institutions in Iran have been asked to refrain from unauthorized competition for attracting deposits and to comply with regulations regarding the ceiling on bank deposits that had been agreed upon about a year ago. In July of last year, the Coordination Council of State Banks, in connection with the Association of Private Banks and Credit Institutions, reached an agreement on determining bank interest rates, including setting the ceiling for the nominal interest rate on one-year bank deposits at a maximum of 15 percent. However, this mandated reduction, as expected, was ignored in practice, and even state banks circumvented it using various accounting and computational methods, offering higher returns to depositors. The Central Bank, in its directive on August 31, has asked banks and credit institutions to refrain from 'applying any methods that lead to an increase in the effective interest rate on deposits' starting from September 11 of this year, otherwise, their managers and employees 'will be prosecuted.' The dizzying anomaly of bank interest rates, which in the Islamic Republic's 'usury-free banking' law is referred to as the bank interest rate for religious reasons, alongside inflation and exchange rates, is considered one of the main variables in macroeconomics and significantly affects the ups and downs of growth rates and the level of activity and welfare of the people. Some citizens deposit their savings in banks and receive interest in return. Banks, relying on these deposits, provide loans to applicants and charge interest on them. In fact, the interest rate is a 'price.' Deposit owners, looking at this 'price,' decide whether to deposit their assets in banks or turn to other markets. Those in need of bank loans also decide whether to apply for these loans for productive investment or for purchasing homes and cars based on this 'price.' Currently, in developed countries, the average expectation of depositors is to receive an interest rate of 1 percent, and loan applicants can generally expect to access bank loans at interest rates of 2 to 3 percent under normal conditions. For example, currently in the Eurozone, obtaining a 20-year mortgage loan at interest rates of 2 to 2.5 percent is entirely feasible. One of the most important signs of Iran's severe economic illness is the very high interest rates that the banking network pays to depositors and the very high interest rates it demands from loan applicants. To illustrate the dimensions of this astonishing disorder, which mocks both the fundamental principles of economic development and social justice, I prefer to resort to an example used by Mohsen Jalalpour, former president of the Iran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines, and Agriculture, to understand the issue. He writes: 'Mr. X, just when Mr. Rouhani was forming his cabinet as the eleventh president in August 2013, brought one million dollars into Iran. He intended to invest this capital in production. He converted his dollar investment to rials at the daily exchange rate and received three billion seven hundred million tomans. He was told that depositing in the bank is more economically viable than production.' Mr. X deposited all his capital in Iranian banks and 'today, after four years, has received about eight billion five hundred million tomans from our banking system. If this amount is converted to dollars and he intends to take his capital out of Iran, he can now take two million three hundred thousand dollars out of Iran. This means that Mr. X's deposit in Iranian banks over four years has yielded him about 130 percent in dollar returns, averaging 32.5 percent per year.' The former president of the Iran Chamber concludes from this example: 'We are among the few countries that annually provide depositors with more than twenty percent in dollar returns, and Mr. X could not achieve such profits without any economic activity anywhere else in the world.' With this dizzying anomaly, which quietly and effortlessly channels vast wealth into the pockets of privileged owners amidst widespread corruption, what should be done? Central Bank officials have resorted to mandating a reduction in interest rates (or the bank interest rate) to solve the issue, arguing that high interest rates deter depositors from investing in productive activities and prevent loan applicants from obtaining necessary resources at reasonable prices. The problem is that reducing interest rates does not come from directives and orders. This initiative has as much positive result as lowering inflation by decree or raising growth rates by command. High interest rates are a symptom of illness, not the cause of the illness. The chaos of Iran's banking network in connection with the recent directive from the Central Bank regarding the decision to impose more control over the banking network to implement the reduction in banking rates can highlight the following points: 1) The Central Bank's main argument for the necessity of reducing interest rates is that since inflation in Iran has decreased, bank interest rates should also decrease. There is no doubt that low interest rates in Europe, North America, and Japan are mainly due to very low inflation levels, and some countries in these regions are even grappling with negative inflation rates. In Iran, the inflation rate has indeed decreased from around forty percent four years ago to about ten percent now. However, inflation expectations in Iran remain high because the roots of this decline have not been eradicated, and potential factors such as a surge in exchange rates could once again return inflation to previous levels. Given this outlook, depositors continue to demand a high 'price' for depositing their assets. 2) The banking network is in such a state of disrepair that it has no choice but to offer high interest rates to attract deposits. Let us not forget that a large portion of banks' assets only exist on paper, but in reality, they have either been burned or require a relatively long time to recover. 'Non-performing loans' or 'delinquent' loans are one of the major current problems in Iran's banking system. This refers to loans that have been granted to a number of real and legal entities, but a very large portion of them never return to the banks. This is the same phenomenon of toxic or burned assets. On the other hand, we must consider the assets that banks have invested in the land and housing market, which, given the severe recession in this market, cannot be liquidated at present. Finally, the third case is the banks' claims against the government, which we know, for various reasons, including financial weakness, lacks the ability to repay these assets. Given these factors, it can be said that many Iranian banks are effectively in a state of bankruptcy and are forced to attract deposits by offering tempting interest rates to pay the previous depositors' profits. 3) Official banks are facing fierce competition from unauthorized funds and institutions that offer very enticing rates to attract savings. In the face of this competition, they have no choice but to resort to accounting and computational tricks to pay higher interest, even while maintaining the appearance of the ceiling set by the Central Bank. 4) Considering all these points, prescribed interest rates are not implemented. We saw that last year's agreement on setting a ceiling of 15 percent for one-year deposits practically went nowhere, and for this reason, the Central Bank had to resort to threats a few days ago to implement the same agreement. If fundamental changes are not made in the structures of Iran's economy and banking system, the recent directive from the Central Bank will also meet the fate of previous directives.
The Problem of Bank Interest Rates in Iran: The Story Continues
The Central Bank of Iran has issued a directive to banks to comply with a previously agreed ceiling on interest rates, but this has been largely ignored, leading to high effective interest rates that deter investment. The banking system is in disrepair, facing competition from unauthorized institutions, and many banks are effectively bankrupt. This situation highlights the challenges in Iran's economic management and the need for structural reforms.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The Central Bank of Iran issued a directive for banks to adhere to a previously set ceiling on interest rates, which has been largely ignored, resulting in high effective interest rates that discourage investment. This situation reflects the ongoing dysfunction in Iran's banking system.
- The agreed ceiling for one-year bank deposits was set at a maximum of 15 percent.
- High interest rates are symptomatic of deeper issues within the Iranian banking system, including widespread corruption and non-performing loans.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran's banking system operates under a unique framework influenced by Islamic law, which complicates interest rate management. The country has faced significant economic challenges, including high inflation and currency fluctuations.
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%