Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Ali Mohammadi Kermani, and Mohammad Yazdi held a trilateral meeting after a several-month hiatus to bring Principlists closer together. This meeting, beyond a New Year gathering, reflects the efforts of influential clerical figures among the Principlists to unify this faction ahead of the parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections. The Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary, the Society of Combatant Clergy in Tehran, and Mesbah Yazdi's circle are working to reduce conflicts within the Principlist camp by proposing a three-pronged model for convergence. These trilateral activities began with the initiative of Reza Taqvi, head of the Coordination Council of Friday Prayer Leaders, after the 2013 presidential election. The significance of these efforts lies in the fact that for the first time, Mesbah Yazdi is considered a key player, and the previous bipolar model seems to have been set aside. Previously, Mesbah Yazdi had issues with the centrality of the Jam'eh-ye Islami and was unwilling to ally with them. His circle and aligned groups, such as the Steadfast Front, were among the main factors of divergence within the Principlists due to their demands for representation. The peak of their disagreements was during the 2013 presidential election, which led to Sheikh Mohammad Yazdi and Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani openly criticizing each other. The first outcome of the coordination meetings was seen in the election of the Assembly of Experts' leadership, where the Principlists managed to elect Sheikh Mohammad Yazdi as the head of this assembly, inflicting a significant defeat on Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. However, the likelihood of repeating this success in upcoming elections remains uncertain. It can be predicted that the aforementioned coalition may successfully form in the Assembly of Experts elections, allowing the Principlists to present a unified list with the support of all sub-groups. However, the recurrence of this approach in the 10th parliamentary elections is questionable. The defeat in the 2013 elections serves as a reinforcing factor that could push them toward unity against their rival. However, the rifts and disagreements are so deep that overcoming them easily is not feasible, and hopes for elder mediation and consensus have limited capacity to overcome obstacles. The post-nuclear negotiation period, assuming a comprehensive nuclear agreement is achieved on schedule, will usher in a new chapter in Iran's political arena, characterized by the confrontation between supporters and opponents of the moderate government. Supporters of the moderate political program are thinking of replicating the outcome of the 2013 presidential election and aligning the majority of the parliament with the government. The Principlists are facing a new situation. In addition to the old rift, part of their forces, centered around Ali Larijani, are trying to define their political position as a middle ground between the moderates and the Principlists within the framework of the Followers of the Guardianship organization. Furthermore, the Principlist groups have not yet shown a favorable attitude toward the triadic arbitration of the Jam'eh-ye Islami and Mesbah Yazdi's circle and are demanding the participation of all groups in forming an electoral coalition. The main variable in the fate of the Principlists in the 2015 elections is achieving a formula for the comprehensive involvement of all groups. It seems that the lack of a universal mechanism is the missing link for unity among the Principlists and the consolidation of the capacities of all groups within this political faction. The absence of a single organization and structure accepted by all factions of the Principlists has made unity difficult for them. However, the support of the leadership and the dominant power structure is an advantage for them. Yet, this advantage diminishes when voter turnout increases, turning into a weakness. In this case, election engineering and the disqualification tools of the Guardian Council, which shares a similar political taste, will work in their favor. Their roadmap is to maintain and solidify the dominant role of the leadership and the institution of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist in the political sphere, considering Khamenei's eight principles regarding desirable political behavior in the political system as guiding principles. The main challenge surrounding unity is the disagreement and competition between traditional Principlists and new Principlists who advocate the discourse of the Third of Tir. There are two opinions regarding the new unity efforts, each of which will influence the outcome of this movement. Some claim that the hardline faction has extended a hand of unity and friendship after their electoral defeat. However, another narrative claims that the elders of the Jam'eh-ye Islami have opened the door for dialogue with Mesbah Yazdi to foster cohesion and resolve disputes. Mohammadi Kermani, who has replaced Mahdavi Kani, has better relations with hardline Principlists and those reliant on security and military layers. This characteristic could make potential unity more accessible, but the resistance of some groups affiliated with traditional Principlists poses a serious obstacle. For instance, Abolqasem Raoufi, a member of the Steadfast Front close to Mohsen Rezaei, expresses skepticism about the effectiveness of the aforementioned trilateral negotiations, stating: "The important point is that the expected result, namely adopting a moderate approach and reaching a unified package, will not be realized... I have no information about the content of this meeting, but this is the same method that has been used in the past to create unity, and we have repeatedly said that it will not be effective. These prominent figures, each with their own concerns and respected positions, are striving for unity based on a duty they feel, but their desired outcome will not be achieved... This group cannot represent all factions of the Principlists, and naturally, their reports and results will remain limited to themselves." As long as this viewpoint exists within some Principlist groups, the formation of a unified Principlist coalition will be unlikely. The Principlists can only achieve unity when a platform for the participation and role of all groups is created and a convincing formula is provided to address demands for representation. However, the main pillars of Principlism may come closer together, and divergence among Principlist groups may decrease. The coming months will reveal the outcome of the trilateral negotiations. However, what is clear is that the Principlists, backed by the governmental institutions they control, will try to prevent supporters of the moderate political program from exploiting the results of the nuclear compromise to advance their domestic political goals.
Unity Efforts of Principlists in the Post-Nuclear Negotiation Period
Key Principlist figures in Iran are attempting to unify their faction following the nuclear negotiations, reflecting deep internal divisions and the challenges of forming a cohesive electoral coalition. The outcome of these efforts will significantly impact the political landscape in Iran, particularly in the context of upcoming elections. The struggle for unity among Principlists is complicated by historical rivalries and differing visions for the future.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
Key Principlist figures in Iran held a trilateral meeting to unify their faction ahead of upcoming elections. This effort reflects attempts to bridge internal divisions and present a cohesive electoral coalition.
- The meeting was initiated by Reza Taqvi to unify Principlists.
- Mohammad Yazdi's election as head of the Assembly of Experts was a significant outcome of these efforts.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The Principlists are a major conservative political faction in Iran, often in opposition to more moderate or reformist groups. Internal divisions have historically weakened their electoral success.
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%