The internet in Iran is becoming increasingly restricted; the expansion of filtering and widespread disruptions, especially since the nationwide protests of 'Women, Life, Freedom,' has led to growing dissatisfaction with the internet situation. The chaotic state of the internet, filtering, and communications, given the daily need for communication, has turned it into a serious topic in the promises of presidential candidates. Among these, promises such as 'ending filtering' or 'dismantling VPNs' have been raised, but the question is what each of these candidates intends to do about changing the internet situation or what they can actually achieve. The attitudes, backgrounds, performance, and promises of the candidates for the fourteenth presidential election regarding the internet and filtering in Iran were highlighted. Last week, on the eve of the start of the election debates, it was rumored that the producers of the famous report 'Internet Quality in Iran' from the Tehran E-Commerce Association, affiliated with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, had prepared the third version of this report but were prohibited from publishing it until July 8, 2024. In any case, in the second version of this report published in December 2023, three factors 'disruption,' 'speed' (bandwidth), and 'restriction' (censorship) were mentioned as the most important internet issues in Iran. Additionally, three government institutions (the Ministry of Communications), the judiciary (the filtering committee in the Vice Presidency for Cyber Space of the Attorney General), and the National Cyberspace Center were cited as responsible for this situation; thus, the president's role in controlling and changing the internet situation is limited, and some of these promises are made without legal backing. The chaotic state of the internet, filtering, and communications, given the daily need for communication, has turned it into a serious topic in the promises of presidential candidates. Among these, promises such as 'ending filtering' or 'dismantling VPNs' have been raised, but the question is what each of these candidates intends to do about changing the internet situation or what they can actually achieve. Last week, on the eve of the start of the election debates, it was rumored that the producers of the famous report 'Internet Quality in Iran' from the Tehran E-Commerce Association, affiliated with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, had prepared the third version of this report but were prohibited from publishing it until July 8, 2024. In any case, in the second version of this report published in December 2023, three factors 'disruption,' 'speed' (bandwidth), and 'restriction' (censorship) were mentioned as the most important internet issues in Iran. Additionally, three government institutions (the Ministry of Communications), the judiciary (the filtering committee in the Vice Presidency for Cyber Space of the Attorney General), and the National Cyberspace Center were cited as responsible for this situation; thus, the president's role in controlling and changing the internet situation is limited, and some of these promises are made without legal backing. However, this triangle mentioned in the report also presents an incomplete picture of the digital governance situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This triangle is essentially the base of a 'pyramid' with 'monopoly and totalitarianism' at its peak, corresponding to the 'Leadership of the Islamic Republic.' The Leader of the Islamic Republic plays three essential and conflicting roles in the internet and information technology in Iran: he is a legislator; the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, based on a decree from Ali Khamenei in March 2012, is a selected and handpicked institution of the Leader of the Islamic Republic, whose resolutions are issued for implementation without going through the usual legislative processes (Guardian Council or Expediency Discernment Council) after being presented to the Leader. Even according to Article 12 of the 'Amendment of the Law on the Structure and Procedure of the Administrative Justice Court,' which was issued by the government of Ebrahim Raisi after being approved by the parliament and the Guardian Council in June 2023, there is no possibility of appealing these resolutions in the Administrative Justice Court. The Leader of the Islamic Republic plays three essential and conflicting roles in the internet and information technology in Iran: he is a policymaker; dissatisfaction with executive bodies is expressed in public speeches, and phrases such as 'the cyberspace is loose' are seen everywhere in the general policies laid out by the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is a financial stakeholder; the Leader of the Islamic Republic is a shareholder in 'Telecommunications Company of Iran, owner of the Hamrah-e-Aval brand' through the Executive Headquarters of Imam's Command and Barakat Foundation (holding of Mobin Trust Development), and through the Foundation of the Oppressed (holding of Iran Electronic Development) and Saba Iran (under the control of the Ministry of Defense), he is a shareholder in 'Irancell'; meaning that almost all mobile internet shares and a significant portion of fixed internet are distributed through institutions under Khamenei's control. This is apart from dozens of small and large startup businesses and Iranian e-commerce that are part of the financial empire controlled by Ali Khamenei through investment networks around 'headquarters and foundations.' In this situation, what can anyone who becomes president do to change the internet situation? What powers do they have against the totalitarian and mafia-like situation under the control of the Leader of the Islamic Republic? And what promises can they make? The powers of the president in cyberspace: The president in Iran is, by law, the head of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace; although this position is relatively ceremonial, the council members have equal voting rights and are generally direct appointees of Khamenei, but the council president has the power to determine the minutes and resolutions. The government also has half the votes of this 12-member committee in the 'filtering committee' in the judiciary through the presence of six ministers and the vice president. However, the most important tool for the government to control the internet situation is the Ministry of Communications, which holds the monopoly on internet imports in Iran through the 'Infrastructure Communications Company' and formulates executive regulations with the Radio Communications Regulatory Authority and grants licenses to the private sector. Outside the Ministry of Communications, ministries such as Education in the subject of electronic education, Health and Medical Education in digital health, Industry, Mining, and Trade and the Central Bank in e-commerce, Culture and Islamic Guidance in the content offered on the internet, Management Organization in the development of e-government, Scientific Vice-Presidency in technology and innovation, etc., are the main stakeholders and related parties of the internet in Iran. Therefore, on paper, the president is not entirely powerless and can play an effective role in virtual governance, although his scope of action is controlled by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and the filtering committee. Based on this and considering the background and attitudes of the six candidates for the fourteenth presidential election, we will compare their electoral promises regarding the internet in Iran. 1. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf: If Qalibaf becomes president, he will not only not change the policies of Ebrahim Raisi's administration regarding internet restrictions and cyberspace but will also facilitate them. Qalibaf was the president of the parliament where the 'Protection Plan' was subject to Article 85 of the Constitution. In this election campaign, he explicitly spoke of dealing with 'chaos in cyberspace.' Thus, like Raisi, he will continue the development of the layers of application services of the National Information Network with support for domestic examples (e.g., messaging apps). At the same time, in the infrastructure layer, he will prioritize the development of fiber optics over 5G as an infrastructural approach. This position helps the centralized structure of the network in Iran, which performs poorly but is easier for the government to control. In the promises he makes, Qalibaf uses terms like 'development,' but the development he refers to is not of the 'internet' but rather the development of the 'National Information Network.' The National Information Network (known as the national internet) aims to create an internal network independent of the outside world. Qalibaf will also facilitate the deployment of military personnel from the General Staff of the Armed Forces in 'digital border crossings.' Qalibaf also seeks to attract the revolutionary-jihadi startup youth generation. A network has formed around the 'Sharif Governance Think Tank,' where several influential individuals in the Supreme Council of Cyberspace trusted by the Leader of the Islamic Republic are active in various sectors, and this group is close to Qalibaf with the presence of individuals like Mohsen Dehnavi. These individuals play a significant role in the development of the 'Sharif Innovation Zone.' Additionally, a club of young managers centered around Rasoul Jalili, the former president of Sharif University of Technology and known as the theorist of smart filtering, such as Mohammad Sadegh Imamian, Eisa Zarepour, Amir Mohammad Lajevardi, Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, etc., played a serious executive role in Raisi's government; institutions like the 'Society of Developers of Clean Cyberspace' or the holding 'Namdar Digital Security.' Perhaps the history and explicitly incorrect statements of Eisa Zarepour, which have created a negative image of him, will prevent him from having a place in Qalibaf's cabinet, but Qalibaf's managers will be from the same faction. In this situation, what can anyone who becomes president do to change the internet situation? What powers do they have against the totalitarian and mafia-like situation under the control of the Leader of the Islamic Republic? And what promises can they make? The president in Iran, by law, is also the head of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace; although this position is relatively ceremonial, the council members have equal voting rights and are generally direct appointees of Khamenei, but the council president has the power to determine the minutes and resolutions. The government also has half the votes of this 12-member committee in the 'filtering committee' in the judiciary through the presence of six ministers and the vice president. However, the most important tool for the government to control the internet situation is the Ministry of Communications, which holds the monopoly on internet imports in Iran through the 'Infrastructure Communications Company' and formulates executive regulations with the Radio Communications Regulatory Authority and grants licenses to the private sector. Outside the Ministry of Communications, ministries such as Education in the subject of electronic education, Health and Medical Education in digital health, Industry, Mining, and Trade and the Central Bank in e-commerce, Culture and Islamic Guidance in the content offered on the internet, Management Organization in the development of e-government, Scientific Vice-Presidency in technology and innovation, etc., are the main stakeholders and related parties of the internet in Iran. Therefore, on paper, the president is not entirely powerless and can play an effective role in virtual governance, although his scope of action is controlled by the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and the filtering committee. Based on this and considering the background and attitudes of the six candidates for the fourteenth presidential election, we will compare their electoral promises regarding the internet in Iran. Qalibaf, if he becomes president, will not only not change the policies of Ebrahim Raisi's administration regarding internet restrictions and cyberspace but will also facilitate them. Qalibaf was the president of the parliament where the 'Protection Plan' was subject to Article 85 of the Constitution. He explicitly spoke of dealing with 'chaos in cyberspace.' Thus, like Raisi, he will continue the development of the layers of application services of the National Information Network with support for domestic examples (e.g., messaging apps). At the same time, in the infrastructure layer, he will prioritize the development of fiber optics over 5G as an infrastructural approach. This position helps the centralized structure of the network in Iran, which performs poorly but is easier for the government to control. In the promises he makes, Qalibaf uses terms like 'development,' but the development he refers to is not of the 'internet' but rather the development of the 'National Information Network.' The National Information Network (known as the national internet) aims to create an internal network independent of the outside world. Qalibaf will also facilitate the deployment of military personnel from the General Staff of the Armed Forces in 'digital border crossings.' Qalibaf also seeks to attract the revolutionary-jihadi startup youth generation. A network has formed around the 'Sharif Governance Think Tank,' where several influential individuals in the Supreme Council of Cyberspace trusted by the Leader of the Islamic Republic are active in various sectors, and this group is close to Qalibaf with the presence of individuals like Mohsen Dehnavi. These individuals play a significant role in the development of the 'Sharif Innovation Zone.' Additionally, a club of young managers centered around Rasoul Jalili, the former president of Sharif University of Technology and known as the theorist of smart filtering, such as Mohammad Sadegh Imamian, Eisa Zarepour, Amir Mohammad Lajevardi, Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, etc., played a serious executive role in Raisi's government; institutions like the 'Society of Developers of Clean Cyberspace' or the holding 'Namdar Digital Security.' Perhaps the history and explicitly incorrect statements of Eisa Zarepour, which have created a negative image of him, will prevent him from having a place in Qalibaf's cabinet, but Qalibaf's managers will be from the same faction. Cultural and internet issues are also highlighted in the third election debate; candidates defended mandatory hijab, continuing the cold reaction in cyberspace.
What Changes Will Filtering Experience Under Each Presidential Candidate Bring?
The article discusses the increasingly restricted internet situation in Iran and how it has become a significant topic in the promises of presidential candidates. It highlights the limited power of the president in changing internet policies due to the control of various governmental bodies and the overarching influence of the Supreme Leader. The candidates' positions on internet filtering and digital governance are analyzed, particularly focusing on Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Saeed Jalili.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The article discusses the promises of Iranian presidential candidates regarding internet filtering and the limited power they have to change the current restrictive policies due to the control of key governmental bodies and the Supreme Leader.
- The internet in Iran faces significant restrictions and disruptions.
- Presidential candidates are making promises about internet policy, but their power is limited by existing structures.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran's internet has been heavily censored and controlled, especially after the 2022 protests, with key decisions influenced by the Supreme Leader and various governmental bodies.
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%