What Will Be the Fate of the Women's Movement in Iran: Independent or Governmental?

In 1989, when the first Women's Affairs Office was established in the presidency under Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, many viewed it as a positive step in the Islamic Republic's approach to women's issues. This analysis continues to be a subject of considerable debate. At the conference of the Foundation for Women's Studies in Iran held last month in Florence, one of the speeches focused on 'Examining the Role of Women's Society in the Fight Against Fundamentalism, with Emphasis on Interaction with Government Women's Affairs Offices.' Noushin Kashavrzania, a senior women's studies expert at Allameh Tabatabai University, examined the interaction of women's activists with these offices during the presidencies of various leaders. According to her, the Beijing Conference was a point of convergence between the Women's Affairs Office, managed by Shahla Habibi during Rafsanjani's presidency, and active women's groups. This convergence, she argues, was a turning point for the identity formation of Muslim feminists in Iran. Kashavrzania stated, 'When women return from the Beijing Conference, they clearly enter the women's domain. The beliefs of some groups change completely, and some lean towards Islamic feminism while maintaining their Islamic identity. It seems that during this period, there is no clear achievement indicating cooperation or follow-up on the issues discussed at the Beijing Conference between the two groups. The reason could be the lack of independent organizations. The legacy of Beijing remained for the subsequent period known as the reform era.' During Mohammad Khatami's presidency and the Islamic feminists, Kashavrzania notes that the relationship between the Women's Participation Office, managed by Zahra Shajai, and active women's groups became more recognized. 'During this period, secular groups become more recognized, and the space for critique opens slightly with the reformist religious thinkers who are part of the government. Naturally, the Islamic feminists have more interaction with the government and are more present at the Women's Participation Center as advisors, researchers, or in promoting the center's policies. I think here the secularists play a more critical role. They participate in meetings or seminars, express their critiques and demands, but their main platform for expressing their demands is the websites and magazines they launch.' Although Kashavrzania mentions that some religious women activists established relationships with the Women's Affairs Office during Khatami's presidency, she believes that 'the prevailing tendency during this period is still to criticize lobbying with the government. (Women activists) raise women's demands but are also engaged in solving their own challenges. (For example) the extensive debate that the Women's Magazine turned into a mainstream issue: do we even have a women's movement or not? Regarding establishing a stronger and more effective relationship with the government, whether we should lobby with the government at all, and how our demands should be articulated. I think the prevailing atmosphere was one of negativity.' Regarding the Women's Affairs Office and the family during Ahmadinejad's presidency, Kashavrzania states that due to a shift in the research and activities of the Women's Affairs Office towards Islamization, the communication channel for women she refers to as religious thinkers was cut off. She considers this severance as a reason for the closeness of two groups of women's activists. According to this women's issues expert, other movements also emerged during this period: 'Women's demands found a platform during Ahmadinejad's presidency, meaning that several campaigns were launched, and they articulated their demands in a much more organized manner than before, such as the One Million Signatures Campaign, the Anti-Stoning Campaign, and the White Scarves Campaign for entering stadiums, which are examples of the organization that formed for these demands.' Although Kashavrzania states that by the end of Ahmadinejad's presidency, the relationship between women's movement activists and the Women's Affairs Office was very weak, Mehrdad Darvishpour, a sociologist residing in Sweden, believes that the independence of the women's movement from government institutions is essential, even though he acknowledges that dictatorial governments have their specific characteristics: 'In authoritarian countries that try to use every tool to legitimize their power institutions, the independence of the women's movement is very important. If these movements become assimilated, they will be more of a tool for legitimizing governments than being able to use government resources for women's benefit. I think insisting on this independence is crucial. However, firstly, the women's movement is not monolithic. Secondly, in a completely independent women's movement in an authoritarian society, if you produce a discourse, it is possible that those who are not feminists—mostly women who are ruling managers—might be influenced by this feminist movement and bring about reforms in government structures. We should not dismiss this. We should welcome any change and shift that benefits women and not criticize it.' Breaking the Taboo of Lobbying in Rouhani's Government However, as Kashavrzania states, during Hassan Rouhani's presidency, the mere presence of Shahindokht Molaverdi in the position of Women's Affairs Deputy has broken the taboo of lobbying with the government. She points out that Molaverdi's previous experience in the Women's Affairs Office during Khatami's presidency and her familiarity with many Islamic and secular women activists in Iran has led to a tacit agreement that the pragmatic part of the movement should advance lobbying policies with the government. The security limitations imposed on women activists, arrests, and the mass emigration of many women activists and journalists, as Kashavrzania notes, have led to the weakening of women activists. She presents this background to emphasize the necessity of lobbying with the government: 'Given the conditions we have in Iran, we must seek ways to interact and establish effective communication. We are compelled to engage with and utilize the potential of government institutions. How can we combat the issue of violence against women, which is widespread in both public and private spheres, and voice our demands without involving various government institutions, both in policymaking and practical actions?' Independence of the Women's Movement and Conditions of Repression However, Mehrdad Darvishpour believes that even if women's activists in Iran are weak, under pressure, or few in number, they must still take care of themselves: 'I emphasize again that historical experience shows that more than governments and state resources becoming a field for the growth and expansion of the women's movement, the opposite danger is more likely. The discussion is not about ignoring the conditions of Iranian society. It is also not about saying that we should not use these openings given the repressive conditions. The crux of my argument is that using every opportunity to advance women's demands should proceed in a way that does not lead to a reduction of women's demands and expectations, does not mix with official government discourse, and does not result in the emasculation of the women's movement. This is a key issue that many women's movement activists are concerned about, and I think this concern is justified. This concern is not incompatible with efforts to exert pressure through publicizing women's demands and even lobbying. Nevertheless, we must continue to emphasize the independence of the women's movement and their non-integration with power institutions, especially the government in a society like Iran.